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This study aims to assess the governance capacity of Transnational Municipal Net-
works (TMNs) active in climate policy. For this purpose, I perform an Event History 
Analysis (EHA) and two case studies, testing the impact of network membership on 
the likelihood of a city adopting a local climate strategy. 
In a fist step, I develop the argument that TMNs influence their constituent’s deci-
sion-making through governance by diffusion, meaning that they devise strategies to 
accelerate policy spread among their members in general, and the spread of local 
climate strategies in particular.  
In a second step, I derive a range of alternative explanatory factors from theory, in-
cluding policy diffusion along regional clusters, the coordinative impact of decisions 
on superordinate political levels, and local factors like a municipality’s financial re-
sources, potential cost savings, and perceived local vulnerability to the repercussions 
of climate change. 
I then test these factors against each other. First by performing an EHA on a unique 
data set containing information on 274 European cities for the time period between 
1992 and 2009, and secondly by examining the cases of Hanover and Offenbach, a 
pioneer and a latecomer in the adoption of a local climate strategy. 
The results of EHA show that TMN membership is indeed the prime motivator for a 
city’s adoption of a local climate strategy, mainly because networks succeed in fa-
cilitating learning processes among their members. Climate policy programs on su-
perordinate political levels are equally important, especially for latecomers. 
The case studies confirm that TMNs are a key resource of knowledge and expertise 
for both pioneers and latecomers. Support from the national government did not play 
a role in Hanover’s decision to introduce a local climate strategy, however, it al-
lowed Offenbach to make a qualitative leap in the elaboration of its action plan. Cost 
savings did not motivate the decision to act on climate change. Rather, it served city 
administrations as an argument to persuade local citizens and businesses to become 
active on their part.  
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1.1 Of Actors & Processes in Global Climate Governance 
Climate change affects people worldwide. It affects them to different degrees and 
irrespectively of whether or not they contributed to its emergence. It is thus a global 
challenge demanding a global solution. Most often, this global solution is thought of 
as a multilateral agreement among nation-states, that is, an international regime 
(e.g. Barrett 2007, Cooper 2000, Paterson & Grubb 1992, Young 1997).1 Accordingly, 
“the discussion of climate policy in science and media has mainly focused on the 
UNFCCC, its Kyoto protocol, and an agreement for the post-Kyoto era” (Sippel & 
Jenssen 2009:3). However, the tedious negotiations at climate summits in Copenha-
gen and Cancun made clear that such an agreement is far from being concluded. 
Given the urgency of meaningful emission reductions and the cost-effectiveness of 
early action (IPCC 2007, Stern 2006), it thus seems worthwhile to identify other ac-
tors and processes through which the governance of climate change might take 
place.  
As a matter of fact, scholars have pointed to a whole list of actors contributing to 
climate governance, including multinational corporations, NGOs and subnational gov-
ernments (Andonova et al. 2009:52). Frequently, these actors join forces across na-
tional borders to increase the impact of their initiatives, thus creating so-called 
“transnational governance networks” (Andonova et al. 2009:57). Unlike international 
regimes, these networks do not draw hierarchical authority over constituents from 
international law. Instead, they rely on soft governance mechanisms to direct their 
members toward network goals (Kern & Bulkeley 2009:319). These include “the diffu-
sion of information, knowledge and norms; the pooling and distribution of financial, 
managerial and technical resources; and more recently, the negotiation and estab-
lishment of a set of norms, rules, and standards outside of the intergovernmental 
arena” (Andonova et al. 2009:63). In the context of this study, I will look at one spe-
                                            
 
1 According to Robert Keohane (1989:4, cited in: Hasenclever et al. 1996:180) international regimes are 
“institutions with explicit rules, agreed upon by governments, that pertain to particular sets of is-
sues in international relations.” Hasenclever et al. (1997:13) classify this definition as the ‘lean de-
finition’ in contrast to Stephen Krasner’s ‘consensual definition’, describing international regimes as 
“implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ 
expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causa-
tion, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules 
are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing 
practices for making and implementing collective choice” (Krasner 1983:2, cited in: Hasenclever et 
al. 1997:12). As this paper focuses on the difference between formal international regimes in the a-
rea of climate policy agreed upon by national governments and the decentralized patchwork of ci-
ties’ climate initiatives, multiplying across Europe, the lean definition of the concept is considered 
completely sufficient. 
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cific actor/network constellation: cities and transnational municipal networks (TMNs) 
active in climate protection.  
1.2 Why Cities Matter to Climate Policy 
Cities matter to climate policy for several reasons. On the one hand, they are a main 
part of the problem: 50% of the world’s population already concentrates in cities, 
consuming 60-80% of energy production and causing about the same share of world-
wide CO2 emissions. On the other hand, they are also part of the solution, as innova-
tions in urban mobility, combined power and heat supply or waste management can 
significantly reduce per capita emissions in cities (Kamal-Chaoui & Robert 2009:5-7). 
In addition, some scholars even assume that municipalities are better positioned than 
national governments to tackle climate change, due to co-benefits of climate policy 
and better preconditions for cooperation at the local level (Kamal-Chaoui & Robert 
2009:64-65, Ostrom 2010:35). Measures like the reduction of car traffic or the exten-
sion of public transport, for instance, do not only curb GHG emissions, they also en-
hance local quality of life via the reduction of local air pollution, noise and conges-
tion, which eventually improves a city’s attractiveness (Kamal-Chaoui & Robert 
2009:30). Regarding the preconditions for successful cooperation, Ostrom (2010:35) 
affirms that local climate projects have better chances of success than international 
negotiations, as they involve more frequent face-to-face communication and easier 
social monitoring of partners, thus promoting the development of trust and reciproc-
ity, two essential factors for effective cooperation and commitment when faced with 
a collective action dilemma. 
What is more, city initiatives in climate protection are rapidly multiplying. An exam-
ple for this is the increase in adoptions of local climate strategies in a sample of 274 
European cities between 1992 and 2009.23 A local climate strategy is an official 
document whose elaboration is based on a formal decision by the municipal legisla-
ture and an inventory of local GHG emissions. It sets a quantitative CO2 reduction 
target to be reached by the respective municipality in a given year, includes a 
comprehensive catalogue of concrete measures for emissions reduction in all 
relevant policy areas and provides a timeline for their implementation (cf. Hamburg 
2007, Amsterdam 2008, Rotterdam 2007, Copenhagen 2009, Vienna 1999).4 The data, 
                                            
 
2 The sample includes all cities that participated in Eurostat’s ‘Urban Audit’ and that are located in a 
country that is a member of both the EEA and the OECD, minus those cities for which too many va-
lues were missing in Urban Audit data (Eurostat 2011a). 
3 The observation period begins in 1992, the year in which the UNCED in Rio de Janeiro “put climate 
protection policy on the political agenda at global, European and national levels” (Kern & Alber 
2009:18). It ends in 2009 as this was the last year for which sufficient data on independent variables 
was available.   
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Amsterdam 2008, Rotterdam 2007, Copenhagen 2009, Vienna 1999).4 The data, com-
piled by the author and presented in figure 1, shows that the number of municipali-
ties, having introduced a so-defined local climate strategy, has risen from 3 – or 
0,01% – in 1992, to 112 – or 40,9% – in 2009. Furthermore, a noteworthy increase in 
yearly adoptions can be observed after 2006. 
1.3 Explaining the Dissemination of Local Climate Strategies 
In this thesis, I aim at identifying the factors driving the spread of local climate 
strategies among European cities. Hence, my guiding research question is: “why have 
European cities adopted local climate strategies in the period from 1992 to 2009?” 
As alluded to above, my primary interest lies in analyzing the influence of ‘transna-
tional municipal networks’ (TMNs), advocating local action on climate change in gen-
eral and the adoption of local climate strategies in particular (Climate Alliance 
2011d, CCP 2011b, energie-cités 2011b, C40 2011b). Since the early 1990s several 
such TMNs have been set up by and for cities, seeking “voluntary commitments from 
[local authorities] for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions” (Kern & Bulkeley 
2009:317). In order to promote this policy goal, “they try to enhance local capacities 
for addressing climate change, they promote the exchange of experience and trans-
fer of know-how among their member cities and they represent the interests of their 
constituents at national, supranational and international level” (ibid.). Building on 
the literature on policy diffusion (e.g. Busch et al. 2005, Dolowitz & Marsh 2000, El-
kins & Simmons 2005, Holzinger et al. 2007, Simmons et al. 2008), I develop the ar-
gument that the various strategies deployed by TMNs to steer member cities towards 
network goals essentially aim at the acceleration of processes in which chains of “in-
terdependent but uncoordinated” decisions by governments to adopt a certain policy 
instrument – in this case a local climate strategy – lead to its broader dissemination 
(Elkins & Simmons 2005:34). In this context, the term ‘interdependent’ refers to 
governments taking independent decisions but factoring in the previous choices of 
other governments, whereas the term ‘uncoordinated’ implies that policy choice is 
neither the result of coercion through a hegemon or superordinate political level nor 
of harmonization based on formal agreement among actors (ibid.). Hence, diffusion 
occurs 
“when governments voluntarily and unilaterally adjust their domestic policies to the 
previous policy choices of other jurisdictions[, doing] so by imitating or learning from 
other governments’ policies, regulations or institutional arrangements” (Busch & Jör-
gens, forthcoming:1). 
 
                                            
 
4 In the absence of a concise definition of a ‘local climate strategy’ in the scientific literature, I draw on 
the documents issued by the municipalities themselves in order to clarify the term. For a longer 
description of what a local climate strategy might consist of see Kern et al. (2005:10). 
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Source: own data 
As Kern & Bulkeley (2009:319-322) point out, TMNs deliberately foster processes of 
learning and imitation within their constituencies, for example by setting up best 
practice databases or promulgating specific benchmarks. Furthermore, they also can 
be shown to apply these strategies to promote the adoption of local climate strate-
gies (Climate Cities Benchmark 2011, CCP 2011a, energie-cités 2011b, C40 2011b). I 
thus assume that TMNs have driven the dissemination of this policy tool by deploying 
strategies of “governance by diffusion”, or in other words, by attempting “to fa-
vourably alter the context of unilateral and voluntary decisions by […] governments 
to adopt a given policy innovation” (Busch & Jörgens forthcoming:291-292). 
In order to assess how relevant the influence of TMNs really is, I will test their im-
pact against other potential determinants of local action on climate change. These 
include the diffusion of information along regional clusters (Kern et al. 2007), the 
coordinative effects of decisions on superordinate political levels (Shipan & Volden 
2008), cities’ financial resources, determining to what extent they can bear upfront 
investment in climate projects (Kern et al. 2005:6-8), the size of local co-benefits, 
determining to what extent the city, its inhabitants, and local business profit from 
climate policy (Kamal-Chaoui & Robert 2009:69-71), and the perceived local vulner-
ability to climate change impacts, underlining the urgency for action (Roberts 
2008:536). 
Figure 1: Adoptions of Local Climate Strategies 1992-2009 
 
In order to evaluate the respective significance of these independent variables, I will 
proceed in two steps. Firstly, I will conduct an Event History Analysis on an original 
data set containing year-by-year information on the aforementioned 274 European ci-
ties for the 18 years between 1992 and 2009. This type of analysis predicts a so-
called ‘hazard rate’, or in other words, “the likelihood of an entity’s (individual’s, 
organization’s, jurisdiction’s) experiencing a given event” (True & Mintrom 2001:36). 
Hakelberg, ffu-report 08-2011   5 
 
 
In the present case, this event is the adoption of a local climate strategy. The corre-
sponding hazard rate is calculated for every year within the observation period by di-
viding the number of cities introducing a local climate strategy in a given year by the 
number of cities that had not yet adopted such a strategy at that point – the so-
called ‘risk set’. In order to estimate the parameters indicating how independent va-
riables cause this hazard rate to fluctuate within a range from 0.000 (no chance of 
adoption) to 0.999 (adoption is almost certain), I will use a standard logit regression 
on the data set (ibid., Mintrom 1997:743-744, Box-Steffensmeier & Jones 2004:69-
71).5 In a second step and in order to better illustrate the actual causal processes lin-
king the covariates to the eventual adoption of a local climate strategy, I will then 
perform two in-depth case studies of Hanover, an early adopter and pioneer of local 
climate policy, and Offenbach, a latecomer with only a small legacy in climate policy 
making. These case studies are informed by interviews with present and former city 
officials, involved in the drafting of the cities’ respective local climate strategies. 
The so-obtained results of my research are important in several respects. Firstly, 
they will identify the most relevant motivators and barriers for local action on cli-
mate change, providing policymakers with information on how to enable further cit-
ies to contribute to the reduction of CO2 emissions. Secondly, they will inform the 
macro theoretical debates outlined in section 1.1, concerning the ability of other ac-
tors than nation-states to contribute to the governance of climate change, relying on 
processes not based on coercion or formal intergovernmental agreement but on 
communication and the steering of information flows. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: in part two, I will present the 
diffusion concept, the strategies by which its underlying processes can be acceler-
ated, and the assumptions about its progression at the local level. In part three, I 
will introduce transnational municipal networks, explain their functioning and gov-
ernance strategies, and develop the hypothesis that these networks promote the 
adoption of local climate strategies within their constituencies through governance 
by diffusion. In part four, I will deduce hypotheses about the impact of alternative 
independent variables on the likelihood of a city adopting a local climate strategy, 
whereas part five is devoted to the study’s research design and the operationaliza-
tion of variables. In part six the statistical findings will be presented and interpreted, 
which are then controlled for robustness in part seven by means of analyzing the two 
case studies. Part eight summarizes the paper’s findings and explains their relevance 
for scientific debate.  
                                            
 
5 In general, my analytical strategy builds on models developed by True & Mintrom (2001), Mintrom 
(1997), and Berry & Berry (1990).  
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2 Processes of Diffusion and Their Accelera-
tion 
So far, the scientific literature on diffusion has mostly focused on the spread of pol-
icy innovations among nation-states.6 Therefore, I will proceed by presenting the as-
sumptions it makes for this level before explaining which modifications are necessary 
when applying the concept to ‘inter-municipal’ dynamics. These mostly concern the 
potential coordination of local policies through national law. 
2.1 What Diffusion Is and Is Not 
Theories of diffusion seek to explain the spatial or temporal clustering of specific po-
licies or policy instruments. Hence, in contrast to theories of policy transfer (e.g. 
Dolowitz & Marsh 2000), they do not focus on an individual transmission from one ju-
risdiction to another, but on the overall dissemination of a certain policy among a 
range of jurisdictions (Holzinger et al. 2007:16). As Elkins & Simmons (2005:33-34) 
point out, diffusion is one of three possible determinants of such dissemination, the 
other two being coincidence and coordination. The term ‘coincidence’ refers to gov-
ernments autonomously responding to similar domestic conditions or problems. Rea-
sons for this might be an external economic shock or similarities in culture and insti-
tutions. The assumption that coincidence has caused the clustering of policies 
constitutes the null hypothesis of diffusion studies (Holzinger et al. 2007:25). In 
contrast, the term ‘coordination’ implies that governments parallelly or subsequently 
introduce a certain policy either because they formally agreed to cooperate and 
harmonize their procedures or because they are forced to do so by an external actor 
like a hegemon, financial institution or donor country (Elkins & Simmons 2005:34).  
The concept of diffusion fits in between the two, in that it refers to processes in 
which policymakers are not formally obliged to adopt a certain policy but voluntarily 
choose to do so, “[drawing] on policy models which have been communicated in the 
international system” (Busch & Jörgens 2005:861). Hence, governments make for-
mally independent policy choices, but factor in the choices other governments made 
before them; the result being an “interdependent but uncoordinated” process of pol-
icy dissemination, essentially based on communication and information flows (Elkins 
& Simmons 2005:34, Busch & Jörgens 2005:865). In principle, the ‘factoring in’ of 
other governments’ choices can take place in three different ways. Through diffusion 
                                            
 
6 Exceptions are for example Berry & Berry (1990) and Mintrom (1997), who focus on policy disseminati-
on among federal states in the U.S.. 
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via learning, meaning that previous adoptions impart information about the benefits 
and downsides of a certain policy model that can be exploited by latecomers (Elkins 
& Simmons 2005:42), through diffusion via imitation, implying that governments in-
troduce policies in response to normative expectations (Busch & Jörgens forthcom-
ing:4), or through diffusion via competition, referring to policymakers seeking politi-
cal or economic advantages over other jurisdictions by either lowering or raising a 
regulatory standard (Busch & Jörgens forthcoming:38, Elkins & Simmons 2005:42, 
Holzinger et al. 2007b). 
2.2 Three Mechanisms of Diffusion 
2.2.1 Diffusion via Learning 
Learning is probably the most intuitive mechanism of policy diffusion. It occurs when 
policymakers in a given jurisdiction react to dissatisfaction with the regulatory status 
quo by looking elsewhere to find a more effective solution to the corresponding pol-
icy problem (Rose 1991:10). This kind of rational learning or “lesson-drawing” (ibid.) 
focuses on merits and outputs of a certain policy, as the motivation for its transfer 
lies in its actual capacity to improve the domestic regulatory situation. Or in other 
words: by drawing lessons from abroad, policymakers seek to combat dissatisfaction 
at home, thus averting possible sanctions like the loss of support or even the loss of 
office (Rose 1991:12). Despite this focus on the performance of a certain policy, 
learning might only be boundedly rational when cognitive biases influence the selec-
tion of information on which policy choice is based. Possible biases include informa-
tion cascades, the availability of information, or the focus on a specific reference 
group (Elkins & Simmons 2005: 42-45).  
Information cascades develop when policymakers in situations of great uncertainty 
base their assessment of a certain policy on the number of governments that have al-
ready implemented it. They are still interested in effectiveness; however, limited 
data, resources, or cognitive faculties cause them to rely on the number of adoptions 
as indicator of performance. In this case, only the decisions made by a few pioneers 
and the quality of information available to these actually program the spread of a 
certain instrument or institution (Elkins & Simmons 2005:43). Furthermore, the avail-
ability of information on a policy model might also determine whether and by whom 
it is taken up. Governments will always rank those models higher in their assessment 
that are easily accessible to them. Be it because they are already familiar with simi-
lar mechanisms or because a policy was first created by an actor with whom inten-
sive communication is already taking place. That way, other more suitable alterna-
tives may be discarded simply because information about them is more difficult to 
retrieve (Elkins & Simmons 2005:44-45). In addition, the focus on specific reference 
groups may also play a role in actors’ policy choice. As Elkins & Simmons (2005:45), 
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referring to insights from psychology and sociology, point out, “imitating similar indi-
viduals is one of the simplest and most effective cognitive heuristics in the calcula-
tion of utilities.” Thus, policymakers prefer to learn from peers with whom they 
share a number of characteristics, implying that policy choices of jurisdictions in the 
same region, with similar values, culture or institutions are more likely to be taken 
into account than those implemented in culturally more dissimilar jurisdictions (Rose 
1991:14).  
2.2.2 Diffusion via Imitation             
Imitation is another type of diffusion process that is assumed to kick in when a criti-
cal mass, that is at least one third, of governments has adopted a certain policy 
(Busch & Jörgens forthcoming:37, Finnemore & Sikkink 1998:901). At this point, the 
policy is likely to turn from one of many alternatives into the ‘appropriate’ solution, 
creating normative expectations based on which peer pressure is exerted on late-
comers. Governments are then urged to respond to this peer pressure through three 
different channels: legitimation, conformity, and esteem (Finnemore & Sikkink 
1998:902-903).  
 Legitimation refers to the desire of governments to gain approval for their actions 
on the international scene, as well as from their domestic constituencies. Both ele-
ments are interlinked in that citizens also positively sanction a good international re-
putation. Or, as Finnemore & Sikkink (1998:903) put it: “citizens make judgments 
about whether their government is better than alternatives by looking at those alter-
natives (in the international and regional arena) and by seeing what other people and 
countries say about their country.” Hence, legitimation is not just about govern-
ments creating a positive reputation and thus winning the trust of their peers, it also 
involves justifying the regulatory status quo to citizens conscious of appropriate solu-
tions to policy problems. 
Conformity, in turn, refers to the urge of governments to align their actions with tho-
se of their peers in order to make clear that they belong to the group. According to a 
rich body of literature in social psychology, beginning with Asch (1951), individuals 
and thus policy-makers, “fulfill a psychological need” when conforming to group 
norms (Axelrod 1968:1105, cited in: Finnemore & Sikkink 1998:903).7 In several expe-
riments, scholars have shown that this need for conformity “is so strong […] that 
individuals will make statements that are objectively wrong in order to avoid deviat-
ing from group judgments” (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998:904, Asch 1951). Or in other 
words, individuals tend to lose faith in their own judgment when they are confronted 
                                            
 
7 According to Katzenstein (1996:5, cited in Keck & Sikkink 1999:90) norms “describe collective expecta-
tions for the proper behaviour of actors with a given identity.” 
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with a disagreeing majority. Thus, policymakers may be urged to introduce the ‘ap-
propriate’ policy alternative, even though it might not be useful in the context of 
their jurisdiction. The reason for this is that deviation from group consensus often 
goes along with the fear of being considered strange, absurd or inferior by the major-
ity (Asch 1953:465). Hence, by conforming, actors seek to regain the approval of the 
group, which mitigates fear and in turn enhances their self-esteem. Consequently, it 
is concern for national as well as self-esteem that leads policymakers to adopt the 
‘appropriate’ solution to a policy problem, thus avoiding “the disapproval aroused by 
norm violation” (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998:904). 
2.2.3 Diffusion via Competition      
The third process through which governments factor in previous choices by other go-
vernments is competition. Busch et al. (2005:151) distinguish between economic 
competition, or situations in which governments struggle “for capital and market 
share for their domestic goods and services” (Simmons et al. 2008:17), and political 
competition in which governments “struggle to shape policy developments at the in-
ternational level in accordance with their national policy patterns and regulatory 
traditions” in order to minimize subsequent adaptation costs (Jörgens 2004:8). 
Most often, economic competition is thought of as a ‘race to the bottom’ in which 
governments alternate in lowering regulatory standards and tax rates in order to at-
tract increasingly mobile capital (Drezner 2007:14). The underlying assumption of 
this approach is that capital is always directed to the place where it can earn the 
highest rate of return. As high tax rates as well as labor and environmental standards 
lower profits by way of increasing production costs, capital will thus be directed to 
the location where taxes and standards are the lowest (ibid.). From this perspective, 
policymakers have a strong incentive to implement market friendlier policies than 
their competitors in order to raise their jurisdiction’s attractiveness for investment 
(Simmons et al. 2008:17), the supposed result being policy convergence on the low-
est common denominator (Drezner 2007:14). Yet, this process of competitive ad-
justment must not always be that straightforward. As Busch et al. (2005:152) point 
out, environmental standards are seldom simply reduced. Rather, governments re-
place “legally binding regulations by softer instruments such as voluntary agreements 
or unilateral self-commitments by polluters.” De facto, this change of policy relaxes 
obligations of the regulated; this is however masked by the shift from an old to a 
new policy model, which is supposedly more innovative and embodies the interna-
tional standard. Hence, governments that seek to reduce standards in response to 
competitive pressures, often import softer policy models already in place elsewhere 
(ibid.).  
Accounts of races to the bottom are popular, however, their empirical foundation 
remains shaky (Drezner 2007:17, Simmons et al. 2008:21). According to Wolf 
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(2004:233, cited in Drezner 2007:16), “the great bulk of foreign direct investment 
continues to go to countries with high labour costs and strong regulatory regimes, not 
least on the environment.” In addition, Jörgens (2004:9) emphasizes that economic 
competition might also lead to ‘races to the top’ in cases where governments either 
seek “first mover advantage”, that is the ability of the highly regulated domestic in-
dustry to quickly expand to foreign markets once standards are raised there (Tews 
2004:18), or respond to demands by domestic industries to raise standards to the 
level of leading markets in order for them not to be confronted with diverging stan-
dards for their products – the so-called “California-effect” (Knill 2008:128). In these 
cases, policies do not converge on the lowest common denominator but towards the 
highest regulatory level.  
Similarly, political competition is also assumed to result in races to the top. In this 
context, governments anticipate either the imminent policy harmonization on the in-
ter- or supranational level (Jörgens 2004:8, Héritier et al. 1996) or the development 
of a critical mass of adopters of a certain policy (Busch et al. 2005:151). In order to 
avoid being obliged by international law or norms of appropriateness to introduce a 
model that does not correspond to their own regulatory tradition, governments will 
thus try to shape upcoming international regulation according to domestic modes and 
institutional preferences. Consequently, governments seek to position themselves as 
leaders in the respective regulatory field in order to promote the adoption of their 
strategy by other governments and/or supra- as well as international organizations 
(Busch et al. 2005:151-152).  
“The result is an often rapid emergence of numerous national regulations in a given 
problem area. Although these national approaches differ in scope or administrative de-
tail, in their sum they form a global regulatory structure which in turn increases the 
prospect of international harmonization or further diffusion” (Jörgens 2004:8). 
 
In a nutshell, diffusion via competition occurs when governments, engaged in a 
struggle over capital, market share for their domestic industries, or political influ-
ence, adapt their policies in order to gain a competitive advantage.  
2.3 From Persuasion to “Governance by Diffusion” 
2.3.1 The Role of Policy Entrepreneurs 
In the previous sections I have shown that diffusion is an interdependent but uncoor-
dinated process of policy dissemination that operates either through learning, that 
is, the boundedly rational search by policymakers for an external solution to a do-
mestic problem, through imitation, referring to policymakers’ urge to conform to 
normative expectations about the adoption of appropriate policies, or through com-
petition, implying that governments adapt their policies in order to gain a competi-
tive advantage over their peers.  
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Up till now, these processes have been presented as if they only depended on direct 
information flows between jurisdictions that are somehow transmitted in an institu-
tional void. However, communication among governments normally takes place in 
specific fora that mediate information flows and also facilitate contacts to non-state 
actors. Examples include issue specific networks as well as IGO sponsored confer-
ences, bringing together policymakers, experts and NGO representatives that ex-
change information and debate policy choice (Jörgens 2004:9-10, True & Mintrom 
2001:39). In these arenas of communication, epistemic communities, transnational 
advocacy networks and IGOs themselves seek to influence government behavior and 
choices in accordance with their own policy goals by promoting norms and strategi-
cally providing knowledge and information (Busch & Jörgens forthcoming:36, Finne-
more & Sikkink 1998:899-900, Betsill & Bulkeley 2006:147, Keck & Sikkink 1999:89). 
Accordingly, they may accelerate diffusion processes by persuading or pressurizing 
governments to conform to specific norms as well as by generating, intensifying and 
steering information flows.  
Epistemic communities, for instance, which are “networks of experts who share a 
common understanding of the scientific and political nature of a particular problem” 
(Betsill & Bulkeley 2004:474), are assumed to gain influence on governments due to 
their ability to provide policymakers with guidance in increasingly complex issue ar-
eas. By developing a scientific consensus on a given topic they set the discursive 
boundaries within which related policy problems are discussed, that way shaping de-
cision makers’ perceptions of the issue and bounding the range of appropriate reac-
tions to it (Adler & Haas 1992:373,375-376). Through transnational communication 
among community members in scientific bodies and bureaucracies, scientific consen-
sus and related policy advice is then diffused, causing an increasing number of poli-
cymakers to adapt their conceptions of – and policy responses to – the respective 
problem (Adler & Haas 1992:378-379).   
Transnational advocacy networks can be made up of such diverse actors as NGOs, so-
cial movements, trade unions, media, and parts of national and international bu-
reaucracy. In general, they “include those actors working internationally on an issue, 
who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges 
of information services” (Keck & Sikkink 1999:89). Whereas epistemic communities 
gain their influence through “authoritative claims to knowledge” (Betsill & Bulkeley 
2004:474), transnational advocacy networks are mostly value driven and seek to per-
suade or pressurize governments to conform to specific norms. TANs often introduce 
these norms into policy debates, promote norm convergence on the international le-
vel and try to convince governments to implement corresponding policies (Keck & 
Sikkink 1999:90). They do this either through persuasion by targeting decision makers 
with powerful messages about specific issues that combine facts with testimonies by 
affected persons, or through the mobilization of shame, meaning that they stage 
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symbolic events during which government failure is publicly denounced (Keck & Sik-
kink 1999:95-97). 
International organizations fulfill several tasks that might lead to the acceleration of 
diffusion processes. As alluded to above, they provide the venues at which inter- and 
transnational communication is centralized and where information flows are bundled 
(Busch & Jörgens 2005b:92-93, Jörgens 2004:9-10). In addition, their bureaucracies 
issue non-binding policy recommendations that might be used as reference points by 
TANs and the domestic public when demanding policy changes from national govern-
ments (Busch & Jörgens 2005b:93). Moreover, international bureaucracies can exert 
influence in ways similar to those of epistemic communities, of which some bureau-
crats might be members. As Busch (2006:4-6) points out, the OECD’s environment di-
rectorate has been capable of defining concepts like the polluter pays principle 
based on which governments have designed policies, of framing discourses and teach-
ing ideas to national civil servants, and of setting topics on governments’ agendas 
that it considered important. 
To what extent the described coordinative capacity enables policy entrepreneurs to 
actually govern by diffusion will be the subject of the following section.   
2.3.2 Strategies for Governance by Diffusion 
Given the decisive role that policy entrepreneurs play in the communication of norms 
and the steering of information flows, Busch & Jörgens (forthcoming:292) advance 
the idea that these actors could engage in what they call “governance by diffusion, 
that is, the attempt to favorably alter the context of unilateral and voluntary deci-
sions by national governments to adopt a given policy innovation” (Busch & Jörgens 
forthcoming:291-292). As Andonova et al. (2009:55) affirm, the term governance im-
plies that actors seek “to achieve some form of public good” by steering a society or 
polity towards particular goals. Accordingly, governance by diffusion must involve ac-
tors with the explicit aim of allocating a certain public good by means of catalyzing 
processes of learning, imitation and competition among governments. Despite the 
observed coordinative effect of policy entrepreneurs’ actions, Busch and Jörgens 
(forthcoming:292-296) do not point to specific cases in which actors have really gov-
erned by diffusion in terms of this definition. Rather, they develop a framework of 
seven strategies that actors could in theory deploy in order to do so in the future.  
The first of these strategies is the “[creation] and [enhancement] of channels of 
cross-national communication” (1). Given that “an impressive and well-functioning 
infrastructure of international organizations is [already] in place” the decisive step 
towards governance by diffusion would therefore be the widespread set up of  “high-
ly specialized communication networks such as issue-specific international commissi-
ons or committees” that provide information about effective policies and best 
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best practice. Examples on which further networks could be modeled are the Inter-
national Network of Green Planners and committees set up by the EU in the context 
of its Open Method of Coordination (Busch & Jörgens forthcoming:292-293). The sec-
ond and third complementary strategies would then be to generate reliable and 
authoritative information on best practices (2), and to make sure that these are dif-
fusable (3), meaning abstract enough to be adjustable to “different politico-
institutional settings” (Busch & Jörgens forthcoming:292-294). Action in these areas 
would increase the availability of information and thus facilitate learning; a goal that 
IGOs are already pursuing through the production of original research, policy-
recommendations, and country reports; the latter being also particularly important 
for strategies four and five.  
These are the “using of peers to accelerate the diffusion of policy innovations”(4) 
and the “increasing of transparency”(5) and can essentially be implemented through 
regular peer reviews like those issued by the OECD on countries’ environmental per-
formance. Reports of this kind let governments know that they are being observed 
and provide them with information on the activities of other governments. That way, 
peer pressure and awareness of appropriate solutions are increased, and imitation 
among governments is promoted (Busch & Jörgens forthcoming:294-295). 
The sixth strategy consists in “strengthening domestic capacities” for the implemen-
tation of policy models communicated in the international system (6). This can be 
done by providing financial incentives and/or expertise to governments that want to 
learn but are inhibited by a lack of resources or know-how. The seventh and final 
strategy involves the “seizing of situative opportunities” (7), meaning that policy en-
trepreneurs should be prepared to take advantage and strengthen the effect of trig-
ger events like major international conferences on an issue that might induce a wave 
of adoptions of a certain policy (Busch & Jörgens forthcoming:295-296). Hence, while 
strategy six is concerned with the removal of domestic barriers, strategy seven aims 
at the utilization of permissive opportunities. 
Overall, one can conclude that strategies are conceivable that could improve existing 
coordinative capacities of policy entrepreneurs and thus enable these to govern by 
diffusion. The implementation of individual strategies can already be observed, how-
ever, no cases have yet been identified in the literature in which several of these are 
strategically applied to enable the allocation of a public good. Against this back-
ground, I will develop the argument that the diffusion of local climate strategies has 
actually been promoted by transnational municipal networks in a way that could a-
mount to “governance by diffusion.” 
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2.4 Diffusion at the Local Level 
Most of the literature cited in the previous subsections to explain the concept of dif-
fusion applies it to relations between nation-states (e.g. Elkins & Simmons 2005, 
Simmons et al. 2008, Busch & Jörgens forthcoming). However, this does not mean 
that diffusion does not occur among governments on subnational levels and that dy-
namics observed in the international sphere do not operate in the transnational sphe-
re as well. As a matter of fact, several studies have shown that diffusion is just as li-
kely to happen between constituent states of a federation (e.g. Berry & Berry 1990, 
Mintrom 1997) or between municipalities in one or several countries (e.g. Eisgruber & 
Simon 2009, Kern et al. 2007, Sugiyama 2008, Shipan & Volden 2006, Shipan & Volden 
2008). This is actually not surprising since the microfoundations of diffusion 
processes remain in place regardless of the political level. Hence, municipal policy-
makers look to other cities for solutions to their policy problems and are subject to 
peer pressure just as their national counterparts are. As Rose (1991:7) emphasizes, 
“the setting [for lesson-drawing] can be another city, another state, another nation 
or an organization’s own past.”   
Despite the absence of conceptual barriers to the application of the diffusion con-
cept to ‘inter-municipal’ dynamics, two important modifications have to be made. 
Firstly, municipalities lack the sovereignty of nation-states. They are subject to pro-
visions from national and regional governments and therefore can be obliged by the-
se actors to introduce a certain policy (Kern et al. 2007:607, Shipan & Volden 
2008:843). Accordingly, policy clusters on the local level may result from coercion by 
superordinate governments, which by definition excludes diffusion as an explanatory 
variable. The potential impact of national and regional provisions on policy choice on 
the local level must therefore be taken into account (see section 4.2). Secondly, the 
extent to which city governments can engage in transnational relations, that is com-
municate and exchange information with municipalities from other countries or at-
tend conferences of municipal networks, crucially depends on their resources. Unlike 
national governments that are embedded in more or less the same international sys-
tem and maintain representations at IGOs and in most countries, many municipalities 
might only have external relations with their immediate proximity. Therefore, their 
access to information on policy innovations is likely to be geographically bounded and 
dependent on the presence of a pioneering city close by (Kern et al. 2007:607). Con-
sequently, any kind of diffusion process at the local level can be expected to proceed 
in two different spheres. Firstly, among those cities engaging in transnational rela-
tions and secondly in concentric circles around pioneering cities that serve as exam-
ples for their direct neighborhood (ibid.). This constellation is probably best imag-
ined as a transnational network of pioneering cities that in turn serve as information 
hubs for other cities in their periphery (see section 4.2).     
Hakelberg, ffu-report 08-2011   15 
 
 
3 Transnational Municipal Networks: Govern-
ing Constituents by Diffusion ?   
3.1 What is a Transnational Municipal Network? 
As mentioned in the previous section, it is not self-evident that cities engage in wi-
despread external relations. Besides contacts within their proximity, they may have 
bilateral connections to a small number of twin cities or participate in local govern-
ment councils on the national, and sometimes on the European level. Another possi-
bility is membership in issue-specific transnational municipal networks.    
3.1.1 Structure, Actors and Goals 
TMNs are constituted by member-cities that are free to join or leave the network. 
Their structure is “non-hierarchical, horizontal and polycentric […], [and] decisions 
taken within the network are directly implemented by its members” (Kern & Bulkeley 
2009:309-310). By encouraging communication, learning and information exchange 
among their constituents TMNs facilitate transnational relations between cities, de-
fined by Risse-Kappen (1995:3) as “regular interactions across national borders when 
at least one actor is a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a national 
government or an international organization.” In general, a TMN is made up of three 
groups of actors: “an international secretariat and national/sectoral co-ordinators; a 
Presidency, Board and General Assembly; and member cities” (Kern & Bulkeley 
2009:314). Secretariats and coordinators are concerned with the administration of 
network programs, whereas boards, made up of a president, vice-presidents and ad-
ditional members, are “responsible for general decision-making between General As-
sembly meetings” (Kern & Bulkeley 2009:315). Board members are usually influential 
personalities like mayors or vice-mayors, representing cities very committed to net-
work goals (ibid.). Member cities, the third type of actor, join TMNs for a variety of 
reasons, including information exchange, access to expertise and funding, or to gain 
political support and legitimacy for initiatives at home (Betsill & Bulkeley 2004:481-
482, Bulkeley et al. 2009:26, Kern & Bulkeley 2009:315). The most active cities regu-
larly send representatives to General Assembly meetings and liaise intensively with 
secretariats and boards. However, in large TMNs the majority of members remain 
passive, considering membership to be rather symbolic (Kern & Bulkeley 2009:316). 
In the area of climate protection, four such TMNs have developed since the early 
1990s. Cities for Climate Protection, the Climate Alliance and energie-cités were 
founded shortly before the UNCED in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 (Kern & Alber 2009:17), 
whereas C40 is a more recent network created in 2005 (C40 2011a). The circum-
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stances of their foundation as well as their membership structure differ considerably. 
The Climate Alliance for instance was founded on the initiative of a group of pioneer-
ing cities and mostly recruits its membership from German speaking countries. Cities 
for Climate Protection is an ICLEI spin off with a global membership structure and a 
European subnetwork that has its headquarters in Freiburg, Germany.8 However, its 
members are mostly found in the UK and Finland were national CCP campaigns exist. 
Energie-cités developed out of a project funded by the European Commission and is 
mostly made up of cities in French speaking countries, whereas C40 is a club of lead-
ing world cities that were invited to join by the mayor of London. Financially, the 
network is supported by the Clinton Foundation (Kern & Bulkeley 2009:316-317, Bul-
keley et al. 2009:26, C40 2011a). About 1400 European municipalities, including most 
capitals, had joined at least one of these TMNs in 2009, the largest network being 
the Climate Alliance with roughly 1100 members, followed by energie-cités with 160, 
Cities for Climate Protection with 120, and C40 with 15 European members (Kern & 
Bulkeley 2009:316, C40 2010c).9    
Despite their differences in history, geographical focus and size, the aim and basic 
strategy of these TMNs is essentially the same. According to Kern & Alber (2009:18)  
“these networks seek voluntary commitments from municipalities for the reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions, they try to enhance local capacities for addressing climate 
change, they promote the exchange of experience and transfer of know-how among 
their member cities and they represent the interests of their constituents at national, su-
pranational and international level.”10  
 
Hence, TMNs have repeatedly been identified as key drivers for local action on cli-
mate change (e.g. Bulkeley et al. 2009:26, Kern & Alber 2009:17, Sippel & Jenssen 
2009:10-11). What kind of strategies they deploy to steer member cities towards 
network goals and why these strategies can be considered to amount to governance 
by diffusion will be discussed in the following subsection. 
3.1.2 TMNs: More Than Policy Entrepreneurs   
The aforementioned TMNs share a clearly stated aim: the mitigation of climate 
change through the reduction of urban CO2 emissions (Kern & Alber 2009:18). In Os-
trom’s (2010:5) terms, this goal constitutes a global public good (see section 1.1). As 
                                            
 
8 Initially, ICLEI was a project of 35 U.S. and Canadian cities active in the area of ozone depletion. In 
1991 and with the support of UNEP it expanded to include about 200 members from all world regi-
ons, treating sustainability issues in general (ICLEI 2011b). 
9 The figure for C 40 includes affiliate members.  
10 The original source of this quote is Kern & Bulkeley (2009:317). However, the latter only refer to the 
Climate Alliance, Cities for Climate Protection and energie-cités when speaking of “these networks.” 
Kern & Alber explicitly include C 40 and use the exact same wording without putting it into quotati-
on marks.  
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TMNs attempt to steer their member cities towards this goal, one can thus conclude 
with Andonova et al. (2009:56) that they engage in some form of governance. In so 
doing, their scope goes beyond that of the policy entrepreneurs identified in section 
2.1.4. Whereas these are conceptualized as actors whose relevance depends on the 
“extent to which they shape, facilitate, and change the behavior of nation states”, 
which in turn are assumed to remain the decisive location of governance (Betsill & 
Bulkeley 2004:475), TMNs are conceived as actors with some sort of sway over a con-
stituency made up of member cities (Andonova et al. 2009:61, Kern & Bulkeley 
2009:319). Or in other words: TMNs govern while TANs lobby. 
According to Bulkeley et al. (2003:244) the way in which this governing happens is 
characterized by one decisive feature. Due to their horizontal and decentralized 
structure, TMNs lack the capacity to steer constituents by hierarchic authority. Since 
the formal bases for cooperation within networks are memoranda of understanding 
devoid of any legal value (Andonova et al. 2009:59), membership obligations are me-
rely of symbolic or political character. This can be illustrated by the relatively weak 
commitments that cities have to make in order to become members. CCP for 
example merely requires new entrants to “take an active role in reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions […] and to strive towards achieving the first cycle of milestones within 
three years of becoming a participant” (CCP 2010:2).11 Furthermore, CCP member-
cities are free to set their own emissions reduction targets with the network just en-
couraging them to pursue more ambitious goals (CCP 2010:3). Similarly, energie-cités 
and the Climate Alliance merely ask members to aspire to reach certain reduction 
targets without formally obliging them to meet a predefined objective (energie-citiés 
2010:6, Climate Alliance 2011a). As alluded to above, even these very loose com-
mitments are completely voluntary on the part of member-cities, since TMNs lack the 
power to sanction constituents in case of non-compliance (Kern & Bulkeley 
2009:323). In reference to the axioms of the diffusion concept, it is thus important to 
retain that TMNs neither have the capacity to coerce members to adopt certain poli-
cies, nor are cities’ reduction targets and climate-related initiatives harmonized via 
them.  
Given this lack of hierarchic authority, networks are assumed to rely on softer forms 
of governance to steer members towards their goal of climate change mitigation via 
the reduction of urban GHG emissions. Kern & Bulkeley (2009:319), building on 
Bulkeley et al. (2003:244-246), identified three core strategies devised by TMNs to 
                                            
 
11 CCP has developed a framework of five milestones, including the conduct of an emissions inventory 
(1), the adoption of an emissions reduction target (2), the development of a short-to-long term Local 
Action Plan (3), the implementation of the local action plan (4), and the evaluation and reporting of 
results (5). After a member-city has reached all five milestones once, it is supposed to restart the 
cycle with more ambitious goals (CCP 2011a).  
Hakelberg, ffu-report 08-2011   18 
 
 
govern their constituents: “(1) information and communication; (2) project funding 
and co-operation (2); and (3) recognition, benchmarking and certification.” In what 
follows, I will present these governance strategies in more detail and show that they 
largely overlap with the seven strategies of governance by diffusion identified by 
Busch & Jörgens (forthcoming:292-296, see section 2.1.5). 
3.2 Governance Strategies Deployed by TMNs 
3.2.1 Strategies of Information and Communication 
Most, if not all, of the scientific literature on TMNs points to the exchange of infor-
mation and experience and the transfer of best practice first when describing the 
workings of networks (e.g. Betsill & Bulkeley 2004:478, Bulkeley et al. 2009:26, Bul-
keley et al. 2003:244, Kern & Alber 2009:17). As Kern & Bulkeley (2009:319-320) 
emphasize: 
“ [these] strategies of information and communication are the bread and butter of 
TMNs. Networks are frequently established for the explicit purpose of creating and 
sharing ‘best’ or ‘good’ practice, and municipalities indicate that the opportunity to 
learn about ‘what works’ from other places is a key motivation for their participation in 
networks.” 
  
In order to increase the availability of information for their constituencies, TMNs 
typically set up best practice databases, comprising innovative climate projects 
elaborated by member cities. However, networks present and grant access to these 
in different ways. Online access to comprehensive databases is provided by the Cli-
mate Alliance, energie-cités and C40 (Climate Alliance 2011b, energie-cités 2011c, 
C40 2011d), CCP regularly elaborates in depth case studies of specific projects, the 
Climate Alliance and energie-cités feature exceptional initiatives in their newslet-
ters, and energie-cités also circulates best-practice CD-ROMs and organizes study 
tours for local officials to visit initiatives in other cities (Kern & Bulkeley 2009:320-
321). The clearly stated aim behind these activities is to foster learning among mem-
ber cities in order to rapidly expand the implementation of innovative techniques for 
the reduction of urban CO2 emissions (Andonova et al. 2009:64, Kern & Alber 
2009:17, Bulkeley et al. 2003:244). However, since best practice studies are elabo-
rated by member-cities and often used by these to enhance their progressive image, 
the transferability of projects may be limited. Hence, many local policymakers feel 
“the need to get behind the official storylines of best practice in order to find the 
real story if any form of implementation was to follow” (Kern & Bulkeley 2009:321).  
In response to this, TMNs have begun to either elaborate lighthouse projects together 
with members (ibid.), or to develop general methodologies and detailed guides for 
the implementation of certain policies on their own (CCP 2011b, Climate Alliance 
2011c, energie-cités 2011d). The Climate Alliance for instance has developed meth-
odologies, guiding members in the elaboration of mitigation and adaptation strate-
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gies as well as in the implementation of specific measures to reduce energy con-
sumption in schools and public buildings (Climate Alliance 2011c). Similarly, CCP of-
fers a guidebook, helping cities with their first steps in climate policy, and ‘grey lit-
erature’ on the performance of specific policy instruments (CCP 2011b). The same 
holds true for energie-cités, which has issued guides on topics like municipal energy 
planning and on how to better market the use of public transport among urban citi-
zens (energie-cités 2011d). These examples show, that TMNs have gone from foster-
ing exchange among members to performing and publishing own research in order to 
not only make information more available but to also increase its transferability. 
Next to accelerating learning processes, strategies of information and communication 
may also foster imitation among TMN members. As Betsill & Bulkeley (2004:486) 
point out, many member-cities do not necessarily take up the technical information 
conveyed by best practice examples but their normative content, implying that poli-
cymakers primarily retain the message that local climate policy is viable and has al-
ready lead to tangible results elsewhere. This proof of feasibility endows local cli-
mate policy with legitimacy, making it a field of action that “local government 
should be concerned with” (ibid.). Hence, the awareness that other municipalities 
are successfully implementing certain climate projects might pressure latecomers or 
new entrants to also become active in a similar way, even if they do not transfer the 
exact practice.     
When comparing these strategies of information and communication to Busch & Jör-
gens’ (forthcoming:292-296) seven strategies for governance by diffusion, one can 
observe a substantial overlap. First of all, TMNs generate information (2) when they 
set up best practice databases, design methodologies, perform original research and 
publish guides and manuals. In addition, methodologies, guides and manuals also im-
prove the “diffusability” of best practices (3) by turning projects embedded in the 
context of individual member-cities into abstract models. Likewise, best practice da-
tabases also increase transparency (5) in that they raise awareness for the achieve-
ments of member-cities, point to the feasibility of local climate policy, and thus 
make inaction less legitimate (see section 2.1.5). 
3.2.2 Strategies of Funding and Cooperation     
The second group of strategies that Kern & Bulkeley (2009:321) identify concerns 
funding of and cooperation among member cities. Funding and cooperation are inter-
linked because the major source of financial support for climate related projects in 
cities, the European Commission, often provides funding only for joint projects by 
several cities. In that respect, TMNs are crucial for member cities, since they either 
facilitate the search for partners or propose joint projects to several members them-
selves (ibid.). In most EU funded projects, TMNs work together with a small number 
of member-cities on a specific climate related issue. For instance, Energie-cités fre-
Hakelberg, ffu-report 08-2011   20 
 
 
quently manages projects like ‘ENGAGE’ and ‘Act2’, the former involving a small 
group of members that elaborate strategies for the greater involvement of local civil 
society in climate protection (ENGAGE 2011), the latter connecting two leading 
members in the area of low energy construction with further cities interested in their 
expertise (Act2 2011). All of the other TMNs coordinate similar projects in which a 
subgroup of their members receives funding to elaborate and implement specific pi-
lot projects together and learn from each other’s experience. Most of the initiatives 
are financed by the EU, the only exception being C40, which relies on funds from the 
Clinton Foundation and other private donors (C40 2011e, SMILE 2009, SESAC 2011).      
As Kern & Bulkeley (2009:321) point out, strategies of funding and cooperation have 
two main effects. On the one hand, they promote network cohesion by tying mem-
ber-cities closer together through sustained cooperation on a specific issue and by al-
so binding them to the network on which their access to external funding depends. 
On the other hand, they enhance member-cities’ capacity to pursue network goals, 
that is, the reduction of urban CO2 emissions. In terms of Busch & Jörgens’s frame-
work of strategies this implies that TMNs “[create] and [enhance] channels of […] 
communication” between members (1) by integrating them in joint projects that 
demand intensive collaboration, and strengthen local capacities (6) for the take up 
of policy innovations by making outside funding available to their constituencies 
(Busch & Jörgens forthcoming:292,295, also see section 2.1.5).  
3.2.3 Strategies of Recognition, Benchmarking and Certification 
The third type of strategy through which Kern & Bulkeley (2009:322) consider TMNs 
to steer their constituencies involves the recognition, benchmarking and certification 
of member-cities’ performance. The underlying aim of these strategies is to promote 
compliance with network goals by creating peer pressure (ibid.). It is however impor-
tant to retain that only two of the four TMNs under study apply these strategies: CCP 
and the Climate Alliance.   
Recognition involves the offering of non-material rewards for outstanding progress by 
individual member-cities, for example through the bestowal of a special status or 
award. CCP, for instance, confers the title ‘City of Ambition’ to municipalities that 
made considerable progress in its milestone cycle (CCP 2010:4), whereas the Climate 
Alliance created the ‘Climate Star’ award to decorate members that have proven 
their exceptional commitment to climate protection (Climate Alliance 2011e). By de-
finition, only a limited number of members can be rewarded, which leads Kern & 
Bulkeley (2009:322) to the conclusion that only the most active members actually 
compete for these awards to further their progressive image, whereas passive mem-
bers are not incited to improve their performance.  
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In contrast, benchmarking is more likely to concern all members, given that it serves 
to measure and compare member-cities’ progress based on a number of pre-defined 
standards (ibid.). In this respect, CCP relies on a cycle of five milestones that mem-
ber-cities should repeatedly go through in order to continuously increase their per-
formance. The milestones include the conduct of an emissions inventory, the adop-
tion of a reduction target, the development of an action plan, the implementation of 
measures and the monitoring of results (CCP 2011c). Likewise, the Climate Alliance 
relies on a list of ’10 Steps’, a ‘Catalogue of Measures’ and ‘the Climate Alliance In-
dicators’ to monitor its members’ progress (Kern & Bulkeley 2009:322). In addition, 
in 2009 it established the ‘Climate Cities Benchmark’ program, which elaborates 
comprehensive activity profiles of its members based on 26 indicators that assess 
performance in the areas of climate policy, energy, traffic and waste. On each indi-
cator, constituents are ranked into one of four levels, ranging from ‘initial stage’ to 
‘front-runner of climate protection’ (Climate Alliance 2011d). 
Certification schemes have not yet been implemented by any of the TMNs, however, 
based on initiatives in Switzerland, Austria and North-Rhine-Westphalia, the ‘Euro-
pean Energy Award’ was set up in 2009 in the context of which private assessors 
evaluate municipal performance in the energy and climate sectors and confer labels 
to cities, showing their progress (Kern & Bulkeley 2009:323, EEA 2011). In the future, 
certification might thus be a way for TMNs to combine measures of recognition and 
benchmarking by linking performance on indicators to the bestowal of a label that 
members could decorate themselves with. 
Overall, one can assume that strategies of recognition, benchmarking and certifica-
tion serve to accelerate two kinds of diffusion processes: imitation and competition. 
Imitation is promoted through benchmarking schemes that compare members’ pro-
gress in the implementation of specific measures, which by way of being elevated to 
the status of milestones, steps or standards become the appropriate policy solutions, 
which cities that want to become active in climate protection should introduce. Fur-
thermore, by conveying information about the progress of others that tells cities how 
common certain practices or performance levels already are, benchmarks increase 
pressure on policymakers to conform to widespread practices and thus further inten-
sify norm dynamics. In reference to Busch & Jörgens’ strategies for governance by 
diffusion, benchmarking clearly is a tool to “[use] peers to accelerate the diffusion of 
policy innovations” (4) and to increase transparency (5), as it informs policymakers 
about the progress of other network members in general and their neighbors in par-
ticular (Busch & Jörgens forthcoming:294-295). 
What is more, recognition schemes intensify competition among leading network 
members that use awards to enhance their progressive image. As Kamal-Chaoui & 
Robert (2009:30, see section 1.2) point out, a reputation for quality of life might en-
hance a city’s competitiveness, especially in the attraction of businesses and staff 
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active in the high-end service sector. Accordingly, local governments could be in-
cited by economic pay-offs to implement innovative climate policies that enable 
them to compete for awards offered by TMNs. As a result, economic competition 
among a small number of leading municipalities might lead to a race to the top in the 
area of local climate protection.  
3.2.4 TMNs Engaging in Governance by Diffusion 
This review of the governance strategies deployed by TMNs to steer member-cities 
towards network goals has shown that they all involve the attempt to accelerate dif-
fusion processes, including learning, imitation, and economic competition. TMNs 
promote learning by setting up best practice databases, performing original research, 
publishing guides and manuals, and integrating members into joint projects on spe-
cific climate related issues. They facilitate imitation by setting benchmarks that un-
derline the appropriateness of particular climate-related measures and pressure poli-
cymakers to conform to practices common among their peers. In addition, the be-
stowal of awards and special statuses that can be used by member cities to enhance 
their green image might induce economic competition among constituents for skilled 
labor and businesses active in the high-end service sector.  
Furthermore, the analysis of these practices with regard to Busch & Jörgens’ frame-
work for governance by diffusion yields the result that TMNs apply six out of the 
seven strategies for the deliberate intensification of diffusion processes. They “[cre-
ate] and [enhance] channels of […] communication” (1) by fostering contacts and co-
operation among members through the set up of joint projects; they “[generate] in-
formation” (2) through the creation of the aforementioned guides, manuals, and best 
practice databases; they “[improve] the ‘diffusability’ of policy models” (3) by 
elaborating abstract methodologies for the implementation of certain policy instru-
ments; they “[use] peers to accelerate the diffusion of policy innovations” (4) and 
“increase transparency” (5) by setting benchmarks that display and compare the pro-
gress of peers, and by providing information on best practices that these have im-
plemented; and they “strengthen […] capacities” by providing their members with 
access to outside funding for climate related projects (Busch & Jörgens forthcom-
ing:292-295). As all this is done in order to steer constituents towards the goal of 
climate change mitigation via the reduction of urban CO2 emissions, one can thus 
conclude that TMNs engage in governance by diffusion. 
3.3 Governance by Diffusion and the Spread of Local Climate Strategies             
 In the previous section I developed the argument that TMNs engage in governance by 
diffusion. With regard to my research question (Why have European cities adopted 
local climate strategies in the period from 1992 to 2009?) and in order to prepare 
the empirical test of this argument, the next step must now be to show that TMNs 
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apply at least part of the governance by diffusion strategies to promote the adoption 
of local climate strategies by their members. In general, all four TMNs under study, 
CCP, the Climate Alliance, energie-cités and C40, mention such action plans on their 
websites and identify them as a crucial tool for the mainstreaming of climate policy 
in municipalities (Climate Compass 2011, CCP 2011c, energie-cités 2011b, C40 
2011b). There are however differences in the strategies they deploy to promote this 
policy instrument.  
Energie-cités for instance offers so-called “ateliers plan climat energie” to its mem-
bers (energie-cités 2011b). These are recurrent workshops that bring about 40 city 
representatives together who engage in the process of elaborating a local climate 
strategy. During workshops, energie-cités provides these city officials with expertise 
on how to elaborate ambitious action plans and incites them to exchange experience 
and to identify solutions that may be transferable to other municipalities. In addi-
tion, it provides an online discussion list on the topic that explicitly serves the pur-
pose of facilitating exchange among city officials responsible for the elaboration of a 
local climate strategy. Currently, this list has more than 500 subscribers from mu-
nicipal administrations (ibid.). Accordingly, the focus of energie-cités clearly lies on 
learning processes, which the network tries to accelerate by “creating and enhancing 
channels of […] communication” between interested members (1), and by providing 
information on how to properly implement action plans (2). In addition, the network 
might also improve the ‘diffusability’ (3) of the local climate strategy concept as its 
‘how to’ expertise is supposedly context-independent (Busch & Jörgens forthcom-
ing:292-293). 
The Climate Alliance, in turn, offers a comprehensive methodology, the so-called 
Climate Compass, whose explicit purpose it is to enable “local authorities to work 
out an immediate climate policy action programme in a very short time” (Climate 
Compass 2011). This methodology comprises 16 steps organized in five modules, 
which go from “raising awareness” via “conducting an inventory” and “defining tar-
gets” to “formulating strategic resolutions” and “developing indicators” for monitor-
ing (Climate Compass 2011b). In addition, the methodology is accompanied by a 
compendium of measures, comprising a matrix of abstract policy concepts and case 
studies from all over Europe, a list of recommended measures that the network con-
siders effective and easy to implement, and a range of further websites and publica-
tions on specific policy sectors like renewable energy, energy efficiency, or cogen-
eration (Climate Compass 2011c). Next to developing this methodology, the Climate 
Alliance also integrated the elaboration of climate concepts and action plans as two 
separate points into its benchmarking system (Climate Cities Benchmark 2011). 
Hence, in addition to promoting policy learning via the Climate Compass methodol-
ogy, the Climate Alliance also attempts to accelerate imitation processes by making 
the adoption of a local climate strategy a benchmark in its system of performance 
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indicators. In terms of the seven strategies for governance by diffusion, this means 
that the Climate Alliance does not only generate information (2) about – and improve 
the diffusability (3) of – the local climate strategy concept, but also uses information 
on peer performance (4) and makes cities’ progress transparent (5) in order to pres-
sure policymakers into adopting an action plan.  
Similarly, CCP also deploys strategies to accelerate processes of both imitation and 
learning. First of all, the adoption of a local action plan is pivotal to its milestone 
methodology as three out of the five milestones that members should attain orbit a-
round a city’s climate strategy. These are the development and implementation of 
an action plan as well as the monitoring of its results (CCP 2011b). Hence, the adop-
tion of a local climate strategy can be assumed to be the crucial indicator for a city’s 
commitment to network goals, especially since CCP expects new entrants to com-
plete the cycle of milestones once within the first three years of adhesion (CCP 
2011e). It can thus be expected that not adopting an action plan goes along with a 
severe loss of reputation inside the network. In addition, CCP provides new members 
with a “Support Service Package” that involves, among others, guidance in the set up 
of an action plan by an expert from the network. This package is supplemented by 
the “CCP Europe Climate Toolkit”, which includes basic guidance and advice in pub-
lished form (CCP 2011d). Here again, a range of strategies for governance by diffu-
sion is deployed. The milestone methodology clearly bestows the adoption of a local 
climate strategy with a high level of appropriateness and enables network members 
to identify non-adopters as laggards. Policymakers thus have to be aware that inac-
tion will not go unnoticed due to increased transparency (5). In addition, local gov-
ernments receive information about the progress of their peers in the elaboration of 
an action plan, which may further increase the urge to follow suit (4). Beyond that, 
guides and manuals provide information on how to implement an action plan (2), 
whereas the delegation of an expert from the network strengthens municipal capaci-
ties by transferring manpower and know-how (6) (Busch & Jörgens forthcoming:296). 
C40, in turn, is a rather special case, since it is not a membership organization like 
the other three TMNs but a club to which leading world cities are invited that have 
already proven their commitment to climate protection (Kern & Alber 2009:17). Hen-
ce, the network does not have to focus on exerting peer pressure to motivate its 
members to take the first basic steps like the introduction of a local climate strat-
egy. Rather, it tries to enable already active cities to become even more ambitious. 
Accordingly, its approach to promoting climate strategies rests on a partnership with 
a leading engineering consultancy, paid by the Clinton Foundation, that elaborates 
advanced CO2 reduction concepts for a limited number of member cities per year 
(C40 2011f). One can thus conclude that C40 aims at the acceleration of learning 
processes by providing outside expertise and, indirectly, funding (6).  
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In sum, this overview shows that all TMNs under study promote the adoption of local 
climate strategies by their members, using a variety of strategies for governance by 
diffusion. Whereas energie-cités and C40 focus on the acceleration of learning proc-
esses by providing their members with opportunities for exchange, guides, manuals, 
outside expertise, and, indirectly, funding, CCP and the Climate Alliance seek to en-
hance processes of both learning and imitation by integrating the adoption of a local 
climate strategy into their benchmarking systems in addition to generating informa-
tion on – and improving the diffusability of – the local climate strategy concept. From 
these insights and the theoretical assumptions discussed in the previous sections, I 
deduce the following hypotheses about the impact of TMNs on the dissemination of 
local climate strategies: 
 
H1: Membership in a transnational municipal network increases the likelihood 
of a city adopting a local climate strategy. 
 
H2: Membership in a transnational municipal network that promotes adoption 
through the acceleration of imitation processes further increases the likeli-
hood of a city introducing a local climate strategy. 
 
H3: The number of years that a city has adhered to a transnational municipal 
network increases the likelihood of it adopting a local climate strategy. 
 
H4: A share of 30% or more of network members that have adopted a local 
climate strategy prior to the city in question increases the likelihood of it do-
ing the same. 
 
H2 is based on the assumption that benchmarking strategies are more powerful than 
information strategies since they urge policymakers to conform to normative expec-
tations (Kern & Bulkeley 2009:322, Finnemore & Sikkink 1998:903); H3 is based on 
the assumption that sustained non-compliance with network goals increases peer 
pressure; and H4 is based on the assumption that the attainment of a critical mass of 
adopters results in norm cascades (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998:901, see section 
2.2.2).12 In order to test the aforementioned hypotheses about TMN impact, I will 
proceed by reviewing alternative explanatory factors for a city’s commitment to cli-
mate protection in general and its adoption of a local climate strategy in particular 
in the next section. 
                                            
 
12 Finnemore & Sikkink (1998:901) assume that a critical mass is made up of at least 30% of actors in a 
given social system. (see section 2.2.2). 
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4 Alternative Explanatory Factors for the 
Adoption of a Local Climate Strategy     
4.1 Selection of Control Variables 
The focus of this thesis is on assessing whether TMNs, engaging in governance by dif-
fusion, accelerate the dissemination of local climate strategies among European cit-
ies. In order to clarify how significant they really are, their influence has to be 
tested against other potentially relevant determinants cited in the scientific litera-
ture. In this respect, two strands of scholarship are important: studies of policy dif-
fusion at the local level and studies on the determinants of local action on climate 
change. From the first strand, I derive additional explanatory variables that poten-
tially affect diffusion patterns at city level irrespectively of the type of policy that is 
diffused, including geographical proximity to frontrunners and the potential coordi-
native effects of decisions by superordinate governments (Kern et al. 2007, Shipan & 
Volden 2008, also see section 2.5). This is crucial in order to be sure that dissemina-
tion is accelerated via TMNs and not along regional clusters or due to interventions 
by other actors.  
In addition to the aforementioned variables, I derive mostly local factors from the 
second strand of research like co-benefits, financial resources, or perceived vulner-
ability to climate change impacts, which are susceptible to determine cities’ policy 
choices independently from external influences. As a matter of fact, numerous single 
or small-n case studies in this research area have led to the identification of a mani-
fold range of explanatory variables for local action on climate change, including mo-
tivators like the improvement of urban quality of life, cost savings, concerns for 
reputation, or the aforementioned vulnerability, and barriers like the lack of finan-
cial resources and know-how, the absence of a national mandate, or competing pol-
icy issues (e.g. Bai 2007, Bulkeley et al. 2009, Carmin 2009, Granberg & Elander 
2007, Holgate 2007, Kern et al. 2005, Kern & Bulkeley 2006, Lankao 2007, Roberts 
2008, Sippel & Jenssen 2009).  
As it would overstretch the scope of this thesis to study all variables that are poten-
tially in the run, a selection was made based on the findings of Sippel & Jenssen 
(2009) who, based on an analysis of over 90 case studies, established a ranking of 
motivators and barriers for local climate governance. In their study, the respective 
relevance of explanatory factors is measured by the number of times a given deter-
minant is mentioned in the scientific literature. On the side of motivators, these are 
cost savings, the improvement of air quality and the perceived vulnerability to cli-
mate change impacts. The most relevant barriers include a lack of financial re-
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sources, insufficient cooperation with other policy levels, and competitive policy is-
sues (Sippel & Jenssen 2009:40).13 Out of these, the improvement of air quality and 
competitive policy issues will not be included in this study. The former because of 
lacking data on local pollution for a significant number of cities in the data set (Euro-
stat 2011b); and the latter because many different competitive policy issues can 
arise in individual cities, which either implies an enormous effort in data collection 
or the over- or underestimation of a particular competitive problem when focusing 
only on one issue like unemployment for example.  
Accordingly, the following explanatory variables will be incorporated into this study 
next to TMNs: in reference to the first strand, the diffusion of policy innovations 
along regional clusters and the coordinative effect of decisions made by superordi-
nate governments will be analyzed; in reference to the second strand, the size of po-
tential cost savings, a city’s financial resources, and the perceived vulnerability to 
climate change impacts will be taken into account; the ‘cooperation with other pol-
icy levels’ variable identified as relevant by Sippel & Jenssen (2009) and the ‘coordi-
native effects of decisions by superordinate governments’ variable from the first 
strand overlap and will therefore be discussed together.  The expected impacts of 
these factors will be presented in the following subsections. 
4.2 Alternative Drivers of Diffusion 
4.2.1 Regional Clustering at the Local Level 
As alluded to above, it is necessary to compare the impact of TMNs on the dissemina-
tion of local climate strategies to a baseline scenario in order to assess whether they 
really outperform the diffusion process that happens without their mediation. Nor-
mally, this baseline scenario would simply be the observed dissemination process 
among all cities in the dataset, network members and non-members confounded 
(True & Mintrom 2001:36). However, this approach might omit accelerated diffusion 
in certain regional clusters, which is assumed to be the prevalent pattern of policy 
spread at the local level (Kern et al. 2007, Shipan & Volden 2008, also see section 
2.5). 
This assumption is based on the observation that a lot of cities do not have the re-
sources to engage in transnational exchange and thus have to rely on communication 
                                            
 
13 Sippel & Jenssen (2009:40-42) established two separate rankings. One based on the number of times 
an explanatory factor is mentioned in scientific articles, this is the one on which my selection is ba-
sed, and another one which uses the number of citations in abstracts as an indicator of relevance. 
For motivators the result is the same, for barriers however the results diverge. In the second ran-
king, inhibiting legal frameworks, collective action problems, and lacking control over utilities are 
identified as most relevant barriers next to the lack of financial resources.  
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with their immediate proximity for access to information on policy innovations. Hen-
ce, poorer or smaller cities are dependent on the presence of a pioneering city close 
by around which information is assumed to spread in concentric circles, eventually 
resulting in regional policy clusters arranged around a central hub (Kern et al. 
2007:607). In this context, local policymakers are expected to only take regional in-
formation into account. Hence, diffusion mechanisms will essentially depend on dy-
namics in this sphere. Just as learning is assumed to depend on the regional availabil-
ity of information, imitation can be expected to depend on regional standards for 
appropriateness and pressure exerted by regional peers. Furthermore, municipalities 
are more likely to compete with their direct neighbors than with other cities across 
Europe (Shipan & Volden 2008:846-847). Hence, the following hypotheses about the 
impact of regional proximity on the adoption of a local climate strategy can be de-
duced: 
 
H5: Proximity to a frontrunner increases the likelihood of a city adopting a lo-
cal climate strategy. 
 
H6: The number of neighboring cities having previously adopted a local climate 
strategy increases the likelihood of a city doing the same. 
 
H7: A share of more than 30% of neighboring cities having previously adopted a 
local climate strategy further increases the likelihood of a city doing the 
same. 
 
H5 represents the assumption that individual frontrunners are crucial drivers of diffu-
sion; H6 is based on the assumption that availability of information within the region 
is crucial for policy learning; and H7, similarly to H4, reflects the potential develop-
ment of norm cascades when a critical mass of adopters is reached (Finnemore & 
Sikkink 1998:901, see sections 3.3 and 2.2.2). 
4.2.2 Coordinative Effects of Decisions by Superordinate Governments          
In section 2.4 the municipal lack of sovereignty was mentioned as one of the crucial 
differences that has to be kept in mind when conducting a diffusion study at the lo-
cal level. This is due to the fact that in this context, coercion, one of the coordina-
tive processes that diffusion strictly ‘is not’ (see section 2.1), is not exerted horizon-
tally, that is, between national governments, but vertically, meaning that cities 
might be forced to introduce a certain policy by superordinate governments (Shipan 
& Volden 2008:843). If this was the case, a policy cluster at the local level would 
simply be the result of a decision taken at national or regional level and not of a se-
ries of interdependent but uncoordinated voluntary and unilateral decisions by local 
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policymakers (Elkins & Simmons 2005:34, Busch & Jörgens forthcoming:1). Overall, 
coercion by higher political levels can be expected to have little impact on the diffu-
sion of local climate strategies in Europe, as climate policy has been a voluntary task 
for municipalities in almost all European countries (Kern & Alber 2009:15, Kern et al. 
2005:5, Sippel & Jenssen 2009:27) – the only exceptions being France, where since 
2008 the adoption of a “plan climat” is mandatory for municipalities with more than 
50.000 inhabitants (Bordeaux 2011, Grenelle 2011), and, indirectly, Great Britain, 
where since 2008 city councils “are assessed [by the national government] on their 
performance in reducing per capita carbon emissions in their area” (Kern & Alber 
2009:23). 
Even though coercion can be excluded for most countries, other means remain 
through which superordinate governments might promote local action on climate 
change – these include the provision of leadership, know-how, and funding (Bulkeley 
et al. 2009:24, Kern & Alber 2009:19-20). Leadership implies that national govern-
ments set the issue of climate change high on the agenda and create a permissive 
environment for cities that want to become active on their part (Bulkeley et al. 
2009:24). This is crucial because cities often demand guidance from national gov-
ernments on how to tackle climate change (Kern et al. 2005:48). Furthermore, mu-
nicipalities have been shown to emulate national initiatives, for example by adopting 
the same reduction targets (Granberg & Elander 2007:545). Consequently, a “lack of 
acknowledgement, encouragement and clear national-level guidance” can be ex-
pected to constitute a substantial barrier to local action on climate change (Jollands 
2008:5). 
In addition to ideational leadership, superordinate governments may also provide re-
sources, that is, know-how and funding, to enable local authorities to implement 
climate policies. The German federal government, for instance, “[provides] munici-
palities with guidelines for local climate protection” (Kern & Alber 2009:19), whereas 
Great Britain set up the ‘Carbon Trust’, an agency that advises business and the pub-
lic sector on how to cut GHG emissions (Carbon Trust 2011). Furthermore, some na-
tional governments offer financial support to local authorities that want to invest in 
climate protection. The oldest and most often cited funding schemes are the Swedish 
LIP and KLIMP programs as well as the Dutch ‘Klimaatconvenant’ (Bulkeley et al. 
2009:25, Jollands 2008:7, Kern & Alber 2009:21). However, further funding schemes 
have recently been set up in other countries, including Germany, France, and Austria 
(BMU 2011, ADEME 2010, Klimafonds 2011). 
Another important provider of resources for climate related projects is the European 
Union. Through several funding schemes, including its Framework Programs for re-
search, the LIFE programs, the Intelligent Energy Europe program and its predeces-
sors ALTENER and SAVE, the EU has channeled finances to municipalities for climate 
related projects, primarily in the areas of mobility and energy efficiency (ELTIS 2011, 
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CORDIS 2011). In addition, in 2008 the EU established the ‘Covenant of Mayors’, a 
voluntary agreement, committing signatory cities to go beyond the EU’s CO2 reduc-
tion target of 20% by 2020 (Kern & Alber 2008:22). Cities abiding by the agreement’s 
rules, which include the set up of a local climate strategy within the year following 
accession, become eligible for additional funding for their climate related projects 
from the newly created ELENA facility (ELENA 2010). Moreover, the Covenant’s se-
cretariat together with the European Commission’s Joint Research Center provides 
member-cities with technical expertise on the implementation of local climate poli-
cies, including local action plans, and regularly chooses so-called ‘benchmarks of ex-
cellence’ among members’ initiatives (COM 2011a, COM 2011b). The aim, structure 
and strategies of the ‘Covenant of Mayors’ strongly resemble those of TMNs (see sec-
tion 3), to which extent it engages in governance by diffusion would be a subject for 
a different study, though.  
In sum, this overview shows that national governments as well as the EU have the ca-
pacity to accelerate the dissemination of local climate strategies among European ci-
ties. Whereas coercion has only been used in two countries and only during the last 
two years of the observation period, leadership, know-how, and funding have been 
provided through different channels by a range of national governments and the EU. 
The most noteworthy initiative by a superordinate government probably being the 
set-up of the Covenant of Mayors, an EU initiative that strongly resembles a TMN. Ac-
cordingly, the following hypotheses can be deduced: 
 
H8: When its national government makes municipal action on climate change 
mandatory, the likelihood of a city adopting a local climate strategy increases. 
 
H9: Strong national commitment to climate protection increases the likelihood 
of a city located in the respective country to introduce a local climate strat-
egy. 
 
H10: The availability of resources from its national government increases the 
likelihood of a city adopting a local climate strategy. 
 
H11: A city’s participation in EU funded, climate related projects increases the 
likelihood of it adopting a local climate strategy. 
4.3 Explanatory Factors at the Local Level 
Next to external influences on the likelihood of a city adopting a local climate strat-
egy, a range of local factors may also determine whether municipalities are willing 
and able to commit themselves to climate protection. Among these local factors are 
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the availability of sufficient financial resources, potential co-benefits that could be 
exploitet by the city, its citizens or local business, and the perceived vulnerability to 
the adverse impact of climate change. These local determinants will be discussed in 
the following subsections.   
4.3.1 Financial Resources  
The implementation of climate-related projects like the extension of public transport 
or combined power and heat supply involves large up-front investment costs (Kamal-
Chaoui & Robert 2009:71). Often, municipalities lack the financial capacity to bear 
these costs, despite potential savings that these projects might yield in the future. 
Hence, commitment to climate protection may be inhibited by budgetary con-
straints. As Bulkeley & Kern (2006:2251) point out, in cities in Germany and the UK 
even small-scale projects have become increasingly hard to execute, as pressure on 
local government finances increases. In Germany this is due to fiscal reforms that re-
duced municipalities’ tax revenues (Bulkeley & Kern 2006:2241), whereas in the UK 
“local authorities are bound by strict central government controls over their fi-
nances” (Bulkeley et al. 2009:17). Along these lines, Sippel & Jenssen (2009:20) as-
sert that municipalities in general have to deal with budgetary constraints, which are 
either linked to a “low and instable revenue base” or insufficient transfers from hig-
her political levels. Accordingly, many municipalities are heavily indebted, which 
further reduces their financial margin of maneuver as a large share of expenditure 
serves to pay interest.   
Overall, municipalities tend to be in financially precarious situations that force them 
to focus on their essential or compulsory tasks and leave little room for ‘luxuries’ 
like climate policy.14 Consequently, the latter will only be implemented where suffi-
cient local resources are available. From these insights, the following hypothesis can 
be deduced:  
 
H12: The likelihood of a city adopting a local climate strategy increases with 
its financial resources. 
 
4.3.2 Cost Savings 
Directly linked to the issue of local financial resources are cost savings, which are 
one of the potential co-benefits of local climate policy already mentioned in section 
                                            
 
14 Compulsory meaning that constitutional provisions confer responsibility to the municipal level.  
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1.2. Savings are mainly related to improvements in energy efficiency, which are sus-
ceptible to reduce costs and CO2 emissions at the same time. As Kamal-Chaoui & 
Robert (2009:70) point out, due to these complementarities, measures like higher 
standards for building insulation can be considered “no-regret strategies”, as savings 
quickly set off the aforementioned up-front investment costs. Hence, these economic 
benefits may provide additional incentives for local climate policy to municipalities, 
which are often severely underfinanced (Bulkeley & Kern 2006:2241). Along these li-
nes, Betsill (2001:401) argues that municipal stakeholders are more likely to support 
environmental policies if proponents can show their short-term cost-effectiveness, 
this being “the ultimate criterion on which city councils make budget decisions.” Mo-
reover, Kern et al. (2005:88-89) state that climate policies are most successfully 
implemented in those German municipalities that do not conceive them as costly 
luxuries but as factors improving efficiency and reducing costs. Hence, pioneering ci-
ties often try to make climate policy auto-sustainable by setting up revolving funds 
that reinvest money freed up through cost savings in additional climate related pro-
jects (Bulkeley & Kern 2006:2246). 
Thus, cost savings matter in two respects. On the one hand, municipalities that are 
reluctant to act on climate change might only be motivated by the co-benefit of cost 
savings, whereupon these would be the primary goal and emissions reduction a nice-
to-have side-effect. On the other hand, cities committed to climate protection might 
be dependent on cost savings in order to finance their initiatives. In both cases the 
size of savings is crucial for the viability of local climate policy, as it determines 
whether and how fast investment costs can be offset and additional projects fi-
nanced. Accordingly, the probability of a local climate strategy being adopted should 
increase with the size of possible savings. As these co-evolve with energy prices, 
their impact should thus be especially meaningful when gas and electricity prices are 
comparatively high. Hence, the following hypothesis can be deduced: 
 
H13: The likelihood of a city adopting a local climate strategy increases with 
energy prices. 
4.3.3 Perceived Vulnerability 
Another potential motivator for local action on climate change is a city’s perceived 
vulnerability to its adverse impacts. According to Sippel & Jenssen (2009:14), espe-
cially adaptation measures are motivated by threats apparently linked to climate 
change, including natural disasters like floods, heavy storms or heat waves. This 
seems logical since improved local resilience directly yields local benefits and pro-
tects local lives and property. As Carmin et al. (2009:19) point out in their case study 
of adaptation policies in Quito and Durban, “one important incentive [for their intro-
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duction] was ensuring the safety of local populations and protecting the natural and 
built environments from natural disasters.” Strikingly, it seems to be unimportant 
whether natural disasters can really be linked to climate change or not. According to 
Roberts, who also conducted a case study of Durban, South Africa (2008:536), ex-
treme weather events,  
“although not directly attributable to climate change, […] have raised general awareness 
of the kind of impacts that may be experienced in a climatically changed future, [which 
led to] increased political and administrative support for climate change-related work in 
the municipality.” 
  
This relation shows that natural disasters can be important trigger events, opening 
so-called windows of opportunity for local action on climate change (Sippel & Jens-
sen 2009:15, Bulkeley et al. 2009:74). Furthermore, Sippel & Jenssen (2009:14-15) 
state that this connection is not limited to adaptation measures. Rather, those cities 
apparently most threatened by climate change are also more progressive when it 
comes to its mitigation.  Thus, perceived vulnerability does not only lead cities to 
improve their resilience out of self-interest, the increased awareness for the adverse 
impacts of climate change also seems to promote a city’s propensity to reduce emis-
sions, which eventually benefits everyone. Based on these insights, one can conclude 
that a city will be ever more inclined to introduce a local climate strategy the higher 
its perceived vulnerability. Accordingly, the following hypothesis can be deduced:  
 
H14: The likelihood of a city adopting a local climate strategy increases with 
its perceived vulnerability to the adverse impacts of climate change. 
 
In the following section, the analytical strategy deployed to test the hypotheses 
elaborated in this and the previous sections will be outlined, starting with an expla-
nation of the statistical method and proceeding with the operationalization of vari-
ables.   
Hakelberg, ffu-report 08-2011   34 
 
 
5 Research Design and Operationalization of 
Variables 
5.1 Event History Analysis and the Dependent Variable 
In order to test the hypotheses deduced in sections 3 and 4 I will perform an Event 
History Analysis (EHA) on an original data set containing year-by-year information on 
274 European cities for the period from 1992 to 2009.15 Event History Analysis is the 
statistical method commonly used to study diffusion processes (e.g. Berry & Berry 
1990, Box-Steffensmeier & Jones 2004, Mintrom 1997, Shipan & Volden 2008, True & 
Mintrom 2001). Its goal is to predict the likelihood, most often termed the “hazard 
rate”, of an entity experiencing an event at a particular point in time, using informa-
tion on a range of covariates (Berry & Berry 1990:398, True & Mintrom 2001:36).  
In this study, the entity is a city and the event of interest is its first adoption of a lo-
cal climate strategy.16 The data used for analysis, the event history, “is a longitudinal 
record showing whether and when the event was experienced by a sample of [enti-
ties] during a period of observation” (Berry & Berry 1990:398). Data included in this 
longitudinal record can either be continuous, meaning that events can be observed 
anywhere in time, or discrete, implying that event occurrences are recorded at dis-
tinct intervals like weeks, months or years (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones 2004:69). As 
this study is based on year-by-year information, meaning that variables can only fluc-
tuate from year to year but not within years, a discrete time model was chosen. Ac-
cordingly, data on dependent and independent variables is arranged in city-years, 
meaning that every city under study contributes one data row to the data set for 
every year in which it is at risk of experiencing the event under study, that is, the 
adoption of its first local climate strategy (True & Mintrom 2001:37).  
As each city can only experience this event once, the number of cities in the so-
called risk set, comprising all cities that have not yet adopted a local climate strat-
egy and are thus at risk of doing so in the future, is reduced at the end of each year 
                                            
 
15 The sample includes all cities that participated in Eurostat’s ‘Urban Audit’ and that are located in a 
country that is both member of the EEA and the OECD, minus those cities for which too many values 
were missing in Urban Audit data (Eurostat 2010a). The observation period begins in 1992 because it 
was in this year that the UNCED in Rio de Janeiro “put climate protection policy on the political a-
genda at global, European and national levels” (Kern & Alber 2009:18). The observation period ends 
in 2009 because this is the last year in which data was available for all variables. 
16 Data on adoptions was collected by the author, relying mostly on information found on city’s websi-
tes, the local climate strategies themselves, and in other official publications. In cases of uncertain-
ty, city administrations were contacted by e-mail or by phone.  
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by the number of cities that adopt a local climate strategy that year (Berry & Berry 
1990:398). Hence, cities do not contribute additional data rows to the data set after 
they have adopted a local climate strategy. The dependent variable in EHA, the haz-
ard rate, indicating the likelihood of an event occurring in a given year, then is cal-
culated by dividing the number of adopters by the number of non-adopters, i.e. the 
risk set (True & Mintrom 2001:36). As this dependent variable is a probability, it is of 
course unobserved. The observed dependent variable on which it is based is a dummy 
indicating whether a city did (1) or did not (0) adopt a local climate strategy in a 
given city-year (Berry & Berry 1990:398). Hence, it is represented as a series of bi-
nary outcomes, making logit the appropriate type of regression for the estimation of 
parameters (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones 2004:70). 
As alluded to above, the point of EHA is to explain how independent variables cause 
the hazard-rate, or in other words, the likelihood of a city adopting a local climate 
strategy, to systematically move between years (True & Mintrom 2001:36). Informa-
tion on independent variables is recorded for every city-year in the data set and can 
thus be time constant or time varying. How they are operationalized will be dis-
cussed in the following subsections.       
5.2 Operationalization of Independent Variables 
5.2.1 TMN Impact (H1-H4) 
In section 3.3 four hypotheses were deduced about the impact of TMNs on the likeli-
hood of a city adopting a local climate strategy: 
 
H1: Membership in a transnational municipal network increases the likelihood 
of a city adopting a local climate strategy. 
 
H2: Membership in a transnational municipal network that promotes adoption 
through the acceleration of imitation processes further increases the likeli-
hood of a city introducing a local climate strategy. 
 
H3: The number of years that a city has adhered to a transnational municipal 
network increases the likelihood of it adopting a local climate strategy. 
 
H4: A share of 30% or more of network members that have adopted a local 
climate strategy prior to the city in question increases the likelihood of it do-
ing the same. 
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In H1 and H2 the independent variable is TMN membership. It is operationalized by 
coding four dummy variables, one for every TMN under study, indicating whether a 
city observed in year t had been a member of the respective network in t-1. The 
time lag is incorporated into the variable in order to make sure that accession to the 
network really happened prior to the adoption of a local climate strategy. The same 
is done with all other variables as well (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones 2004:111). The 
incorporation of one variable per network has the convenient effect to enable the in-
terpretation of differences in their significance with regard to the strategies that 
networks employ to foster the diffusion of local climate strategies (see section 3.3). 
In three cases, data on membership and accession dates were kindly provided by the 
networks (see annex I), in one case, they were retrieved from the network’s website 
(C40 2011g).  
In H3 the independent variable is the number of years during which a city has ad-
hered to one or more of the TMNs. It is operationalized by simply counting the num-
ber of years between year t and a city’s accession to the network. As the counting 
process is based on entries in the dummy variables indicating TMN membership, the 
time lag is automatically incorporated into this variable. In cases where a city is a 
member of more than one network, membership years are added. This is consistent 
with the purpose of this independent variable, which is supposed to measure peer-
pressure caused by sustained non-compliance with network goals (see section 3.3). 
Adding membership years then simply reflects the assumed increase in peer-pressure 
caused by non-conformity to normative expectations in more than one network. 
In H4 the independent variable is the share of a city’s peers that had adopted a local 
climate strategy in t-1. This variable is operationalized by dividing the total number 
of network members by the number of network members that adopted a local cli-
mate strategy between the beginning of the observation period and t-1. In cases 
where a city is a member in more than one network, shares for the respective net-
works are added and then divided by the number of networks in which a city partici-
pates – the result being the share of this city’s peers that had adopted a local cli-
mate strategy in t-1 (True & Mintrom 2001:42). As this variable is supposed to specify 
the impact of norm cascades, which are assumed to be triggered when a critical mass 
of at least 30% of adopters is reached, it has to take the expected non-linear effect 
of the share of previous adopters on the likelihood of a city adopting a local climate 
strategy into account (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998:901, see section 2.2.2). Hence, it is 
transformed into a categorical variable that indicates whether more or less than 30% 
of a city’s peers had adopted a local climate strategy in t-1. 
In sum, these independent variables are not only suitable to depict the general ef-
fect of TMN membership on the likelihood of a city adopting a local climate strategy. 
Rather, they are constructed to also specify the distinct impact of imitation proc-
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esses by enabling the interpretation of differences in significance between networks 
and by measuring peer-pressure as well as the effect of norm-cascades. 
5.2.2 Regional Clusters (H5-H7)   
In section 4.2.1 three hypotheses were deduced concerning the influence of regional 
clusters on the overall dissemination of local climate strategies: 
 
H5: Proximity to a frontrunner increases the likelihood of a city adopting a lo-
cal climate strategy. 
 
H6: The number of neighboring cities having previously adopted a local climate 
strategy increases the likelihood of a city doing the same. 
 
H7: A share of more than 30% of neighboring cities having previously adopted a 
local climate strategy further increases the likelihood of a city doing the 
same. 
 
In order to operationalize the independent variables in H5 to H7 a measure of prox-
imity had to be specified. Given that the data set mostly contains information on big-
ger cities that are located across Europe, a rather large radius of 100 kilometers was 
fixed as a city’s immediate proximity. This happened quite arbitrarily and certainly 
constitutes a weakness of the research design. However, no exact measure of 
proximity, besides contiguity (Shipan & Volden 2008:847), could be found in the lit-
erature on policy diffusion at the local level, therefore, this procedure was inevita-
ble.  
Hence, in H5 the independent variable is the presence of a frontrunner within a 
100km radius around a given city. A frontrunner is defined as a city that adopted a 
local climate strategy during the first wave of adoptions, that is, between 1992 and 
2001. This definition is based on the observation presented in figure 1 that the dis-
semination of local climate strategies has so far proceeded in three waves. The afo-
rementioned long and flat wave from 1992 to 2001, a second shorter and larger wave 
from 2002 to 2006, and the third extremely steep wave from 2007 to 2009 (see secti-
on 1.3). The variable is operationalized as a dichotomous dummy, indicating whether 
a pioneering city was present in t-1 (1) or not (0). As frontrunners have introduced 
local climate strategies at different times, the variable will indicate the presence of 
a pioneering city from the year in which it adopted its action plan onwards.  
In H6 the independent variable is the absolute number of neighbors within a city’s 
proximity that had introduced a local climate strategy in t-1. This variable is sup-
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posed to reflect the availability of information within a city’s region, which is as-
sumed to increase with the number of cities from which lessons could potentially be 
drawn. It thus reflects the significance of learning processes as well as the assump-
tion made by Kern et al. (2007:616) that information diffuses faster among cities that 
are located in conurbations like the Ruhr area. 
H7 is the regional equivalent of H4, which was operationalized in the previous sec-
tion. Here, the independent variable is the share of peers within a city’s proximity 
that had adopted a local climate strategy in t-1. This share is calculated by dividing 
the cumulated number of adopters in a given year by the total number of peers 
within a city’s proximity. In order to approximate the effect of norm cascades, this 
variable then is transformed into a categorical variable indicating whether the share 
of adopters was below or above 30% in t-1 (see section 5.2.1).  
In sum, the variables reflecting the significance of regional proximity allow for the 
differentiation between learning and imitation processes within regional clusters. 
Whereas the absolute number of adopters in a city’s neighborhood indicates the avai-
lability of information and thus the significance of learning processes (see section 
2.2.1), the share of previous adopters reflects the importance of peer pressure and 
thus the relevance of imitation processes (see section 2.2.2). Similarly, the presence 
of a frontrunner also serves as an indicator for the relevance of imitation, as the lit-
erature assumes that laggards emulate the behavior of pioneering cities rather than 
using them as sources of information (Kern et al. 2007:607, Shipan & Volden 
2008:847). 
5.2.3 Coordination on Superordinate Political Levels (H8-H11) 
In section 4.2.2 four hypotheses were deduced concerning the coordinative effect of 
decisions by superordinate governments: 
  
H8: When its national government makes municipal action on climate change 
mandatory, the likelihood of a city adopting a local climate strategy increases. 
 
H9: Strong national commitment to climate protection increases the likelihood 
of a city located in the respective country to introduce a local climate strat-
egy. 
 
H10: The availability of resources from its national government increases the 
likelihood of a city adopting a local climate strategy. 
 
H11: A city’s participation in EU funded, climate related projects increases the 
likelihood of it adopting a local climate strategy. 




In H8 the independent variable is the presence of a mandatory requirement for mu-
nicipalities to implement climate policies imposed by the national government. It is 
operationalized by coding a dummy variable that indicates whether in year t such re-
gulation had been adopted in the country in which a city is located. Exceptionally, no 
time lag is incorporated in this case, as the legislative process in France, one of the 
two countries that introduced mandatory requirements in 2008, the other being 
Great Britain (Bordeaux 2011, ADEME 2010, Kern & Alber 2009:23), already involved 
cities as early as 2007 and thus gave them the chance to anticipate coming require-
ments (Grenelle 2011b). As this variable indicates the relevance of coercion in 
France and Great Britain from 2008 to 2009, a high significance level would thus indi-
cate that diffusion had not been the decisive driver of dissemination in these two 
countries during these two years (see section 2.1). 
In H9 the independent variable is national commitment to climate protection, which 
is supposed to reflect to what extent national governments provide leadership on the 
issue. In order to measure commitment, a basic indicator was built showing whether 
in t-1 a national climate strategy, a carbon tax, and a feed-in tariff had been in pla-
ce in the country in which a given city is located. For every adopted measure, one 
point is allocated on the indicator, meaning that it fluctuates between 0 and 3. The 
three measures were chosen because they have an agenda-setting function (national 
climate strategy), directly affect citizens’ and corporate finances (carbon tax), or in-
volve the allocation of subsidies (feed-in-tariffs), and should thus be publicly notice-
able signs of a national government’s commitment to climate protection. Further-
more, feed-in-tariffs and carbon taxes provide financial incentives for action to mu-
nicipalities and their citizens alike. Data on the adoption of national climate strate-
gies was retrieved from the IEA’s Climate Change Database (IEA 2011), whereas the 
data on national adoptions of feed-in-tariffs and carbon taxes was kindly provided by 
Busch & Jörgens who collected it in the context of their dissertation project (forth-
coming).  
In H10 the independent variable is the availability of national resources, that is, 
funding and know-how, for climate related projects in municipalities. In order to op-
erationalize this variable, another basic indicator was built, showing whether na-
tional funding or other support schemes had been in place in t-1. On this indicator 
one point is allocated for the availability of expertise, whereas two points are allo-
cated when funding is available. In practice, funding comes along with expertise; 
hence, there are no cases where only a funding scheme is in place at national level 
(e.g. BMU 2011, ADEME 2010, Kern & Alber 2009:21, Granberg & Elander 2007:543). 
The data used to built this indicator was retrieved from several sources, including 
the IEA’s Climate Change Database (IEA 2011), secondary literature (Kern & Alber 
2009, Bulkeley et al. 2009, Sippel & Jenssen 2009, Granberg & Elander 2007, IEA 
Hakelberg, ffu-report 08-2011   40 
 
 
2009), and websites of national environmental ministries and agencies (e.g. BMU 
2011, ADEME 2010, Klimafonds 2011, klima:aktiv 2011, Carbon Trust 2011, Energy 
Saving Trust 2011, Klimp 2011, KEMIN 2009, SFOE 2011). 
In order to operationalize independent variables in H8 to H10, data measured at the 
national level is used to explain behavior at the local level. This means that one 
measurement, i.e. the presence of mandatory requirements for municipalities, ap-
pears several times in the data set as every city underlying these requirements con-
tributes the same value. This does not challenge results in general, but a potential 
exaggeration of the significance levels of those variables using national data needs to 
be taken into account when interpreting results. 
This inconvenience could be avoided in the operationalization of H11. Here, the in-
dependent variable is a city’s participation in climate related projects funded by the 
EU. Unlike most national governments, the EU provides access to comprehensive pro-
ject databases that indicate which cities participated and received financial support 
(CORDIS 2011, Intelligent Energy Projects 2011, LIFE Projects 2011, COM 2011c).17 Ac-
cordingly, an indicator could be build, showing in how many EU funded projects or i-
nitiatives a city had participated between the beginning of the observation period 
and t-1. This indicator includes information on membership in the Covenant of May-
ors, and on participation in joint and unilateral projects funded under the following 
programs: the Framework Programmes for research, the LIFE program, the Intelligent 
Energy Europe program, and its predecessors ALTENER 1 and 2 and SAVE 1 and 2. The 
search confirmed that these are the relevant sources for financial support for climate 
related projects in municipalities (ELTIS 2011, Act 2 2001, SESAC 2011, SMILE 2009, 
ENGAGE 2011).18 19 20 21 However, as search results were used to build a single indica-
                                            
 
17 Important exceptions are the Austrian, Swedish, and German governments that provide access to da-
tabases indicating which cities have received funding for climate related projects (KLIMP 2011b, 
Klimafonds 2011, BMU 2011) 
18 Funds in this area might also be obtained from the INTERREG program; however, no searchable data-
base exists that provides information on projects for the entire observation period. 
19 In order to find relevant projects funded under the Framework Programmes and the ALTENER and 
SAVE programs, the CORDIS database was searched, using the key words municipality OR town OR ci-
ty OR “local authority” and selecting the following subjects: Renewable Sources of Energy, Energy 
Saving, Biofuels, Hydrogen and Fuel Cells, Other Energy Topics, Environmental Protection, Waste 
Management, Sustainable Development, Climate Change & Carbon Cycle Research. This search yiel-
ded 1119 results which were browsed one by one in order to find those projects were a city or seve-
ral cities received funding in order to implement or participate in a climate related project.  
20 In order to find relevant projects funded under the Intelligent Energy Europe program its database 
was searched using the keywords municipality OR town OR city OR “local authority”. Again, obtained 
results were browsed for projects in which a city government or a company fully or partly owned by 
the city obtained funding for a climate related project.  
21 In order to find relevant projects funded under the LIFE program, its database was search selecting 
local authority as beneficiary and climate protection, emissions reduction, energy saving, and 
greenhouse gas as keywords. The keywords were selected one by one and results were browsed for 
relevant projects each time.  
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tor, the variable does not yield significance levels for individual programs, rather it 
indicates – and is supposed to indicate – the amount of EU support in general that 
was received by a given city over the course of the observation period.   
Overall, the variables representing the coordinative influence of national govern-
ments measure coercion and leadership, as well as the availability of know-how and 
funding. In these cases, national data is used to explain behavior at the local level. 
Hence, the significance of these variables may be overstated. This inconvenient does 
not affect the variable displaying the received EU support, though, as distinct data 
could be retrieved for each city in the data set.   
5.2.4 Local Determinants (H12-H14) 
In sections 4.3.1 to 4.3.2 the following hypotheses were derived about the impact of 
local factors on the likelihood of a city adopting a local climate strategy: 
 
H12: The likelihood of a city adopting a local climate strategy increases with 
its financial resources. 
 
H13: The likelihood of a city adopting a local climate strategy increases with 
energy prices. 
 
H14: The likelihood of a city adopting a local climate strategy increases with 
its perceived vulnerability to the adverse impacts of climate change. 
 
In H12 the independent variable are a city’s financial resources. In this study, these 
are approximated by local GDP per capita in t-1. Local economic performance is as-
sumed to be a good proxy for the size of a city’s tax revenues; however, an impor-
tant qualification has to be made. As Bulkeley & Kern (2006:2241) point out, munici-
pal revenues crucially depend on a country’s fiscal organization, meaning that fiscal 
reforms decided at the national level determine which kind and what share of taxes 
municipalities receive. Thus, despite very high local productivity, tax revenues may 
be low if higher political levels instead of municipalities benefit from them. There-
fore, the percentage of debt in municipal budgets would have been a slightly better 
proxy of local investment capacity. Unfortunately, for reasons of data availability, 
this measure could not be used. In contrast, the data on local GDP per capita could 
be retrieved from Eurostat (2011b, 2011c) for all municipalities for almost the entire 
observation period, thus minimizing the number of missing values in the data set. 
In H13 energy prices are the independent variable. This indicator is used to approxi-
mate potential cost savings resulting from improvements in energy efficiency, as the-
se are more important when prices are high. This variable is operationalized by mea-
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measuring the development of national energy prices between t-3 and t-1. The two-
year time span was chosen in order to display a general trend instead of yearly fluc-
tuations that might be misleading. In addition, national data had to be used because 
of the non-availability of data on local prices. Hence, the impact of this variable on 
the dependent variable might be overstated, which has to be kept in mind when 
interpreting results (see section 5.2.3). Absolute index values of national energy 
prices were retrieved from the OECD and then used to calculate the aforementioned 
percentage changes (OECD.Stat 2011). 
The independent variable in H14 is perceived vulnerability to the adverse impacts of 
climate change. Two indicators are used in its operationalization. The first one dis-
plays the number of deaths caused by extreme weather events in t-2 and t-1 in the 
country in which a city is located. The two-year time span was chosen in order to ac-
count for a possible delay of reaction that may be caused by the time needed to 
elaborate and adopt a local climate strategy in response to a changed perception of 
local vulnerability. Here again, national data is used for reasons of availability, which 
has to be considered when interpreting results. Nonetheless, it can be assumed that 
extreme weather events in a given country will have an effect on perceived vulner-
ability across that country, due to nationwide media coverage. The data on disaster 
deaths was retrieved from the Emergency Events Database maintained by the WHO’s 
Collaborating Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) (EM-Dat 
2011). The second indicator used to approximate perceived vulnerability shows 
whether a city is located at the coast or not. As climate change is often associated 
with rising sea levels caused by the melting of the arctic ice shield (IPCC 2007), cities 
at the coast should be more vulnerable to the impacts of climate change than in-land 
cities. Municipalities receive coastal status when they are located in one of the 
costal regions identified by Eurostat in its Yearbook of the Regions 2010 (Eurostat 
2010). 
Independent variables, their operationalization and data sources discussed in this and 
the previous subsections are summed up in table 1. In the following section the re-
sults of Event History Analysis, retrieved using these variables, will be presented. 
First by discussing a range of descriptive measures and then by interpreting the re-
sults of inference statistics obtained using logit. 
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Table 1: dependent Variables, Operationalization, and Sources 
Variable Category Variable Name Operationalization Sign Data Source 
CCP Dummy variable indicating whether a city had been a member of the CCP network in t-1 (1) or 
not (0). 
+ E-mails received from CCP staff (see 
annex I) 
CA Dummy variable indicating whether a city had been a member of the Climate Alliance in t-1 
(1) or not (0). 
+ E-mails received from Climate Alliance 
Staff (see annex I) 
EC Dummy variable indicating whether a city had been a member of energie-cités in t-1 (1) or not 
(0). 
+ E-mails received from energie-cités 
staff (see annex I) 
C40 Dummy variable indicating whether a city had been a member of C40 in t-1 (1) or not (0). + C40 2011g 
NETYEARS Number of years that a city has been a member in one of the TMNs. In cases were a city par-
ticipates in more than one network, membership years are added.  
+ Based on CCP, CA, EC, C40 
TMN Impact (sec-
tion 5.2.1) 
NETPEERSKAT Categorical variable indicating whether a share of 0, less (1) or more (2) than 30% of members 
in a TMN in which a city participates had adopted a local climate strategy in t-1. In cases in 
which a city is a member of more than one TMN, shares are added and divided by the number 
of networks in which a city participates.  
+ Based on the dependent variable and 
CCP, CA, EC, C40. Calculations by the 
author. Operationalization based on 
True & Mintrom (2001). 
LOCPIO Dummy variable indicating whether a pioneer was located within a 100km radius around a 
given city in t-1. Pioneers are cities that belong to the first wave of adopters (1992-2001). 
+ Based on the dependent variable. 
Neighboring cities were identified us-
ing Diercke (1996).  
LOCLEARN Variable indicating the absolute number of cities within a 100km radius that had adopted a lo-
cal climate strategy in t-1.  
+ Based on the dependent variable. 
Neighboring cities were identified us-
ing Diercke (1996). 
Regional Clusters 
(section 5.2.2) 
LOCPEERSKAT Categorical variable indicating whether a share of 0, less (1) or more (2) than 30% of cities 
within a 100km radius around a given city had adopted a local climate strategy in t-1.  
+ Based on the dependent variable. 
Neighboring cities were identified us-




NATCOERCE Dummy variable indicating whether a mandatory requirement to become active on climate 
change was imposed on cities in a given country by the respective national government in t-1 
(possible overestimation due to the use of national level data). 
+ IEA (2011), Kern & Alber (2009) Bor-
deaux (2011), Grenelle (2011). 
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NATLEAD Basic indicator showing whether a national climate strategy, a carbon tax, and a feed-in-tariff 
had been in place in a city’s country of location in t-1 (possible overestimation due to the use 
of national level data).  
+ IEA (2011), data used in Busch & Jör-
gens (forthcoming). 
NATFUND Basic indicator showing whether advice and/or funding were provided to cities for climate re-
lated projects by respective national governments in t-1 (possible overestimation due to the 
use of national level data). 
+ IEA (2011), Kern & Alber (2009), … (see 
section 5.2.3) 
els (section 5.2.3) 
EUFUND Indicator showing the number of EU funded climate related projects in which a city had par-
ticipated between the beginnng of the observation period and t-1.  
+ LIFE projects (2011), Intelligent Energy 
Projects (2011), CORDIS (2011), COM 
(2011c) 
GDPCAP A city’s local GDP per capita in t-1. + Eurostat (2011b, 2011a) 
NRG Percentage change of energy prices between t-3 and t-1 (possible overestimation due to the 
use of national level data). 
+ OECD.Stat (2011). Transformation of 
absolute values into % changes by the 
author. 
COASTAL Dummy variable indicating whether a city is located at the coast (1) or not (0). A city received 
costal status when located in one of the coastal regions identified in Eurostat (2011a). 
+ Eurostat (2011a) 
Local Factors (sec-
tion 5.2.4) 
DISDEATH Number of deaths caused by extreme weather events in a city’s country of location in t-2 and 
t-1(possible overestimation due to the use of national level data).  
+ EM-Dat (2011) 
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6 Results from Event History Analysis 
6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics discussed in this section are supposed to acquaint the 
reader with the data on which inference statistics are based. They already point to-
wards a range of interrelationships, however, they do not constitute a proof of cau-
sality since the data set is not made up of a basic population, which would be all 
European cities, but of a sample of these cities. Hence, only inference statistics can 
indicate the significance of causal relationships between covariates (Raab-Steiner & 
Benesch 2010:11-13). 
As figure 1 already pointed out (see section 1.3), the share of adopters of a local 
climate strategy among the 274 European cities in the sample increased from 0,01% 
in 1992 to 41% in 2009. This process of dissemination proceeded in three waves: the 
first rather long and flat wave ranging from 1992 to 2001, the second slightly higher 
one ranging from 2002 to 2006, and the third extremely steep wave building up from 
2007 to 2009. Accordingly, when looking at the overall hazard rate listed in table 2 
and depicted in figure 4 one can deduce that between 1992 and 2001 there was only 
a 0,9% chance of a city adopting a local climate strategy, whereas this probability 
was already at an average 2,4% throughout the second wave and even at 9,8% over 
the course of the third wave. 
As table 2 indicates, early adopters, that is, cities that introduced a local climate 
strategy between 1992 and 2001 can mostly be found in Switzerland, southwestern 
Germany, Austria and Scandinavia, whereas adoptions in the second wave are geo-
graphically more widespread, including first introductions in northern Italy, Spain 
France, Great Britain, and the Benelux countries. The third wave then is predomi-
nantly shaped by a large number of adoptions in France and Great Britain. Quite 
strikingly, 17, or 29%, of the 59 adoptions in that period happened in the UK. An 
overview over the geographical distribution of adoptions is given in figure 2. 
TMN membership also increases over the course of the three waves, however, with a 
markedly different progression. The number of members in the Climate Alliance for 
instance increased sharply from 5 in 1992 to 37 in 2001 (see figure 3). Then, how-
ever, the curve flattens between 2002 and 2009 where only 10 additional members 
joined the network. The patterns observed for CCP and energie-cités are less ex-
treme in this respect, still, none of the networks affiliated more members after 2001 
than before. 
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Table 2: Cities, Adoptions, and Descriptive Statistics 
YEAR CITIES NOADOPT HAZARD CUMUL SHARE 
1992 Zürich, Basel, Frankfurt 3 0,010948905 3 0,010948905 
1993 - 0 0 3 0,010948905 
1994 Berlin, Saarbrücken, Tampere 3 0,011070111 6 0,02189781 
1995 Kiel, Bern 2 0,007462687 8 0,02919708 
1996 Dortmund, Freiburg, Graz, Hannover 4 0,015037594 12 0,04379562 
1997 Stuttgart 1 0,003816794 13 0,047445255 
1998 Dresden, Stockholm, Lausanne 3 0,011494253 16 0,058394161 
1999 Bonn, Karlsruhe, Koblenz, Wien, Linkö-
ping, München 
6 0,023255814 22 0,080291971 
2000 Nürnberg 1 0,003968254 23 0,083941606 
2001 Mülheim 1 0,003984064 24 0,087591241 
2002 Bruxelles Bochum, Barcelona, Darmstadt, 
Modena  
5 0,02 29 0,105839416 
2003 Clermont-Ferrand, Torino, Venezia, 
Trento, Eindhoven, Malmö, Leicester, 
Aberdeen  
8 0,032653061 37 0,135036496 
2004 Augsburg, Rennes, Arnhem, Jönköping, 
Bristol  
5 0,021097046 42 0,153284672 
2005 Mainz, Rostock, Leipzig, Perugia, 
Miskolc, Uppsala, Turku  
7 0,030172414 49 0,178832117 
2006 Vitoria, Padova, Milano, Nottingham 4 0,017777778 53 0,193430657 
2007 Hamburg, Potsdam, Paris, Lyon, Nantes, 
Bologna, Rotterdam, Utrecht, Nijmegen, 
Ljubljana, Helsinki, London, Edinburgh  
13 0,058823529 66 0,240875912 
2008 Arhus, Düsseldorf, Bielefeld, Bremen, 
Madrid, Murcia, Lille, Besancon, Greno-
ble, Marseille, Firenze, Ancona, Amster-
dam, Tilburg, Enschede, Breda, Lissabon, 
Göteborg, Cardiff, Newcastle, Cam-
bridge, Exeter, Portsmouth, Coventry, 
Wirral    
25 0,120192308 91 0,332116788 
2009 Kobenhavn, Essen, Zaragoza, Bilbao, 
Hospitalet, Strasbourg, Bordeaux, Le 
Havre, Budapest, Porto, Örebro, Belfast, 
Leeds, Manchester, Sheffield, Stevenage, 
Worcester, Wolverhampton, Kingston, 
Génève, Roma 
21 0,114754098 112 0,408759124 
Source: own data; noadopt indicates the number of adoptions per year; hazard indi-
cates the yearly hazard rate; cumul shows cumulated adoptions; and share indicates 
the share of adopters among all cities in the data set. 
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Source: Google Maps/ own data. Blue dots indicate first wave adopters, green dots 
indicate second wave adopters, and red dots indicate third wave adopters. The 
green dot for Barcelona is almost entirely masked by the red dot for Hospitalet.  
Figure 2: Geographical Distribution of Adoptions 
 
Part of the slow down may be due to saturation at least in Western Europe, however, 
another explanation might also be competition coming from newer initiatives such as 
C40, which increased membership from 5 European cities in 2005 to 13 in 2009, or 
the Covenant of Mayors, which was set up by the EU in 2008 and already affiliates 
2181 members in 2011 (Newell & Bulkeley 2010:60, Kern & Alber 2009:22, COM 
2011d). In total, the share of cities that participated in at least one TMN increased 
from 2,2% in 1992 to 30% in 2001, and subsequently to 41,2% in 2009. These figures 
underline once again that overall network expansion slowed down after 2001 and 
that differences in the speed of TMN expansion after that date are mostly due to cit-
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Source: data provided by TMN secretariats and retrieved from (C40 
2011g). 
ies joining a second network. Interestingly, the share of cities participating in net-
works (41,2%) and those having adopted a local climate strategy in 2009 (42%) are 
almost identical, even though dissemination patterns had diverged quite remarkably 
over the course of the observation period. 
 
Figure 3: Development of TMN Membership 1992-2009 
 
A first hint towards the significance of TMNs results from the comparison of network 
hazard rates with the hazard rate observed among cities located in proximity to a pi-
oneer, and the baseline hazard (see section 4.2.1). As one can see in figure 4, all the 
incorporated dummy variables outperform the baseline hazard in every year of the 
observation period. Hence, the local climate strategy concept diffused faster among 
TMN members and neighboring cities of a pioneer than among all cities in the 
sample. Furthermore, when comparing average hazard rates for TMN members and 
cities located close to a pioneer, it becomes clear that all but one network have con-
sistently beat geographic proximity in the acceleration of diffusion (see table 3). CCP 
members for instance were more than twice as likely to introduce a local climate 
strategy in any year of the observation period than neighbors of a pioneer. In specific 
years, the likelihood of cities participating in the Climate Alliance, CCP, or C40 to 
adopt a local climate strategy even rose above 60%. These very high values are either 
the result of a few initial members adopting action plans quickly after network foun-
dation, or are caused by a significant reduction of the size of the risk set at the end 
of the observation period, where most of the network members had already adopted 
a local climate strategy. In 2009, for instance, only 10 CCP members were left in the 
risk set and 7 out of these adopted a local climate strategy that year. Similarly, in 
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1992 the Climate Alliance had 5 initial members among cities in the sample, three 
out of which introduced an action plan the same year. As these indicative results 
were obtained by manually calculating hazard rates without regard to other covari-
ates in the data set, though, they are only of descriptive value and cannot serve as a 
proof of causality. 
In sum, this section has given an overview over the temporal and geographical distri-
bution of the dependent variable, the development of overall membership in TMNs, 
and the hazard rates of specific populations such as TMN members and cities located 
in proximity to a pioneer. Whereas the presented measures have descriptive value 
and facilitate the interpretation of results from inferential statistics, they cannot 
confirm causal relationships among covariates. The outcomes of the inferential test 
of hypotheses that does provide significance levels for independent variables will be 
discussed in the next section. 
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Figure 4: Visual Representation of Hazard Rates Listed in Table 3 
Source: own data 
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Source: own data; tothazard indicates the baseline hazard, lochazard indicates the hazard 
rate for neighbors of pioneering cities. 
Table 3: Hazard Rates for TMNs, Neighbors of Pioneers, and Baseline Hazard 
YEAR TOTHAZARD CCPHAZARD CAHAZARD ECHAZARD C40HAZARD LOCHAZARD 
1992 0,010948905 0 0,6 0 0 0 
1993 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1994 0,011070111 0,222222222 0,052631579 0 0 0 
1995 0,007462687 0 0,045454545 0 0 0,066666667 
1996 0,015037594 0,090909091 0,137931034 0 0 0,0625 
1997 0,003816794 0 0,04 0 0 0 
1998 0,011494253 0,133333333 0,037037037 0,058823529 0 0,034482759 
1999 0,023255814 0,066666667 0,111111111 0 0 0,090909091 
2000 0,003968254 0 0,041666667 0 0 0 
2001 0,003984064 0 0,041666667 0 0 0,027777778 
2002 0,02 0,055555556 0,086956522 0,111111111 0 0,026315789 
2003 0,032653061 0,2 0,090909091 0,107142857 0 0,027777778 
2004 0,021097046 0,05 0,05 0,04 0 0,057142857 
2005 0,030172414 0,095238095 0,157894737 0 0 0,121212121 
2006 0,017777778 0,1 0 0,037037037 0 0 
2007 0,058823529 0,222222222 0,157894737 0,133333333 0,75 0,137931034 
2008 0,120192308 0,4 0,235294118 0,192307692 0,25 0,2 
2009 0,114754098 0,7 0,071428571 0,208333333 0,666666667 0,15 
Average 0,028139373 0,129785955 0,108770912 0,049338272 0,092592593 0,055706437 
 
 
6.2 Inferential Statistics 
Overall, the EHA model generated highly significant results for most of the variables 
operationalized in section 5. Based on these results seven out of the fourteen hy-
potheses derived in sections 3 and 4 can be confirmed. These include most of the hy-
potheses about TMN impact and all of the hypotheses concerning the coordinative ef-
fect of decisions made by superordinate governments. In contrast, all hypotheses 
concerning the impact of geographic proximity have to be rejected. Given that prox-
imity is often considered a prerequisite for information exchange among cities (Shi-
pan & Volden 2008, Kern et al. 2007), this further underlines the significance of TMNs 
for the diffusion of local climate strategies among European cities. 
Hakelberg, ffu-report 08-2011   52 
 
 
Table 4: Variables in the Equation 
    B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
CCP22 2,389 ,433 30,471 1 ,000 10,906 
CA 2,850 ,514 30,701 1 ,000 17,291 
EC 2,027 ,444 20,836 1 ,000 7,590 
C40 ,928 ,697 1,774 1 ,183 2,530 
NETYEARS -,100 ,036 7,915 1 ,005 ,905 
NETPEERSKAT     2,160 2 ,340   
NETPEERSKAT(1) ,747 ,509 2,153 1 ,142 2,111 
NETPEERSKAT(2) ,139 ,366 ,144 1 ,705 1,149 
LOCPIO -,616 ,385 2,552 1 ,110 ,540 
LOCLEARN ,199 ,110 3,271 1 ,071 1,221 
LOCPEERSKAT     2,731 2 ,255   
LOCPEERSKAT(1) ,035 ,401 ,008 1 ,930 1,036 
LOCPEERSKAT(2) -,518 ,362 2,052 1 ,152 ,595 
NATCOERCE 2,152 ,364 34,864 1 ,000 8,603 
NATLEAD ,535 ,176 9,283 1 ,002 1,707 
NATFUND ,447 ,157 8,089 1 ,004 1,564 
EUFUND ,257 ,074 12,195 1 ,000 1,294 
GDPCAP ,000 ,000 12,596 1 ,000 1,000 
NRG ,013 ,014 ,806 1 ,369 1,013 
COASTAL -,755 ,279 7,319 1 ,007 ,470 
DISDEATH ,000 ,000 ,013 1 ,910 1,000 
Step 1a 
Konstante -7,420 ,855 75,291 1 ,000 ,001 
a. Variables entered on Step 1: CCP, CA, EC, C40, NETYEARS, NETPEERSKAT, LOCPIO, 
LOCLEARN, LOCPEERSKAT, NATCOERCE, NATLEAD, NATFUND, EUFUND, GDPCAP, 
NRG, COASTAL, DISDEATH. 
6.2.1 Results for TMN Impact (H1-H4) 
H1 can be partially confirmed, since membership in three out of the four TMNs sig-
nificantly increases the likelihood of a city adopting a local climate strategy. 
Whereas the indicators of membership in CCP, the Climate Alliance and energie-cités 
are all highly significant, the C40 variable only reaches a significance level of .183, 
which implies that the null hypotheses, coincidence, cannot be rejected. The most 
likely explanation for this comes in three legs. First of all, six out of the thirteen 
                                            
 
22 Variables in blue feature a significance level of below ,050.  
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European C40 members had already adopted a local climate strategy prior to their 
accession to the network. Out of the remaining seven only one city did not partici-
pate in another TMN as well and this city, Warsaw, had not yet adopted a local cli-
mate strategy at the end of the observation period.  
In contrast, membership in one of the other three TMNs increases the likelihood of a 
city adopting a local climate strategy by factors of 10,906 (CCP), 17,291 (Climate Al-
liance), and 7,590 (energie-cités), respectively. Hence, a member city of the Climate 
Alliance, for instance, is 17 times more likely to introduce an action plan than the 
average city in the sample. In comparison to the other indicators, these values imply 
that membership in CCP or the Climate Alliance has the largest impact on likelihood 
out of all variables in the model. In turn, the influence of membership in energie-
cités lags behind the other two, which at first sight seems to imply that H2 can be 
confirmed. As expected, those TMNs that deploy strategies aiming at the accelera-
tion of both learning and imitation processes have a larger influence on their mem-
bers’ policy choices than TMNs that only promote learning. However, it is puzzling in 
this respect that the variables that were set up to measure the relevance of imita-
tion processes inside networks do not yield the expected results.  
Thus, a city’s years of membership in a TMN are highly significant, however, their ef-
fect goes in the opposite direction of what had been expected. Rather than increas-
ing the odds of adoption as assumed in H3, every additional year of adhesion reduces 
this likelihood by 9,5%. This implies that new entrants either adopt a local climate 
strategy within the first years of membership, or become less and less interested in 
network goals the longer they adhere. Hence, rather than being urged to adopt a lo-
cal climate strategy by the desire to conform to normative expectations, laggards 
seem to simply ignore network dealings when their behavior is in contradiction to 
prevalent standards of appropriateness. This result backs up the finding of Kern & 
Bulkeley (2009:329) that TMNs are mostly “networks of pioneers for pioneers” made 
up of a hard core of active cities and a periphery of passive cities that do not signifi-
cantly change their behavior after accession. Hence, H3 cannot be confirmed. 
Furthermore, the variable measuring the impact of norm cascades triggered by the 
attainment of a critical mass of adopters among network members does not make a 
difference. From the significance level of NETPEERSKAT (2) one can deduce that the-
re is a chance of more than 70% that observed interrelationships with variance on the 
dependent variable are the result of coincidence. Accordingly, H4 stating that the at-
tainment of a critical mass of at least 30% of adopters among network members 
increases the likelihood of a city adopting a local climate strategy has to be re-
jected. 
Given that both variables measuring peer pressure do not yield the expected results, 
the acceleration of imitation processes does not seem to be the mechanism through 
which TMNs steer their members towards network goals. Hence, the application of 
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benchmarking strategies fostering imitation cannot be the reason why CCP and the 
Climate Alliance have been more successful in promoting local climate strategies 
than energie-cités. Two alternative explanations seem possible. First of all, CCP and 
especially the Climate Alliance might simply put more emphasis on the acceleration 
of learning, for example through the set up of abstract methodologies that guide 
members towards the adoption of a local climate strategy. This seems plausible given 
that the adoption of an action plan is a central aspect of membership in both net-
works (see section 3.3). Accordingly, efforts by CCP and the Climate Alliance to im-
part information about their elaboration should be more intense than efforts by en-
ergie-cités, which assists members in the set up of an action plan but has neither 
built an abstract methodology nor made adoption a pivotal element of membership 
(see section 3.3). The second reason might be that energie-cités’ members are 
mostly French cities (Kern & Bulkeley 2009:317), which have little leeway for the e-
laboration of distinct policy initiatives given the centralized structure of the French 
state. 
What has to be retained from these results is first of all that three out of the four 
TMNs are highly successful in accelerating the diffusion of local climate strategies. 
Whereas members of the Climate Alliance are 17 times more likely to adopt an action 
plan than the average city in the sample, membership in CCP and energie-cités mul-
tiplies the odds ten- and sevenfold, respectively. With the exception of national co-
ercion, which has been geographically and temporally bound, no other variable 
matches any of these values. This confirms the assumption made in section 3.3 that 
TMNs, engaging in governance by diffusion, were the decisive driver behind the 
spread of local climate strategies among European cities. 
Furthermore, as indicators measuring the relevance of imitation processes inside 
networks did not generate the expected results, TMNs can be assumed to mostly ex-
ert their influence on members via the acceleration of learning processes. Conse-
quently, the enhancement of channels of communication (1), the elaboration and 
provision of information (2), and the improvement of the diffusability of the local 
climate strategy concept (3) by networks can be considered the most relevant stra-
tegies of governance by diffusion for the spread of local action plans between 1992 
and 2009. However, laggards can often not be reached by networks via these strate-
gies, which leads to a division of members into a hard core of active cities and a pe-
riphery of passive ones that become less and less likely to change their behavior the 
longer they adhere to the network (Kern & Bulkeley 2009:329). Accordingly, gov-
ernance by diffusion seems to only work with constituents that are at least in part in-
trinsically motivated to commit themselves to local climate protection.   
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6.2.2 Results for Regional Clusters (H5-H7)    
 Variables measuring the influence of regional clusters on the likelihood of a city 
adopting a local climate strategy were incorporated into the model in order to con-
trol for diffusion processes that might proceed without the mediation of TMNs. The 
assumption on which these variables are based is that most cities have only limited 
capacities to participate in transnational relations and thus only take information 
available within their immediate periphery into account (see section 4.2.1). How-
ever, the results show that local climate strategies did not diffuse along regional 
clusters. As a matter of fact, all three variables, measuring the impact of a pioneer-
ing city close by (LOCPIO), the availability of information from direct neighbors 
(LOCLEARN), and the peer pressure exerted by regional peers (LOCPEERSKAT), yield 
significance levels that confirm the null hypothesis. Accordingly, H5-H7, stating that 
neighboring pioneers, the absolute number of previous adopters within a city’s prox-
imity, and the attainment of a critical mass of adopters in the neighborhood increase 
the likelihood of a city adopting a local climate strategy, have to be rejected. These 
findings once again underline the relevance of TMNs for the diffusion of local climate 
strategies, as they show that the spread of this policy instrument is predominantly 
driven by information flows and communication within networks.  
6.2.3 Results for Coordination on Superordinate Political Levels (H8-H11) 
Unlike the aforementioned regional clusters, coordination emanating from decisions 
on superordinate political levels consistently increases the likelihood of a city adopt-
ing a local climate strategy. What has to be kept in mind though is that three out of 
the four variables measuring coordination from above use national data to explain 
behavior on the local level. Therefore, their significance may be overstated.  
Out of the four variables, the most relevant influence is exerted by mandatory re-
quirements imposed on cities by their national governments. As NATCOERCE indi-
cates, these increase the odds of adoption by a factor of 8,603, which comes close to 
the impact of CCP membership, at least on paper. Accordingly, H8 can be confirmed. 
As mentioned in section 5.2.3, only two national governments made the elaboration 
of local climate policy mandatory for city officials. These are France and Great Brit-
ain who both introduced compulsory requirements in 2008. Despite their limited ap-
plication, the overall effect on the dissemination of local climate strategies in 
Europe is remarkable. As table 2 shows, 52% of the total number of adoptions of local 
climate strategies in 2008 and 2009 happened either in Great Britain or in France, 
which implies that an important part of the third wave of dissemination is not the re-
sult of a diffusion process but of coercion emanating from national governments. Ac-
cordingly, TMNs did not play the decisive role in this phase, which becomes even 
more obvious, when taking into account that the expansion of TMN membership 
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slowed down after 2001 (see figure 3), and that additional years of network member-
ship have been found to decrease the likelihood of a city adopting a local climate 
strategy (see section 6.2.1). This implies that those late coming network members in 
France and Great Britain that adopted action plans in the last two years of the ob-
servation period were primarily pushed by national governments instead of TMNs. It 
thus seems as if TMNs have been more successful in motivating and enabling pioneers 
to become active on climate change than in pushing laggards, even within networks, 
towards minimal commitment. This implies that networks and the strategies of gov-
ernance by diffusion they deploy need to be supplemented by more interventionist 
measures if truly widespread municipal commitment is to be achieved.  
In addition to exerting coercion, which runs counter to the logic of diffusion, national 
governments have exercised coordinative influence by means that facilitate such 
processes. As the result for NATLEAD shows, national commitment to climate protec-
tion, measured by the introduction of a national climate strategy, a feed-in-tariff, 
and a carbon tax, increases the likelihood of a city located in the corresponding 
country to adopt a local climate strategy by 70% per adopted policy. Hence, cities lo-
cated in countries that have adopted all of these policies are more than twice as li-
kely to introduce an action plan as the average city in the sample. H9 can thus be 
confirmed. Quite surprisingly, these values indicate that leadership is even more im-
portant to cities than the provision of resources by the national government, which, 
in accordance with H10, increases the odds of adoption by only 56% per unit. Accord-
ingly, a city’s capacity to take up policy innovations in the area of climate protection 
does not only depend on know-how and financial support, but also on leadership by 
example and ideational encouragement through the national government.   
Next to support coming from the national government, cities are also dependent on 
funding provided by the EU. As EUFUND indicates, every EU funded, climate related 
project that a city participates in increases the odds of it adopting a local climate 
strategy by 29,4%. Accordingly, H11 can also be confirmed. What has to be consid-
ered here, though, is that TMNs often facilitate the access to EU funding, as they en-
able members to find partners for joint projects (see section 3.2.2). Hence, those 
cities that have repeatedly received financial support from the EU are likely to also 
be TMN members. This implies that the joining of forces between different actors 
that combine their respective capacities has the highest chance of yielding tangible 
progress in the area a local climate protection.  
In sum, superordinate political levels can be assumed to have had a substantial im-
pact on the dissemination of local climate strategies among European cities. This 
conclusion holds even when the potential overestimation of variables made up of na-
tional data is taken into account, since significance levels are unequivocal and no-
where near a p-value of 5%. Especially the third wave of adoptions is in large part 
due to mandatory requirements imposed by national governments in France and 
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Great Britain, which implies that diffusion has not been the only process driving dis-
semination of the course of this period. In addition, leadership and resources made 
available by national governments have been found to accelerate the diffusion of lo-
cal climate strategies, as well as funding provided by the European Union, which is 
often channeled to cities via TMNs that facilitate the teaming up with project part-
ners. 
6.2.4 Results for Local Determinants (H12-H14)        
The results for local factors yield a mixed picture. A city’s financial resources, meas-
ured by local GDP per capita, are highly significant, however, a one-euro increase in 
GDP only entails a minimal increase in the likelihood of a city adopting a local cli-
mate strategy. This increase is so small that it cannot be displayed by the three deci-
mals of parameters in table 4. Hence, minimal differences in GDP do not have much 
of an impact, whereas values highly above average can be expected to have a 
noticeable impact on the odds of adoption. Accordingly, H12, which predicts a posi-
tive relationship between financial resources and the likelihood of a city adopting a 
local climate strategy, can be confirmed. 
In contrast, the development of energy prices does not have a significant effect on 
local governments’ decisions to introduce a climate strategy. Hence, the assumption 
embodied in H13 that cost savings constitute an important motivator for local action 
on climate change has to be rejected. Likewise, the expected impact of a city’s per-
ceived vulnerability to the adverse impacts of climate change cannot be confirmed. 
Rather than increasing the likelihood of a city introducing an action plan, coastal sta-
tus decreases the odds of adoption by 53%, which simply reflects that more in-land 
cities have adopted local climate strategies than coastal cities have. Furthermore, 
the number of disaster deaths in the two years prior to a given city-year is 
completely irrelevant for the decision to introduce a local climate strategy. Accord-
ingly, local problem pressure does not seem to a major concern for European cities 
active on climate change, which implies to the rejection of H14. 
In sum, these local factors do not exert the same impact as external influences on 
the odds of a city adopting a local climate strategy. The provision of external re-
sources for instance has been found to be much more important than differences in 
local financial resources. In addition, neither the size of cost savings, nor local prob-
lem pressure motivate city governments as much to become active on climate change 
as TMN membership and encouragement coming from national governments.  
In order to test the robustness of these statistical findings and to further approxi-
mate the causal processes linking variables, two brief case studies will be conducted 
in the following section. With Hanover and Offenbach a frontrunner and a latecomer 
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were selected for in-depth analysis in order to account for differences in motives be-
tween these two groups, which most theories of diffusion expect (see section 2.2.2). 
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7 Case Studies 
The case studies of Hanover and Offenbach are both primarily based on interviews 
conducted with city officials currently or formally responsible for the elaboration of 
climate policy in the respective municipalities. Both interviews were based on a 
compendium of questions that largely overlapped and that interviewees received in 
advance (see annex II). Information on Hanover was obtained in an interview with 
Reinhard Martinsen, who had been the head of the department for preventive envi-
ronmental protection and environmental planning in Hanover’s city administration 
from 1987 to 1995. In addition, he has also led the administrative working group pre-
paring the EXPO 2000 from 1991 to 1995.23 Information on Offenbach was obtained in 
an interview with Sabine Swoboda, who has been subject specialist on climate pro-
tection, renewable energies, and nature and landscape conservation in Offenbach’s 
city administration since 2006, and with Mathias Trümner-Friese, who is the personal 
assistant to Offenbach’s mayor responsible for the environment.24 Unless indicated 
otherwise, evidence cited in the case studies is based on these interviews.  
7.1 Hanover: From Mediocrity to Champions League  
Hanover introduced its first local climate strategy within the first wave of adoptions 
in 1996 and can thus be considered a frontrunner in this respect (Hanover 2011a). 
The council decision to elaborate this action plan was already taken in 1990, which 
underlines that Hanover had tackled the issue prior to the UN’s Rio Conference in 
1992, which is generally assumed to be the starting point for climate policy (Kern & 
Alber 2009:17). Following this council decision, in 1994 the city’s central energy of-
fice that had already been in place since the late 1980s was relabeled “central office 
for climate protection” and charged with the elaboration of the city’s first action 
plan, which focused on initiatives in the areas of mobility, housing, and business and 
set the rather ambitious reduction target of 25% by 2005. However, with an actually 
achieved reduction of 7,5% in 2005, this target was missed by far  (Hanover 2011b). 
The basic preconditions for Hanover’s early commitment to climate protection were 
created by two distinct developments. First of all, the Green party joined the ruling 
coalition in 1987 and worked towards the establishment of an environmental depart-
ment, which had not been part of Hanover’s city administration before. Accordingly, 
mostly external staff was recruited for this department and these experts imported 
their environmental know-how into the city administration. Furthermore, the Red-
                                            
 
23 The interview was conducted and recorded on skype on January 12th 2011. 
24 The interview was conducted and recorded on skype on February 4th 2011.  
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Green coalition in the city council, flanked by an active scene of citizen initiatives, 
constantly pushed the administration as well as Hanover’s utilities towards more en-
vironmentally friendly practices, for example by making sustainability the general 
principle for all city programs, and by obliging the local energy supplier to grant de-
centralized cogeneration units access to its electricity grid.  
The second development that raised widespread awareness for sustainability issues in 
Hanover was the city’s application to host the EXPO 2000, which was the first new 
type of world exhibition to be held, meaning that this fair was organized around a 
central motto defined by the Bureau International des Expositions. For the EXPO 
2000 this motto was “Man, Nature, Technology – a New World Begins,” which was 
supposed to motivate exhibitors to present innovative solutions for the reconciliation 
of these three aspects. Hence, in order to be considered as a host, Hanover had to 
prove progressiveness and commitment to sustainable development early on. Fur-
thermore, after Hanover had been selected in 1990, city officials had the impression 
that the world was watching them and thus decided to further enhance the city’s 
progressive image. 
“Die Stadt hat sich dann in dem Wissen, dass die Welt auf Hannover schaut, bemüht, 
den Leitgedanken der Nachhaltigkeit in die Praxis umzusetzen.” 
 
7.1.1 The Impact of TMNs  
In the context of the EXPO application, leading city representatives, including the 
former chief municipal director Jobst Fiedler and the head of the environmental de-
partment Hans Mönninghoff, got in contact with their counterparts from Toronto, the 
main competitor for the organization of the EXPO, which had already been involved 
in projects and consultations that eventually led to the establishment of ICLEI, and 
also became the organization’s first seat (ICLEI 2011b). Due to these personal ac-
quaintances, Hanover eventually became one of the founding members of ICLEI and 
was also among the 14 initial participants of the network’s CO2 Reduction Project, 
the predecessor of the CCP campaign (Betsill 2001b:1). At the same time, the city 
was also a founding member of the Climate Alliance, however, city officials in 
Hanover valued their membership in ICLEI more, as it granted them access to exper-
tise from the then leading cities in Canada and Scandinavia. Or as Mr. Martinsen put 
it: 
“Über ICLEI eher als über das Klimabündnis hatte Hannover den internationalen Draht 
zu den Pionieren in Kanada und Skandinavien. Daher kamen die Impulse vor allem von 
ICLEI. Es gab zwar schon Ökoinstitute und das Wuppertalinstitut, aber die hatten noch 
keine wirkliche Erfahrung im Bereich lokaler Klimaschutz.” 
 
Accordingly, in the early stages the environmental department and local politicians, 
who were already sensitized to sustainability issues, mainly drew their specifically 
climate related expertise from ICLEI and the cities with whom they cooperated in the 
Hakelberg, ffu-report 08-2011   61 
 
 
urban CO2 reduction project.25 This applies especially to know-how related to the 
elaboration of a local climate strategy, as the clearly stated aim of this two-year ini-
tiative was to “develop comprehensive local strategies to reduce emissions of green-
house gases, especially CO2” (ICLEI 1993:1-2). The means by which this should be a-
chieved were a range of “policy workshops, technical consultations, and research 
drawing on the data gathered by each municipality” (ibid.). Hence, learning was 
definitely the main purpose of this project, and also the main reason for Hanover to 
liaise more intensively with ICLEI than with the Climate Alliance. Furthermore, the 
explicit interest in initiatives elaborated outside Germany underlines that cities in 
the transnational sphere rather than direct neighbors were perceived as relevant 
sources of information on policy innovation.  
The following statement by Mr. Martinsen on Hanover’s relation to other frontrunners 
also reflects the importance of learning and information exchange for the cohesion of 
this group of pioneers: 
“Es gab eine Art Wettbewerb zwischen diesen Städten in dem es darum ging, wer es 
schafft, Klimaschutz am Besten umzusetzen. Dieser war allerdings eher von Koopera-
tion, Erfahrungsaustausch und Interesse als von Konkurrenz geprägt. Wer ist der Beste 
gab es nicht.” 
 
 As it seems, cities participating in the urban CO2 reduction project had the aim to 
improve their performance together by pushing each other towards innovation and by 
sharing experience. Hence, the type of competition described here did not force city 
governments to adapt their behavior to altered conditions against their will (Elkins & 
Simmons 2005:39). Rather, they took the welcome challenge to swim with the best 
and to elaborate initiatives that could arouse the interest of likeminded policymak-
ers. Hence, cities did not only join to draw lessons but also to underline their innova-
tive capacity by providing others with expertise. Thus, if competition took place, it 
was competition for recognition among peers. 
Next to learning, this recognition aspect seems to have been the second incentive for 
Hanover to participate especially in transnational projects on climate protection ra-
ther than in regional or national ones. As Mr. Martinsen affirmed:  
“Mit Umweltschutz kann man das Stadtimage aufbessern. Hannover ist von der Größe, 
Bedeutung usw. eher eine mittelmäßige Stadt, aber mit der internationalen Ausrichtung 
beim Umweltthema konnte sich Hannover in die Champions League hocharbeiten.” 
 
 Hence, the commitment to climate protection and its celebration on the transna-
tional scene was used by Hanover to get rid of its mediocre image and to underline 
                                            
 
25 According to Betsill (2001b:1), cities participating in the urban CO2 reduction project were Ankara, 
Bologna, Chula Vista, Copenhagen, Dade County, Denver, Hanover, Helsinki, Minneapolis, Portland, 
Saarbrücken, Saint Paul, and Toronto. 
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that the city was far more progressive than commonly assumed. Accordingly, 
ICLEI/CCP also served as a platform on which Hanover could present itself and en-
hance its reputation. As alluded to above, a progressive image was desirable due to 
the international attention caused by the organization of EXPO 2000. In addition, it 
was also perceived as a crucial factor for the attraction of business and qualified per-
sonnel to the city: 
“Hannover war mal Industriestadt, aber heute sind 84% der Arbeitsplätze im Dien-
stleistungssektor. Hier will man nicht nur die einfachen Jobs in der Stadt haben, sondern 
auch Wissenschaft und Forschung stärken. Wenn es attraktive Arbeitsplätze in den 
Bereichen Nachhaltigkeit, Wissenschaft und Forschung gibt, ist das ein Faktor für die 
Stadtqualität.” 
 
The third aspect of TMN membership next to learning and the enhancement of the ci-
ty’s reputation that motivated or enabled Hanover to become active on climate 
change was the access to EU funding. As Mr. Martinsen affirmed, thanks to contacts 
arranged by ICLEI and the Climate Alliance, the city could raise more than 16 million 
euros through the participation in EU sponsored projects in the 1990s. This is con-
firmed by research in the EU’s databases, which showed that Hanover had partici-
pated in two projects in collaboration with Utrecht, Lisbon, and Palma de Mallorca 
prior to the adoption of its local climate strategy in 1996 (CORDIS 2011). These pro-
jects were funded under the EU’s THERMIE program and concerned energy extensive 
planning of cities as well as the mobilization of CO2 reduction potentials in residen-
tial buildings. As Mr. Martinsen emphasized, the partners for these projects were 
found via ICLEI. 
In sum, membership with ICLEI/CCP promoted Hanover’s commitment to climate pro-
tection in three different ways. First of all, close collaboration with other pioneering 
cities in the urban CO2 reduction project, the predecessor of the CCP campaign, 
made information about how to tackle climate change at the local level available to 
local politicians and the city administration. Secondly, ICLEI served as a platform on 
which commitment to climate protection could be celebrated in order to enhance 
the city’s reputation vis-à-vis its peers in the transnational arena and in relation to 
the general public. Thirdly, the city gained access to EU funding via the teaming up 
with partners from the network. 
7.1.2 Influence of Neighbors and Higher Political Levels  
As Hanover is one of the initial pioneers of local climate protection, the city became 
active on the issue before the national government, another city close by, or the 
Land had elaborated meaningful programs.26 Accordingly, it had not been encouraged 
                                            
 
26 This information is taken from the data set. 
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to become active on climate change by the national government or any of the other 
actors. Hence, instead of providing inspiration, the national government was rather 
perceived as lagging behind own initiatives, whereas the Land was mostly considered 
obstructive. 
“Die Städte sind näher am Nachhaltigkeitsziel dran als die Bundesregierung. Der Rat 
für nachhaltige Entwicklung lädt die Städte mittlerweile sogar zu Konsultationen ein.” 
 
“Das Land arbeitet eher kontraproduktiv. Es möchte zum Beispiel die Umweltzone in 
Hannover wieder verbieten.” 
 
As discussed in the previous subsection, the city thus sought information and ac-
knowledgment among likeminded peers in the transnational sphere. In addition, it 
closely followed international developments and aligned its own actions to postulates 
coming from this level, for example by adopting a reduction target for its first local 
climate strategy that had been communicated during the Kyoto process.  
“Man hat sich immer an den globalen Zielen orientiert und dann versucht, diese für 
Hannover umzusetzen.”  
 
In addition, the European Union was an important reference point for Hanover, 
mostly because it incorporated sustainability as a general principle into its programs 
from an early stage and promoted environmental objectives that matched those of 
the city. Hence, Hanover could regularly obtain funding from the EU, and helped to 
implement its policy goals in return, shortcutting national and regional governments.   
“Die EU Fachprogramme haben sich schon sehr früh nach dem Leitbild der Nachhaltig-
keit gerichtet. Es gab immer inhaltliche Übereinstimmungen zwischen EU Programmen 
und den hannoverschen Initiativen. Hier gab es eine direkte Verbindung, die die Lan-
des- und Bundesebene überbrückt hat. Die Finanzierung durch EU Fördermittel hat 
auch dazu geführt, dass man indirekt die Ziele der EU auf lokaler Ebene umgesetzt hat. 
Die nationale Ebene wurde dadurch umgangen.”   
 
This statement once again emphasizes the prevalent perception of city officials in 
Hanover that the national government had not much to contribute to initiatives in 
the areas of climate protection and sustainability. Furthermore, it also points to an 
explicit EU strategy to govern past national governments and directly cooperate with 
municipalities that share its policy goals.  
7.1.3 Local Factors 
With a GDP per capita of 23300 ! in 1996, Hanover was in the lower midfield of Wes-
tern European cities in the data set (Eurostat 2011b). Despite this apparent lack of 
financial resources, the city was able to implement meaningful climate policies. One 
reason for this is that regular refurbishment of municipal buildings, including schools, 
kindergartens, and social housing is already provided for in the city’s budget and can 
easily be implemented in accordance with the highest energetic standard, as cost sa-
vings set off initial investment rather quickly.  
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Furthermore, Hanover still owns its public utilities and can thus rely on their revenue 
and influence their investment decisions. With regard to emissions reduction, the 
utilities are the crucial instrument of local climate policy as they enable the city to 
decide on the expansion of combined power and heat supply and to order the 
modernization of power plants. 
“Das Hauptinstrument ist die Energiepolitik der Stadtwerke, die das Fernwärmenetz 
ausbauen, die spezielle Tarife anbieten und die Kraftwerkanlagen modernisieren um die 
Erreichung der CO2 Minderungsziele zu ermöglichen.” 
 
Given that public utilities can already make major progress on their own, the city it-
self does not have to rely on tax revenue to invest in climate protection. However, 
this cooperative stance of the city’s energy supplier had to be fought for by the city 
council in general and the head of the city’s environment department in particular. 
“Die Stadtwerke wurden durch schiebende und ziehende Maßnahmen in Richtung 
Nachhaltigkeit und Klimaschutz bewegt. Hans Mönninghoff war lange Zeit im Auf-
sichtsrat der Stadtwerke und hat das Thema dort durchgesetzt. Mittlerweile haben die 
Stadtwerke diese Themen zur Unternehmensphilosophie gemacht.” 
 
In addition, the city focused on the elaboration of individual demonstration projects 
that were partly EU funded and aimed at motivating private investors to improve en-
ergy efficiency on their part. These projects involved rather little investment from 
the city but had a large impact on investment decisions by private developers. An 
example for this is the creation of the new housing estate “Am Kronsberg”, in which 
80% of overall CO2 emissions are avoided by improvements in insulation and heating. 
“Durch diese Standards, die dort gesetzt wurden, sind praktisch alle Neubauten in der 
Stadt auch nach diesen Standards gebaut worden, weil die Investoren sagen, was die 
dort können, können wir auch! Wenn sie vor Ort zeigen, was möglich ist hat dies eine 
Signalwirkung.” 
 
The second local factor in the data set, cost savings, played a role in the refurbish-
ment of municipal buildings. More importantly, however, they also served as the 
prime argument of the proponents of local climate policy to convince parts of the 
city administration, local business and citizens of the merits of local climate protec-
tion. The central office for climate protection, for instance, mostly used the argu-
ment that the climate friendly solution is eventually also the cheaper one when ad-
vising other parts of the city administration on policy choice. Furthermore, the pro-
pensity of private investors to participate in demonstration projects was observed to 
increase with energy prices.  
“Außerdem wurden Investoren auch durch steigende Energiepreise motiviert, die dazu 
geführt haben, dass sich ein energieneutrales Haus schon nach sechs Jahren rechnet.”   
 
As it seems, pointing towards cost savings was the passe-partout solution when im-
portant stakeholders had to be persuaded to also commit to climate protection. 
“Es wurde immer über den Pfad, und kostet auch weniger, argumentiert.“ 
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In contrast to these local factors, perceived vulnerability to climate change has ap-
parently not played a role, since it was not brought up by Mr. Martinsen when inter-
rogated about the incentives for local action on climate change. 
In sum, Hanover was able to finance climate protection because it implemented al-
ready planned refurbishments in accordance with high energetic standards, redi-
rected investment priorities of its public utilities and elaborated demonstration pro-
jects that motivated private investors to become active on their part. Cost savings 
facilitated the compliance with highest energetic standards in refurbishments and 
served as main argument in the persuasion of municipal stakeholders. Perceived vul-
nerability did apparently not play a role. 
7.1.4 Comparing Results 
Overall, the case study of Hanover confirms some of the statistical findings but 
mostly brings up additional explanatory factors. As to TMN impact, it backs up the 
conclusion drawn in section 6.2.1 that networks mainly influence their members via 
the acceleration of learning processes. Hanover mainly focused on its membership 
with ICLEI/CCP precisely because it facilitated access to expertise coming from pio-
neering cities in Canada and Scandinavia. Furthermore, the case study confirms the 
assumption by Kern & Bulkeley (2009:321) cited in section 3.2.2 that strategies of 
funding and cooperation, or in Busch & Jörgens’s terms the strengthening of capaci-
ties (6) (forthcoming:295), constitute a major incentive for local governments to par-
ticipate in TMNs. In addition, Hanover’s explicit focus on cooperation with pioneers 
in the transnational sphere confirms the finding in section 6.2.2 that geographic pro-
ximity does not foster information flows in the area of local climate protection.  
In contrast, the EHA model did not grasp competition for reputation among network 
pioneers, as all network members were assumed to be each other’s peers. However, 
it seems as if pioneers tend to team up with other pioneers and only take policy 
adoption by these into account. Hence a 30% share of adopters among network mem-
bers in general does not have any meaning for cities that are only focused on a cer-
tain subgroup. In addition, the relevance of economic benefits linked to a progressive 
reputation was not integrated into the EHA model as neither a city’s image nor the 
relationship between image and increased attractiveness for business and skilled la-
bor can be adequately measured.  
Concerning the coordinative effect of superordinate governments, the results for 
Hanover show that pioneering cities tend to be less dependent on resources and lea-
dership provided by national governments than the average city in the data set. Once 
again, this underlines the importance of transnational information flows among pio-
neering cities for the spread of knowledge and policy instruments in the earlier days 
of local climate policy. Another interesting finding is that municipalities have 
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indirectly reciprocated the EU’s financial support, by allowing it to govern past na-
tional governments and to pursue its policy goals together with likeminded municipal 
governments.  
As to local factors, the case of Hanover confirms that GDP per capita has a rather 
small impact on a city’s capacity to act, as a range of strategies can be employed to 
implement climate policy in a budget friendly way, for example by ordering public 
utilities to rearrange their investment strategy or by motivating private investors. In 
Hanover’s case the extent to which these were inclined to act was however highly 
dependent on energy prices, which contradicts the statistical finding that cost sav-
ings do not have an influence on local commitment to climate protection. In turn, 
perceived vulnerability was not mentioned as a potential motivator for local action 
on climate change, which confirms the results from the EHA model.  
What is more, the case study of Hanover pointed towards the influence of the Green 
Party on the creation of permissive preconditions for local commitment to climate 
protection and to the importance of the city’s application to host the EXPO 2000. 
Two explanatory factors that the model did not take into account at all.   
7.2 Offenbach: Financial Constraints Are Not an Excuse 
The City of Offenbach introduced its first local climate strategy in 2010 (Offenbach 
2010). It is thus a third wave adopter and among the last German municipalities un-
der study to launch a local action plan.27 However, this does not imply that Offenbach 
had completely ignored climate protection before. The council decision to elaborate 
a climate strategy was already taken in 2006 (ibid.), and the city’s earliest activities 
in this issue area date back to 1997 when Offenbach decided to join the Climate Alli-
ance and elaborated a local agenda 21.28 These activities coincide with the accession 
of the Green party to the city’s coalition government and were actively promoted by 
it. In the following years, a range of individual projects was elaborated, including the 
set up of an energy saving initiative in 2003, in which the city and local craftsmen 
jointly offer advice on energy efficiency to citizens and other local businesses (Of-
fenbach 2011a). In addition, in 2006 the city launched an initiative to install solar 
panels on all municipal roofs and invited citizens to tender certificates that grant a 
fixed share of the facilities’ revenue (Offenbach 2011b). The latest major climate re-
lated project that Offenbach is involved in since 2009 is the “Rhine-Main Model Re-
gion for Electric Mobility” that investigates how different means of electric trans-
                                            
 
27 Technically, Offenbach had thus been a non-adopter during the actual observation period of this study 
(1992-2009).  
28 The decision to join the Climate Alliance was made in 1997. Membership became effective in 1998. 
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port, ranging from hybrid busses to pedelecs, can be used to enhance urban mobility 
(Offenbach 2011c). The model region is financed by the Federal Ministry of Trans-
port, Building, and Urban development and its headquarters are resident with Offen-
bach’s public utilities (BMVBS 2011). 
7.2.1 TMN impact             
As mentioned above, Offenbach decided to join the Climate Alliance in 1997 and be-
came a full member in 1998. Since then, the city participated in a couple of the net-
work’s working groups and engaged in more intense bilateral relations with cities 
from Japan, which were arranged by the Climate Alliance. In general, city officials 
consider participation in the network a good possibility to access information on local 
climate protection and to act in concert with other municipalities. As Mr. Trümner-
Friese put it: 
“Die Mitgliedschaft im Netzwerk bietet den Expertinnen und Experten in den Kommu-
nen die Möglichkeit, sich auszutauschen und von den gegenseitigen Erfahrungen zu 
profitieren, um gemeinsam mehr für den Klimaschutz zu erreichen.” 
 
In particular, Offenbach profited from know-how communicated within the network, 
as its secretariat as well as other network members supported the city in the elabo-
ration of both its CO2 inventory (Offenbach 2010:9). As Mr. Trümner-Friese affirmed: 
“Das Netzwerk ist eine Plattform auf der Wissensaustausch stattfindet. Auch die CO2 
Bilanz ist in Zusammenarbeit mit anderen Netzwerkmitgliedern entstanden.” 
 
This exchange of knowledge mostly happened via the network’s issue specific work-
ing groups. For instance, Offenbach could draw on its participation in a joint study 
group of 13 municipalities that tested a new type of CO2 inventory and exchanged 
their respective experiences. As Mrs. Swoboda pointed out: 
“Es gibt einen regen Erfahrungsaustausch über die Netzwerke. Man orientiert sich an 
anderen Beispielen und überlegt, ob etwas übernommen werden kann. Offenbach war 
zum Beispiel eine der 13 Testkommunen für die Entwicklung des CO2 Bilan-
zierungstools ‘Ecoregion.’ Die Stadt hat in der entsprechenden AG mitgearbeitet und 
das Tool in Zusammenarbeit mit anderen Mitgliedern weiterentwickelt.” 
 
In addition, Offenbach also joined the Climate Alliance’s working group on electric 
mobility, as it was interested in related initiatives outside the Rhine-Main Model Re-
gion that could impart information on how to deal with specific regulatory details. 
Mr. Trümner-Friese sums up the importance of rational learning in this respect: 
“Welche Infrastruktur muss in den Städten geschaffen werden, damit Elektromobilität 
funktioniert? Da gibt es viele kleine Fragen in der Praxis auch in Bezug auf die StVo, 
die geklärt werden müssen.”  
 
This underlines that TMN membership influenced Offenbach primarily by providing 
the opportunity to draw lessons from previous experience in the set up of local cli-
mate strategies, CO2 inventories, and the necessary infrastructure for electric mobil-
ity. That the focus of the Climate Alliance’s activities clearly lies on the acceleration 
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of learning processes, despite the elaboration of a range of benchmarking tools (Cli-
mate Cities Benchmark 2011), is illustrated in the following statement by Mrs. 
Swoboda, concerning the large time lag between Offenbach’s accession to the net-
work and the eventual adoption of a local climate strategy.  
“Es wird vom Klimabündnis nicht gefordert etwas Vorzeigbares zu erarbeiten.” 
 
Accordingly, Offenbach’s city administration did not feel pressurized by the network 
to finally become active. Rather, interested individuals within the administration u-
sed membership as an argument to convince other stakeholders that the city should 
begin to elaborate a tangible strategy.  
“Der Beitritt zum Klimabündnis erfolgte 1998, aber der Beschluss ein Kli-
maschutzkonzept zu erstellen erst 2006. Ein paar Jahre lang ist also nicht so richtig viel 
passiert. Einzelne Projekte wie z.B. die Energiesparinitiative wurden initiiert, aber der 
Beitritt wurde nicht sofort instrumentalisiert. Es hat ein paar Jahre gebraucht, bis die 
Einsicht reifte, dass ohne konkrete Beschlüsse, z.B. zur Erstellung eines Kli-
maschutzkonzeptes, nicht viel geschieht. Dafür war die Mitgliedschaft sinnvoll, um zu 
sagen: ‘Wir sind jetzt Mitglied wir sollten irgendwann auch mal etwas Vorzeigbares er-
arbeiten’” (Sabine Swoboda). 
 
Hence, TMN membership itself apparently constituted a resource for local policy 
champions that was employed to push the subject of local climate policy inside the 
city council and the municipal administration. This largely corresponds to the finding 
of Betsill & Bulkeley (2004:484) that membership backs up the position of proponents 
of local climate policy inside city administrations. 
In sum, the Climate Alliance secretariat as well as other network members provided 
Offenbach with technical information and thus supported its efforts to implement its 
local climate strategy, its CO2 inventory, as well as policies linked to electric mobil-
ity. City officials had a clearly rational interest in detailed technical know-how com-
municated via the network, which underlines that learning has been the predominant 
mechanism affecting policy choice in Offenbach. In contrast, the absence of norma-
tive pressure felt by city officials makes clear that the network does not accelerate 
imitation processes, despite its benchmarking system. Instead, local policy champi-
ons use TMN membership as a resource to reinforce their position within the city’s 
council and administration. 
7.2.2 The Influence of Neighbors and Higher Political Levels          
Unlike Hanover in the early 1990s, which could not rely on information available in 
its immediate proximity or from superordinate political levels, Offenbach could draw 
on expertise and resources from both its larger neighbor Frankfurt and the national 
government. Frankfurt had already adopted a local climate strategy in 1992 and had 
also been a driving force behind the foundation of the Climate Alliance (Climate Alli-
ance 2011d). Since then, its activities in climate protection have been coordinated 
by a well-staffed energy department that has accumulated almost 20 years of expe-
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rience in the implementation of local climate policies (Frankfurt 2011). Hence, this 
department was repeatedly approached by Offenbach’s city administration for exam-
ple to obtain advice in the context of the restructuring of its environmental agency 
into the present agency for environment, energy, and mobility, but also in relation to 
the elaboration of its local climate strategy (Offenbach 2010:3). As Mrs. Swoboda 
pointed out: 
“Es besteht ein enger Kontakt zu Frankfurt. Das Energiereferat existiert dort seit 15 
Jahren, hat eine sehr gute personelle Ausstattung und viel Erfahrung. Während der Auf-
bauphase unserer Fachgruppe Klimaschutz haben wir daher Kontakt zu den Frankfurter 
Kollegen gesucht.”      
  
Hence, Offenbach’s climate related initiatives as well as its local climate strategy 
were in part informed by advice retrieved from its larger neighbor. In addition, the 
city also collaborates with Frankfurt and other municipalities in the Rhine-Main area 
in specific initiatives like the model region for electric mobility, where policy and 
technical solutions are elaborated together (Offenbach 2011d). Accordingly, Offen-
bach’s relations to its pioneering neighbor are rather marked by cooperation and in-
formation exchange than by competition.  
“Zwischen den Städten gibt es keine Konkurrenz. Das Engagement kommt von sich 
aus, Wir sind selber überzeugt vom Thema. Wir greifen Informationen über vorange-
gangene Initiativen anderer Städte eher auf, um Akteure bei uns vor Ort von der Not-
wendigkeit des Handelns zu überzeugen.” 
 
Similarly to what has been observed for TMN membership, policy champions inside 
the city administration use information on other cities’ initiatives to advance their 
cause, rather than being pressurized by activities of pioneers close by. In sum, prox-
imity to a frontrunner has in part facilitated Offenbach’s commitment to climate 
protection, by making information available and providing the opportunity for coop-
eration in joint projects. In addition, references to the achievements of cities close 
by help local policy champions to push the issue of climate protection forward in 
municipal institutions.  
Besides being affected by its neighborhood, Offenbach has also profited from re-
sources coming from the national government for example in the context of the fed-
erally funded model region for electric mobility and also in the elaboration of its lo-
cal climate strategy. As a matter of fact, Offenbach was one of the cities that re-
ceived financial support for the set up of a local action plan under the ‘climate pro-
tection initiative’ funded by the Federal Ministry of the Environment (BMU 2011a). 
This financial support enabled Offenbach to implement a more ambitious action plan 
than originally planned, however, it did not have an influence on the actual decision 
to elaborate a local climate strategy. As Mrs. Swoboda emphasized: 
“Die CO2 Bilanz wurde schon vor der nationalen Förderung erledigt und es war auch 
klar, dass ein Maßnahmenprogramm entwickelt wird. Als der Beschluss gefasst wurde, 
war nicht abzusehen, dass es eine nationale Förderung geben würde. Wir hätten das 
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Klimaschutzprogramm also auch ohne dieses Programm erarbeitet, aber natürlich mit 
weniger Mitteln.”  
 
Due to the additional funding coming from the national government, Offenbach could 
hire external consultants that supported the city in the elaboration of its local cli-
mate strategy. These consultants had already advised other local governments before 
and could thus impart information about the effectiveness of specific projects. For 
instance, the first measure from the climate strategy that is now being implemented 
in Offenbach, a door-to-door advisory service on energy efficiency for citizens, had 
already been successfully applied in North-Rhine-Westphalia and was thus recom-
mended by one of the consultants.  
“Die Gutachter haben schon für andere Städte Konzepte entwickelt und können sagen, 
was woanders gut gegriffen hat. Die Haus zu Haus Beratung aus dem Kli-
maschutzkonzept wurde zum Beispiel von einer Kommune in NRW übernommen. Die 
Empfehlung kam vom Gutachterbüro” (Sabine Swoboda).  
 
In sum, the national initiative did not give the decisive impulse, however, the provi-
ded funding made a qualitative difference in that it enabled Offenbach to hire exter-
nal experts that decisively shaped its action plan. Another means by which the natio-
nal government exerts influence on Offenbach’s climate policy is the provision of 
subsidies like the feed-in-tariff without which municipal initiatives like the solar pa-
nel program mentioned in the introduction could not be executed. In addition, natio-
nal funding schemes are a decisive argument when advising citizens and local busi-
nesses on energy efficiency. Consequently, a large part of the city’s activities in cli-
mate protection concerns the assistance of these actors in the application for natio-
nal subsidies. 
Thus, unlike Hanover in the early 1990s Offenbach is in part dependent on national 
initiatives in the elaboration of its climate policies. Even though the decisive impulse 
for action came from the city itself, national funding made a qualitative difference 
in the elaboration of its climate strategy. Furthermore, the city could only set up 
certain programs and motivate citizens to become active on their part because of 
available subsidies form the national government. It thus seems as if latecomers we-
re more reliant on support from superordinate political levels than pioneers.29 
7.2.3 Local Factors 
As Offenbach is the most indebted city in the Land of Hesse, implying that only 3% of 
its budget can be flexibly allocated, the lack of financial resources constituted a sub-
stantial barrier to local climate policy. In total, only 70.000 ! are available for cli-
                                            
 
29 Funding from the EU was not brought up during the interview; it is thus assumed that it has not played 
a decisive role in Offenbach.  
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mate protection from the municipal budget per year despite the fact that the city of 
Offenbach still partly owns its public utilities. This is due to the fact that most of the 
utilities’ revenue is already allocated to other entries in the budget. Accordingly, 
proponents of climate protection had to be inventive in the use of available funds 
and mostly focused on budget friendly measures. However, the city’s financially pre-
carious situation did not serve as an excuse for lacking commitment. Rather, city of-
ficials seemed to be motivated by the challenge to prove that Offenbach had a ca-
pacity to act despite its bad finances. As both interlocutors emphasized: 
“Man darf sich nicht durch knappe finanzielle Ressouren abschrecken lassen, sondern 
muss die vorhandenen Möglichkeiten und Handlungsräume erkennen und nutzen.“ 
 
Hence, measures in the local climate strategy focus mostly on advisory services for 
citizens and local business as well as awareness campaigns. In addition, a range of 
programs, including ecologic driver trainings and a funding scheme for refurbish-
ments, could be set up with the help of local sponsors that carry most of the costs 
(Offenbach 2010:54). In general, city officials in Offenbach attempt to overcome the 
lack of municipal resources by putting more emphasis on the persuasion of private 
actors to either change their behavior or to partake in climate related programs pro-
posed by the city. As Mr. Trümner-Friese pointed out: 
“Man kann auch mit relativ geringem Budget viel erreichen, vor allem durch 
Überzeugungsarbeit sowie gezielte und direkte Informations- und Unterstützungsange-
bote.” 
 
Thus, Offenbach made a virtue of necessity and responded to lacking finances mostly 
by trying to commit citizens and local business to become active on their part. In this 
respect, the most important argument was the second local factor under study: cost 
savings. Both, the city’s energy saving initiative as well as the door-to-door advisory 
service are based on the idea that citizens and local business need to be made aware 
of the personal co-benefits of climate protection: 
“Durch die Energiesparinitiative wird seit längerem ein Bewusstsein für Energiesparen 
und Energieeffizienz geschaffen. Hier wird seit vielen Jahren vermittelt: ‘Tue Gutes für 
die Umwelt und schone gleichzeitig deinen Geldbeutel.” 
 
In sum, Offenbach’s precarious financial situation posed a challenge to policymakers 
responsible for climate protection, which was tackled by focusing mostly on budget 
friendly measures, like advisory services and awareness campaigns. In this context, 
the most important argument to motivate citizens as well as local business to beco-
me active on their part was the reference to financial co-benefits, that is, cost sa-
vings. 
7.2.4 Comparing Results   
 As did the previous study on Hanover, the case of Offenbach confirms the statistical 
finding that TMNs accelerate diffusion via learning. City officials in Offenbach had is-
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sue specific interests and joined the network’s corresponding working groups to ob-
tain technical know-how from other cities. Moreover, this case study also confirms 
that processes of imitation have not played a role given that city officials did not feel 
pressurized by the Climate Alliance during the 9 years between Offenbach’s acces-
sion to the network and the council decision to adopt a local action plan. Instead, lo-
cal policy champions have used network membership to persuade other municipal 
stakeholders of the urgency for action.  
As to the relevance of regionally available information, the case of Offenbach con-
tradicts the statistical findings and the study on Hanover, as the city has substan-
tially profited from advice given by its more experienced neighbor Frankfurt. The 
comparison to Hanover suggests that pioneers tend to focus on the transnational 
sphere given that there is no local information available, whereas latecomers rely 
mostly on regionally available information. This confirms the finding of Kern et al. 
(2007) that clusters develop in the periphery of transnationally connected frontrun-
ners. 
A similar conclusion can be drawn with regard to the influence of national govern-
ments. Whereas Hanover had outpaced the national government in the early 1990s, 
Offenbach could draw – and was in part reliant – on national funding or subsidies for 
its climate related projects. This also confirms the statistical results that found na-
tional leadership and funding to be highly significant. In contrast, EU support seems 
to have not played a decisive role in Offenbach, as it was not brought up by city 
officials when interrogated about the influence of other political levels. 
Concerning local factors, the case of Offenbach shows that a lack of financial re-
sources can be overcome by adapting policy measures to budget constraints and by 
tapping private and external sources of funding. In addition, just like the study on 
Hanover, it contradicts the statistical finding that rising energy prices are irrelevant 
to local climate policy, as citizens’ commitment largely depends on personal co-
benefits. Finally, perceived vulnerability to climate change impacts has apparently 
not played a role in Offenbach, as interviewees did not make any reference to it. 
This is consistent with statistical results as well as the Hanover case.  




This thesis’ most consistent finding is that transnational municipal networks (TMNs) 
have significantly accelerated the diffusion of local climate strategies among Euro-
pean cities between 1992 and 2009. Whereas the results from Event History Analysis 
show that TMN membership increases the likelihood of a city adopting a local climate 
strategy by up to 17 times, the case studies of Hanover and Offenbach underline that 
pioneers and laggards alike seek and profit from expertise, contacts, and resources 
provided by the networks. This implies that TMNs impact member-cities predomi-
nantly via the acceleration of learning processes, which they achieve by increasing 
the availability of information, by multiplying contacts among members, and by en-
hancing their capacities to act locally on climate change. 
In contrast, imitation processes have not been accelerated via TMNs. Despite the set 
up of milestone and benchmarking systems, the share of previous adopters does not 
affect the likelihood of a network member to introduce a local climate strategy. This 
result also applies to cases in which a critical mass, comprising at least 30% of net-
work members, has adopted an action plan. Accordingly, norm cascades do not play a 
role among network constituencies. Likewise, additional years of membership de-
crease rather than increase the likelihood of a network member adopting a local cli-
mate strategy, which highlights that consistent non-compliance with network goals 
does not increase normative pressure. Thus, members either adopt a local climate 
strategy within the first years of membership or become passive. These statistical 
findings are consistent with results from the two case studies, which show that nei-
ther Hanover nor Offenbach felt pressurized by networks or network peers. This be-
came most obvious in the case of Offenbach, where city officials explicitly stated 
that the Climate Alliance does not keep track of its members’ progress. Instead, 
membership is used as an argument by local policy champions to persuade other local 
stakeholders of the urgency for action. 
As to the third diffusion process, competition, the case of Hanover shows that front-
runners among network members compete with each other for a progressive reputa-
tion, which is expected to yield economic benefits by means of enhancing a city’s at-
tractiveness. This effect could not be grasped statistically as network members were 
not subdivided in groups of pioneers and laggards. However, the finding suggests that 
TMNs have a chance of pushing pioneers towards sustained innovation by organizing 
contests and setting up schemes of recognition. 
In comparison to TMNs, regional information flows have been found to be less signifi-
cant. Results from EHA indicate that neither the presence of a pioneering city close 
by, nor the absolute number or the share of previous adopters among neighbors in-
fluence the likelihood of a city adopting a local climate strategy. Accordingly, diffu-
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sion along regional clusters, including processes of imitation and learning, has not 
played a role in the spread of local action plans – at least in aggregate. For pioneers, 
this result is confirmed by the case of Hanover, which shows that the city could not 
rely on regionally available information and was therefore eager to access the trans-
national sphere to obtain knowledge from pioneers in Canada and Scandinavia. In 
contrast, the case of Offenbach demonstrates that neighboring pioneers can consti-
tute an important source of advice for latecomers, as the city relied in part on ex-
pertise coming from Frankfurt’s energy department. Thus, available information 
from contiguous neighbors is relevant for latecomers, whereas expertise accessible 
within a 100km radius is not. In combination, these findings suggest that knowledge 
on local climate policy circulates first and foremost among pioneers in the transna-
tional sphere, before potentially spreading to their respective immediate peripher-
ies. This matches similar findings by Kern et al. (2007) concerning the dissemination 
of local agenda 21. 
Coordinative effects of decisions by superordinate governments, the third potential 
external driver of adoptions of local climate strategies, have been found to exert 
substantial influence, however, less so than TMNs. Especially where national manda-
tory requirements have been in force, that is, in France and Great Britain since 2008, 
a remarkable increase in adoptions of local climate strategies could be observed. 
This implies that the third wave of adoptions from 2007 to 2009 is in part the result 
of coercion rather than diffusion. In addition, national governments have fostered 
the spread of local climate strategies by providing municipalities with leadership and 
resources. As results from EHA show, strong national commitment to climate protec-
tion as well as the provision of know-how and funding substantially increase the like-
lihood of cities to adopt local climate strategies. Whereas Hanover had not been reli-
ant on support from the national government in the early 1990s, the case of Offen-
bach confirms these findings given that the city could make a qualitative leap in the 
elaboration of its climate strategy thanks to financial support from the Federal Minis-
try for the Environment. In addition, many of its other climate-related initiatives rely 
directly or indirectly on national subsidies. Overall, these results imply that pioneers 
have been less dependent on resources and encouragement coming from the national 
government than latecomers. The latter, in turn, seem to need this additional sup-
port in order to implement more ambitious local climate policies. 
As to the impact of EU support, results from EHA show that participation in climate 
related projects financed by the European Union significantly increases the likelihood 
of a city adopting a local climate strategy. As the case of Hanover demonstrates, ac-
cess to this financial support is often granted via TMNs, which facilitate the search 
for qualified partners among their constituencies. As Offenbach has not profited from 
EU support for the elaboration of local climate policies, these findings suggest that 
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mostly groups of pioneers, coordinated via TMNs, have the capacity to apply for – and 
thus eventually receive – funding from the EU. 
The local factors under study have been found to be less significant than TMN im-
pact. Results from EHA show that large differences in GDP per capita can explain 
non-adoption in one and adoption in another city, however, both case studies under-
line that cities implementing local climate strategies are not necessarily the richest. 
On the one hand, this is the case because additional financial resources like revenue 
from public utilities or investment from private sponsors can be tapped to facilitate 
local climate policy. On the other hand, a range of budget friendly initiatives like ad-
visory services and awareness campaigns enable municipalities to make progress de-
spite financial constraints. As to cost savings, statistical findings and case study re-
sults are in contradiction. Whereas EHA indicates that rising energy prices do not in-
crease the likelihood of a city adopting a local climate strategy, both case studies 
demonstrate that cost savings are a crucial argument for the motivation of citizens 
and local businesses to become active on their part. The reason for this divergence 
may be that local governments do not mechanically react to rising prices at specific 
moments but consistently refer to the possibility of saving money when advising local 
stakeholders. In contrast to this divergence, results on perceived vulnerability are 
unequivocal. Neither EHA nor the case studies provide evidence for the assumption 
that the likelihood to act locally on climate change increases with the perceived risk 
of becoming adversely affected by climate change.                 
Accordingly, also in comparison to other independent variables, TMNs, accelerating 
diffusion via learning, remain the most powerful explanatory factor for the overall 
dissemination of local climate strategies in Europe between 1992 and 2009. In refer-
ence to Busch & Jörgens’ framework (forthcoming:292-296) these findings imply that 
TMNs have been observed in successfully applying three out of the seven strategies 
for governance by diffusion. First and foremost, they have created and enhanced 
channels for transnational communication (1) by organizing issue specific working 
groups, arranging bilateral contacts, and facilitating their members’ search for part-
ners for joint projects. In addition, they have generated information (2) based on 
which expertise has been provided to members concerning the elaboration of local 
climate policies in general and climate strategies in particular. This has been espe-
cially relevant in Offenbach, where the network was directly involved in the set up of 
the city’s CO2 inventory and action plan. Accordingly, TMNs have also strengthened 
their members’ capacity to act (6) by injecting necessary know-how into city admini-
strations and by providing access to EU funds. Given that these strategies were de-
ployed to contribute to the mitigation of climate change – a global public good – one 
can conclude that TMNs have proven their capacity to govern by diffusion and have 
thus contributed to the governance of climate change (Andonova et al. 2009, Ostrom 
2010).  
Hakelberg, ffu-report 08-2011   76 
 
 
What has to be kept in mind, though, is that networks only reach part of their con-
stituencies via the aforementioned strategies. A large number of members remain 
passive and do not substantially change their behavior following accession. This calls 
the actual steering capacity of networks into question and implies that latecomers 
need additional support and encouragement especially from national governments. 
Given that cities crucially matter to climate policy due to their large share in overall 
emissions and their unique capacity to reduce per capita emissions via innovations in 
urban mobility and combined power and heat supply (see section 1.2), it is thus nec-
essary that TMNs, the EU, national governments, and private actors join forces in a 
polycentric approach to the governance of climate change that enables actors at all 
levels, including municipal governments, to make meaningful progress in climate pro-
tection (Ostrom 2010). In this context, initiatives like the Covenant of Mayors, which 
combines the EU’s capacities with those of TMNs and local governments, or C40’s 
partnership with the Clinton Foundation that taps private finances to enable local 
climate policy could serve as blueprints for the further orchestration of efforts by 
public and private, supra- and transnational actors in the governance of climate 
change (Abbott & Snidal 2010). If these polycentric initiatives were further devel-
oped, they could constitute a meaningful alternative to the governance of climate 
change via international regimes, turning municipalities from “laboratories of de-
mocracy” into laboratories of climate policy (Shipan & Volden 2008:840).                                 





Abbott, Kenneth W., and Duncan Snidal. 2010. International regulation without in-
ternational government: Improving IO performance through orchestration. The Re-
view of International Organizations 5, no. 3 (8): 315-344. 
 
Adler, Emanuel, and Peter M. Haas. 1992. Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World 
Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program. International Organiza-
tion 46, no. 01: 367-390.  
 
Alber, Gotelind, and Kristine Kern. 2009. Governing Climate Change in Cities: Modes 
of Urban Climate Governance in Multi-Level Systems. In OECD Conference Pro-
ceedings. Paris: OECD. http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/7/41449602.pdf. 
 
Andonova, Liliana B., Michele M. Betsill, and Harriet Bulkeley. 2009. Transnational 
Climate Governance. Global Environmental Politics 9, no. 2 (Mai 1): 52-73.  
 
Asch, Solomon. 1953. Social Psychology. New York: Prentice Hall. 
 
Asch, Solomon. 1951. Effects of group pressure upon the modification and distortion 
of judgment. In: Guetskow (ed.). Groups, leadership, and men. Carnegie Press. 
 
Bai, X. 2007. Integrating Global Environmental Concerns into Urban Management: The 
Scale and Readiness Arguments. Journal of Industrial Ecology 11, no. 2: 15-29. 
 
Barrett, Scott. 2007. Why cooperate?: the incentive to supply global public goods. 
Oxford [u.a.]: Oxford Univ. Press.  
 
Bauer, Michael, Hildegard Hogen, Ute Gräber-Seißinger, Achim Pollert, and Bernd 
Kirchner. 2004. Das Lexikon der Wirtschaft: Grundlegendes Wissen von A bis Z. 
Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. 
 
Berry, Frances Stokes, and William D. Berry. 1990. State Lottery Adoptions as Policy 
Innovations: An Event History Analysis. The American Political Science Review 84, 
no. 2 (Juni 1): 395-415. 
 
Betsill, Michele M., und Harriet Bulkeley. 2004. Transnational Networks and Global 
Environmental Governance: The Cities for Climate Protection Program. Interna-
tional Studies Quarterly 48, 471-493.  
 
Betsill, Michele, and Harriet Bulkeley. 2006. Rethinking Sustainable Cities: Multilevel 
Governance and the 'Urban' Politics of Climate Change. Environmental Politics 14, 
no. 1: 42.  
 
Betsill, Michele, und Harriet Bulkeley. 2007. Looking Back and Thinking Ahead: A 
Decade of Cities and Climate Change Research. Local Environment: The Interna-
tional Journal of Justice and Sustainability 12, no. 5: 447 - 456. 
 
Betsill, Michele M. 2001a. Mitigating Climate Change in US Cities: Opportunities and 
obstacles. Local Environment: The International Journal of Justice and Sustainabil-
ity 6, no. 4: 393 - 406. 




Betsill, Michele. 2001b. Acting Locally, Does it Matter Globally? The Contribution of 
U.S. Cities to Global Climate Change Mitigation. Paper prepared for the Open 
Meeting of the Human Dimensions of Global Environmental Change Research 
Community, Rio de Janeiro, 6-8 October 2001. 
 
Bruin, K., R. B. Dellink, A. Ruijs, L. Bolwidt, A. Buuren, J. Graveland, R. S. Groot, et 
al. 2009. Adapting to climate change in The Netherlands: an inventory of climate 
adaptation options and ranking of alternatives. Climatic Change 95, no. 1-2 (4): 
23-45.  
 
Bulkeley, Harriet. 2006. Urban sustainability: learning from best practice? Environ-
ment and Planning A 38, no. 6: 1029 – 1044. doi:10.1068/a37300. 
 
Bulkeley, Harriet, Anna Davies, Bob Evans, David Gibbs, Kristine Kern, and Kate 
Theobald. 2003. Environmental Governance and Transnational Municipal Networks 
in Europe. Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning 5, no. 3: 235. 
 
Bulkeley, Harriet, Heike Schroeder, Katy Janda, und Jimin Zhao. 2009. Cities and 
Climate Change: The role of institutions, governance and urban planning. Paper 




Busch, Per-Olof. 2006. The OECD Environment Directorate: The Art of Persuasion and 
Its Limitations. Global Governance Working Paper No. 20. 
http://www.glogov.org/?pageid=22  
 
Busch, Per-Olof, and Helge Jörgens. Forthcoming. Governance by diffusion: Interna-
tional environmental policy coordination in the era of globalization. Promotion 
eingereicht am Fachbereich Politik- und Sozialwissenschaften. Freie Universität 
Berlin. Oktober 2009. 
 
Busch, Per-Olof, and Helge Jörgens. 2005. The international sources of policy conver-
gence: explaining the spread of environmental policy innovations. Journal of Euro-
pean Public Policy 12 (Oktober): 860-884.  
 
Busch, Per-Olof, Helge Jorgens, and Kerstin Tews. 2005. The Global Diffusion of 
Regulatory Instruments: The Making of a New International Environmental Regime. 
The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 598, no. 1 
(März 1): 146-167.  
 
Busch, Per-Olof, and Helge Jörgens. 2005. International patterns of environmental 
policy change and convergence. European Environment 15, no. 2: 80-101. 
 
Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M., and Bradford S. Jones. 2004. Event History Modeling: A 
Guide for Social Scientists. Cambridge University Press. 
 
Carmin, JoAnn, Debra Roberts, and Isabelle Anguelovski. 2009. Planning Climate Re-
silient Cities: Early Lessons from Early Adapters. 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTURBANDEVELOPMENT/Resources/336387-
1256566800920/6505269-1268260567624/Carmin.pdf   
 
Hakelberg, ffu-report 08-2011   79 
 
 




Cooper, Richard. 2000. “International Approaches to Global Climate Change.” The 
World Bank Research Observer 15:145–172. 
 
Corfee-Morlot, Jan, Lamia Kamal-Chaoui, and Michael Donovan. 2009. Cities Climate 
Change and Multilevel Governance. In OECD Environmental Working Papers No. 14. 
Paris: OECD Publishing. 
 
Dhakal, Shobhakar. Urban Energy Use and Greenhouse Gas Emissions in Asian Mega-
Cities: Policies for a Sustainable Future | Clean Air Initiative. 
http://www.cleanairinitiative.org/portal/node/2385. 
 
Diercke. 1996. Diercke Weltatlas. Braunschweig: Westermann. 
 
DiMaggio, Paul J., and Walter W. Powell. 1983. The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional 
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields. American Socio-
logical Review 48, no. 2 (April): 147-160. 
 
Dolowitz, David P., and David Marsh. 2000. Learning from Abroad: The Role of Policy 
Transfer in Contemporary Policy-Making. Governance 13, no. 1: 5-23. 
 
Drezner, Daniel W. 2008. All politics is global: explaining international regulatory re-
gimes. Princeton University Press. 
 
Elkins, Zachary, and Beth Simmons. 2005. On Waves, Clusters, and Diffusion: A Con-
ceptual Framework. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science 598, no. 1 (März 1): 33-51.  
 
Fearon, James, and Alexander Wendt. 2002. Rationalism vs. Constructivism: A Skep-
tical View. In: Carlsnaes, Walter, Thomas Risse, and Beth Simmons. Handbook of 
international relations. London [u.a.]: Sage. 
 
Finnemore, Martha. 1993. International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: The 
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cutural Organization and Science Pol-
icy. International Organization 47, no. 4 (Autumn): 565-597. 
 
Finnemore, Martha, und Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. International Norm Dynamics and Po-
litical Change. International Organization 52, no. 04: 887-917. 
 
Fleming, P. D., und P. H. Webber. 2004. Local and regional greenhouse gas manage-
ment. Energy Policy 32, no. 6 (April): 761-771.  
 
Granberg, Mikael, und Ingemar Elander. 2007. Local Governance and Climate Change: 
Reflections on the Swedish Experience. Local Environment: The International Jour-
nal of Justice and Sustainability 12, no. 5: 537. 
 
Haas, Peter M. 1992. Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy 
Coordination. International Organization 46, no. 01: 1-35.  
 
Hardin, Garrett. 1968. The Tragedy of the Commons. Science 162, no. 3859 (Dezem-
ber 13): 1243-1248.  
 
Hakelberg, ffu-report 08-2011   80 
 
 
Hasenclever, Andreas, Peter Mayer, und Volker Rittberger. 1996. Interests, Power, 
Knowledge: The Study of International Regimes. Mershon International Studies Re-
view 40, no. 2 (Oktober 1): 177-228. 
 
———. 1997. Theories of international regimes. Cambridge studies in international re-
lations ; 55. Cambridge <<[u.a.]>>: Cambridge Univ. Press. 
 
Héritier, Adrienne, Christoph Knill, und Susanne Mingers. 1996. Ringing the changes 
in Europe: regulatory competition and the transformation of the state : Britain, 
France, Germany. Walter de Gruyter. 
 
Holgate, Claudia. 2007. Factors and Actors in Climate Change Mitigation: A Tale of 
Two South African Cities. Local Environment: The International Journal of Justice 
and Sustainability 12, no. 5: 471.  
 
Holzinger, Katharina, Helge Jörgens, and Christoph Knill. 2007. Transfer, Diffusion 
und Konvergenz von Politiken. Politische Vierteljahresschrift / Sonderheft. Wies-
baden: VS Verl. für Sozialwiss. 
 
Holzinger, Katharina, and Christoph Knill. 2005. Causes and conditions of cross-
national policy convergence. Journal of European Public Policy 12, no. 5: 775.  
 
Holzinger, Katharina, Christoph Knill, and Thomas Sommerer. 2008. Environmental 
Policy Convergence: The Impact of International Harmonization, Transnational 
Communication, and Regulatory Competition. International Organization 62, no. 
04: 553-587.  
 
Holzinger, Katharina, and Thomas Sommerer. 2011. ‘Race to the Bottom’ or ‘Race to 
Brussels’? Environmental Competition in Europe. JCMS: Journal of Common Market 
Studies 49, no. 2: 315-339. 
 
Hox, J. J. 2002. Multilevel analysis: techniques and applications. Routledge. 
 









IEA. 2009. Innovations in Multilevel Governance for Energy Efficiency. Information 
Paper Series. IEA/OECD Publishing. www.iea.org/papers/2009/mlg_final_web.pdf 
 
IEA. 2008. Climate Policy and Carbon Leakage: Impacts if the European Emissions 
Trading Scheme on Aluminium. Information Paper Series. IEA/OECD Publishing. 
www.iea.org/papers/2008/Aluminium_EU_ETS.pdf 
 
IPCC. 2007. Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change, February 11. 
 
Jollands, Nigel. 2008. Cities and Energy – a discussion paper. Paper presented at the 
OECD’s international conference on competitive cities and climate change. Milan, 
October 2008. www.oecd.org/dataoecd/54/18/42544964.pdf  




Jones, Emma, Matthew Leach, and Joanne Wade. 2000. Local policies for DSM: the 
UK's home energy conservation act. Energy Policy 28, no. 3 (März 1): 201-211 
 
Jörgens, Helge. 2004. Governance by Diffusion - Implementing Global Norms Through 
Cross-National Imitation and Learning. SSRN eLibrary (GOVERNANCE FOR 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT. THE CHALLENGE OF ADAPTING FORM TO FUNCTION, 
William M. Lafferty, Edward Elgar, eds). 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=652942. 
Kamal-Chaoui, Lamia, and Alexis Robert. 2009. Competitive Cities and Climate 
Change. OECD Regional Development Working Papers No. 2. OECD Publishing. 
 
Kathryn Harrison, and Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom. 2007. The Comparative Politics of 
Climate Change. Global Environmental Politics 7, no. 4. Global Environmental 
Politics: 1-18. 
 
Keck, M. E., and K. Sikkink. 1999. Transnational advocacy networks in international 
and regional politics. International Social Science Journal 51, no. 159: 89-101. 
 
Keohane, Robert O. 1973. Transnational relations and world politics. Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. 
 
Kern, Kristine, Claudia Koll, and Malte Schophaus. 2007. The diffusion of Local 
Agenda 21 in Germany: Comparing the German federal states. Environmental Poli-
tics Volume 16, no. Number 4 (August): 604-624. 
 
Kern, Kristine, Niederhafner, und Rechlin. 2005. Kommunaler Klimaschutz in 
Deutschland - Handlungsoptionen, Entwicklung und Perspektiven. WZB Discussion 
Paper SP IV 2005-101. 
 
Kern, Kristine, and Harriet Bulkeley. 2009. Cities, Europeanization and Multi-level 
Governance: Governing Climate Change through Transnational Municipal Net-
works*. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 47, no. 2: 309-332.  
 
Knill, Christoph. 2008. Europäische Umweltpolitik: Steuerungsprobleme und 
Regulierungsmuster im Mehrebenensystem. VS Verlag, Mai 27. 
 
Kousky, Carolyn, und Stephen H Schneider. 2003. Global climate policy: will cities 
lead the way? Climate Policy 3: 359-372. 
 
Lambright W. H, Changnon S. A, und Harvey L. D.D. Urban Reactions to the Global 




Lankao, Patricia Romero. 2007. How do Local Governments in Mexico City Manage 
Global Warming? Local Environment: The International Journal of Justice and 
Sustainability 12, no. 5: 519.  
 
Levi-Faur, David. 2005. The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism. The ANNALS of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science 598, no. 1 (März 1): 12 -32.  
 
McCarney, Patricia, Mohamed Halfani, und Eduardo Moreno. 2009. City Indicators on 
Climate Change: Implications for Policy Leverage and Governance. Paper pre-
sented at the Worldbank Urban Symposium on Climate Change. 







Mintrom, Michael. 1997. Policy Entrepreneurs and the Diffusion of Innovation. Ameri-
can Journal of Political Science 41, no. 3 (Juli): 738-770. 
 
Newell, Peter, und Harriet Bulkeley. 2010. Governing Climate Change. Taylor & Fran-
cis, April 2. 
 
Offenbach am Main. 2010. Integriertes Klimaschutzkonzept – Endbericht. 
http://www.offenbach.de/stepone/data/downloads/18/0a/00/IKSKgesamt.pdf  
 
Olson, Mancur. 1971. The logic of collective action: public goods and the theory of 
groups. Reprinted. Harvard economic studies ; 124. Cambridge, Mass. [u.a.]: Har-
vard Univ. Press. 
 
Ostrom, Elinor. 2010. A Polycentric Approach for Coping with Climate Change. SSRN 
eLibrary. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1494833#. 
 
Paterson, Matthew. 1996. Global warming and global politics. Routledge. 
 
Paterson, Matthew, and Michael Grubb. 1992. “The International Politics of Climate 
Change.” International Affairs 68:293–310. 
 
Raab-Steiner, Elisabeth, and Michael Benesch. 2010. Der Fragebogen: Von der For-
schungsidee zur SPSS/PASW-Auswertung. UTB, Juni. 
 
Risse-Kappen, Thomas. 1995. Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: non-state ac-
tors, domestic structures and international institutions. Cambridge studies in in-
ternational relations ; 42. Cambridge <<[u.a.]>>: Cambridge Univ. Press. 
 
Roberts, Debra. 2008. Thinking globally, acting locally — institutionalizing climate 
change at the local government level in Durban, South Africa. Environment and 
Urbanization 20, no. 2 (Oktober 1): 521 -537.  
 
Rose, Richard. 1991. What Is Lesson-Drawing? Journal of Public Policy 11, no. 1 
(Januar 1): 3-30. 
 
Schreurs, Miranda A. 2008. From the Bottom Up. The Journal of Environment & De-
velopment 17, no. 4 (Dezember 1): 343 -355.  
 
Shipan, Charles R., und Craig Volden. 2006. Bottom-Up Federalism: The Diffusion of 
Antismoking Policies from U.S. Cities to States. American Journal of Political Sci-
ence 50, no. 4: 825-843. 
Simmons, Beth A., Frank Dobbin, und Geoffrey Garrett. 2008. The global diffusion of 
markets and democracy. Cambridge University Press. 
 
Sippel, Maike, und Till Jenssen. 2009. What about local climate governance? A review 
of promise and problems. MPRA Paper. November. http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/20987/. 
 
Stern, Nicholas. 2007. The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review. Cam-
bridge University Press. 
 
Hakelberg, ffu-report 08-2011   83 
 
 
Sugiyama, Natasha Borges. 2008. Theories of Policy Diffusion. Comparative Political 
Studies 41, no. 2 (Februar 1): 193 -216. doi:10.1177/0010414007300916. 
 
Tanner, Thomas, Mitchell, und Polack. 2009. Urban Governance for Adaptation: As-
sessing Climate Change Resilience in Ten Asian Cities. IDS Working Papers - 315. 
http://www.ntd.co.uk/idsbookshop/details.asp?id=1069. 
 
Tews, Kerstin. 2004. “Diffusion als Motor globalen Politikwandels - Potentiale und 
Grenzen.” ffu-report 1–28. 
 
True, J., und M. Mintrom. 2001. Transnational Networks and Policy Diffusion: The 
Case of Gender Mainstreaming. International Studies Quarterly 45, no. 1: 27-57. 
 
World Bank. 2010. The World Development Report: Development and Climate 
Change. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2010/Resources/5287678-
1226014527953/WDR10-Full-Text.pdf   
 
Young, Oran R. 1997. Global governance: drawing insights from the environmental 
experience. MIT Press. 
 
Zahran, Sammy, Samuel D Brody, Arnold Vedlitz, Himanshu Grover, und Caitlyn 
Miller. 2008. Vulnerability and capacity: explaining local commitment to climate-
change policy. Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 26, no. 3. En-
vironment and Planning C: Government and Policy: 544-562. 
 
Internet Sources 
Act2 2011: http://www.concerto-act2.eu/. 
 
ADEME. 2010. Fiche climat-energie. 
http://www2.ademe.fr/servlet/KBaseShow?sort=-1&cid=96&m=3&catid=23373  
 
BMU 2011a: Klimaschutzinitiative. http://www.bmu-
klimaschutzinitiative.de/de/projekte_nki?p=1&d=450. (23.02.2011) 
 
BMVBS 2011: Elektromobilität-Modellregion Rhein-Main. 
http://www.bmvbs.de/SharedDocs/DE/Artikel/UI/modellregion-rhein-
main.html?nn=36210. (last access: 23.02.2011) 
 




C40 2011a : Climate Leadership Group - History of the C40. 
http://www.c40cities.org/about/. (15.02.2011) 
 
C40 2011b: Climate Leadership Group – Climate Change Action Plans. 
http://www.c40cities.org/ccap/ (23.02.2011) 
 
C40 2011c: Climate Leadership Group - C40 Cities - Affiliate cities. 
http://www.c40cities.org/cities/affiliate/. (l4.02.2011) 
 
C40 2011e: Climate Leadership Group - CCI City Programmes. 
http://www.c40cities.org/initiatives/ccicityprogrammes/. (24.02.2011) 




C40 2011f:  http://www.c40cities.org/initiatives/c40-urban-life.jsp. (24.02.2011) 
 
C40 2011g: http://www.c40cities.org/summit/2007/attendees.jsp. (24.02.2011) 
 
C40 2011d: Climate Leadership Group - Best practices. 
http://www.c40cities.org/bestpractices/. (24.02.2011) 
 




CCP 2011a: CCP Campaign. http://www.iclei-europe.org/ccp/ccp-campaign/ 
(17.02.2011) 
 
CCP 2011b: Tools and Links. http://www.iclei-europe.org/ccp/tools-and-
links/.(17.02.2011)  
 
CCP 2011c: http://www.iclei-europe.org/ccp/ccp-campaign/. (17.02.2011) 
 
CCP 2011d: http://www.climate-protection.eu/.(17.02.2011) 
 
CCP 2011e: Campaign Involvement. http://www.iclei-europe.org/ccp/campaign-
involvement/.(17.02.2011) 
 
Climate Alliance. 2011a: “Climate Alliance: Home.” 
http://www.klimabuendnis.org/home.html. (23.02.2011) 
 
Climate Alliance 2011b: Best-Practice-Beispiele. http://klimabuendnis.org/best-
practice0.html?&L=1. (23.02.2011) 
 
Climate Alliance 2011c: Tools. http://klimabuendnis.org/tools0.html?&L=1. 
(23.02.2011) 
 
Climate Alliance 2011d: Benchmarks. http://www.benchmark-kommunaler-
klimaschutz.net/. (23.02.2011) 
 
Climate Alliance 2011e: Geschichtlicher Rückblick. 
http://www.klimabuendnis.org/538.html?&L=1. (23.02.2011) 
 
Climate Cities Benchmark 2011: http://www.climate-cities-benchmark.net/. 
(23.02.2011) 
 
Climate Compass 2011a: Why a CLIMATE COMPASS? http://www.climate-
compass.net/_why.html. (21.02.2011) 
 
Climate Compass 2011b: Modules of the CLIMATE COMPASS methodology. 
http://www.climate-compass.net/_modules.html.(12.02.2011) 
 
Climate Compass 2011c: Materials. http://www.climate-
compass.net/materials.html. (17.02.2011) 
 
COM 2011a.  
http://www.eumayors.eu/about_the_covenant/coordination_and_support_en.htm. 
(10.02.2011) 




COM 2011b: http://www.eumayors.eu/benchmarks_of_excellence/index_en.htm. 
(23.02.2011) 
 
COM 2011c: http://www.eumayors.eu/covenant_cities/towns_cities_en.htm. 
(23.02.2011) 
 
COM 2011d: http://www.eumayors.eu/home_en.htm. (23.02.2011) 
 




Die Zeit. 2011: “Klimaflüchtlinge: Der große Treck” | Wirtschaft | ZEIT ONLINE. 
http://www.zeit.de/2009/42/Klimafluechtlinge. (28.01.2011) 
 







ELTIS 2011 EU Funding Programmes. 
http://www.eltis.org/Vorlage.phtml?mainID=455&id=456 (25.02.2011 
 
EM-DAT 2011: http://www.emdat.be/advanced-search. (25.02.2011) 
 
energie-cités. 2010: Membership Package 2010 http://www.energy-
cities.eu/IMG/pdf/membership_pack_2010_en.pdf  (23.02.2011) 
 
energie-cités 2011b: Les Ateliers Plan Climat Energie. http://www.energy-
cities.eu/Les-Ateliers-Plans-Climat-Energie,2126. (23.02.2011) 
 
energie-cités. 2011c: Best Practice Database. http://www.energy-
cities.eu/cities/case_studies.php?lang=en. (23.02.2011) 
 
energie-cités. 2011d : Publications. http://www.energy-cities.eu/-Publications,62-
.(23.02.2011) 
 
Energy Saving Trust 2011: Green Communities / UK Home - Energy Saving Trust. 
http://www.energysavingtrust.org.uk/cafe.(05.02.2011) 
 
ENGAGE 2011: http://www.citiesengage.eu/. (03.02.2011) 
 




































ICLEI 2011a: Local Governments for Sustainability : History. 
http://www.iclei.org/index.php?id=748. (17.02.2011) 
 
ICLEI 2011b: Local Governments for Sustainability : History. 
http://www.iclei.org/index.php?id=748. (17.02.2011) 
 
IEA 2011: Climate Change Database. http://www.iea.org/textbase/pm/?mode=cc. 
(28.01.2011) 
 
Intelligent Energy Projects 2011: 
http://ieea.erba.hu/ieea/page/Page.jsp?op=search. (28.01.2011) 
 




klima:aktiv 2011: e5 - Programm für energieeffiziente Gemeinden. 
http://www.klimaaktiv.at/article/archive/12058. (19.02.2011) 
 
















LIFE Projects 2011: Environment - LIFE by Theme. 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/life/project/Projects/index.cfm  (19.02.2011) 
 
OECD.Stat 2011: Consumer Prices (MEI). 
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=MEI_PRICES. (18.02.2011) 
 

















SESAC 2011: Sustainable Energy Systems in Advanced Cities - Other partners. 
http://www.concerto-sesac.eu/spip.php?rubrique120. (18.02.2011) 
 
SFOE  2011: The SwissEnergy programme. 
http://www.bfe.admin.ch/energie/00458/index.html?lang=en. (18.02.2011) 
 
SMILE 2009: http://www.smile-europe.org/frame1.html. (18.02.2011) 
 









Annex I: Providers of data on TMN accession dates 
 
CCP 
Javier Gómez Prieto 
Project Assistant, Climate and Air Team 




Phone: +49-761 / 36 89 2-0 
e-mail: ccp-europe@iclei.org  
 
Mabel Chow 
Project Assistant Intern, Climate and Air Team 








Stephanie Sternheimer  
Klima-Bündnis - Europäische Geschäftsstelle  
Galvanistr. 28 














2 Chemin de Palente 
F-25000 Besançon 
Tel: +33 3 81 65 36 87 
e-mail: blandine.pidoux@energy-cities.eu  
 
 
Annex II: Compendia of Questions 
Hanover 
Mit der Einsetzung der Klimaschutzleitstelle 1994 und der Verabschiedung des ersten Kli-
maschutzprogramms 1996, gehört Hannover zu den Pionieren lokaler Klimapolitik. 
-       Wie und wann entstand in der Stadtverwaltung, bzw. der Politik das Bewusstsein 
dafür, dass Klimaschutz auf lokaler Ebene möglich und sinnvoll ist? 
-       Gab es eine Person, bzw. Gruppe, die das lokale Engagement besonders gefördert 
hat? Falls ja, woher bezogen diese Personen ihr Wissen, wie wurden sie selbst für 
das Thema sensibilisiert? 
-       Woher bezog die Stadtverwaltung das Wissen, wie Klimaschutz auf lokaler Ebene 
umzusetzen ist? 
-       Welches Verhältnis bestand zu anderen Städten, die zeitgleich ähnliche Initiativen 
erarbeitet haben?  
  
Hannover ist bereits seit 1990 Mitglied des Klimabündnisses und von ICLEI. 
-       Wer gab den Anstoß, sich diesen Netzwerken anzuschließen? 
-       Was hat man sich von der Partizipation in Städtenetzwerken versprochen? Welche 
Anreize gab es, mitzumachen?  
-       In welcher Weise hat Hannover im Endeffekt von seinen Mitgliedschaften profitiert? 
Gibt es in dieser Hinsicht Unterschiede zwischen den Netzwerken? 
-       Wurden die Aktivitäten anderer Netzwerkmitglieder näher verfolgt? Wenn ja, wie 
wurde mit diesen Informationen umgegangen? 
        -    Auf welche Weise hat sich Hannover in die Aktivitäten der Netzwerke eingebracht? 
  
Eine Vorreiterrolle in einem neuen, vielen Menschen unbekannten Politikfeld zu übernehmen 
ist meistens mit Widerständen verbunden. 
-       Wie wurde die Notwendigkeit lokaler Klimapolitik gegenüber den verschiedenen lo-
kalen Akteuren begründet? 
Hakelberg, ffu-report 08-2011   90 
 
 
-       Welche Argumente wurden herangezogen, um das Thema zu „verkaufen“? 
-       Auf welche Weise wurde der lokale Klimaschutz anfangs in die kommunalen Ver-
waltungsstrukturen eingebettet? 
-       Wurde das Thema innerhalb der Stadtverwaltung sofort akzeptiert? Falls nein, wie 
wurde diese Akzeptanz geschaffen? 
  
Die meisten Kommunen haben mit finanziellen Engpässen und geringer werdenden Einnahmen 
zu kämpfen. Hannover gehörte Anfang der 90er nicht zu den reichsten Kommunen (gemessen 
am lokalen BIP pro Kopf). 
-       Warum konnte sich Hannover eine freiwillige Aufgabe wie den Klimaschutz damals 
leisten? 
-       Warum wurde dieses Thema anderen Investitionen vorgezogen und wie wurde dies 
gerechtfertigt? 
  
Als unterste Politikebene sind Kommunen vom regulativen Rahmen, den Land, Bund und EU 
vorgeben, abhängig. 
-       Welchen Einfluss hatte dieses regulative Korsett? Gab es in diesem Zusammengang 
Unterschiede zwischen den jeweiligen, übergeordneten Politikebenen? 
-       Welche Wirkung hatten klimapolitische Initiativen auf diesen Politikebenen auf die 
lokale Klimapolitik? 
  
Welche Ziele wurden mit der Einführung des ersten Klimaschutzprogramms verbunden? 
-       In Bezug auf die Reduzierung von CO2 Emissionen. 
-       In Zusammenhang mit anderen, nicht direkt mit der Abmilderung des Klimawandels 
verbundenen Bereichen. 
-       Welche Kriterien spielten bei der Instrumentenwahl eine Rolle? 
-       In welchen Bereichen (Energie, Verkehr, Stadtplanung) wurden hauptsächlich Maß-
nahmen ergriffen? Wie ist diese Auswahl zu begründen? 
- Welche Vorteile wurden mit einem, im Vergleich zu anderen Kommunen, frühzeiti-




-       Wie und wann entstand in der Stadtverwaltung, bzw. der Politik das Bewusstsein 
dafür, dass Klimaschutz auf lokaler Ebene möglich und sinnvoll ist? 
-       Gab es eine Person, bzw. Gruppe, die das lokale Engagement besonders ge-
fördert hat? Falls ja, woher bezogen diese Personen ihr Wissen, wie wurden sie 
selbst für das Thema sensibilisiert? 
-       Woher bezog die Stadtverwaltung das Wissen, wie Klimaschutz auf lokaler Ebene 




-       Welches Verhältnis bestand zu anderen Städten, die zeitgleich/ zuvor ähnliche 
Initiativen erarbeitet haben? 
Offenbach  ist Mitglied des Klimabündnisses. 
-       Wer gab den Anstoß, sich diesem Netzwerk anzuschließen? 
-       Was hat man sich von der Mitgliedschaft versprochen? Welche Anreize gab es, 
mitzumachen?  
-       Wurden die Aktivitäten anderer Netzwerkmitglieder näher verfolgt? Wenn ja, wie 
wurde mit diesen Informationen umgegangen? 
         -    Auf welche Weise hat sich Offenbach in die Aktivitäten des Netzwerks einge-
bracht? 
  
Klimapolitik ist für die Kommunen eine freiwillige Aufgabe. Es erschließt sich nicht sofort, 
warum eine einzelne Stadt etwas zur globalen Herausforderung der Emissionsminderung bei-
tragen sollte, während andere Städte bzw. ganze Weltregionen untätig bleiben.  
-       Wie wurde die Notwendigkeit lokaler Klimapolitik gegenüber den verschiedenen 
lokalen Akteuren begründet? 
-       Welche Argumente wurden herangezogen, um das Thema zu „verkaufen“? 
-       Auf welche Weise wurde der lokale Klimaschutz anfangs in die kommunalen Ver-
waltungsstrukturen eingebettet? 
-       Wurde das Thema innerhalb der Stadtverwaltung sofort akzeptiert? Falls nein, 
wie wurde diese Akzeptanz geschaffen? 
  
Die meisten Kommunen haben mit finanziellen Engpässen und geringer werdenden Einnahmen 
zu kämpfen. Offenbach gehört ebenfalls nicht zu den reichsten Kommunen (gemessen am lo-
kalen BIP pro Kopf). 
-       Warum kann sich Offenbach Investitionen in den Klimaschutz leisten? 
-       Warum wurde dieser Bereich anderen Investitionsfeldern vorgezogen und wie 
wurde dies gerechtfertigt? 
  
Als unterste Politikebene sind Kommunen vom regulativen und finanziellen Rahmen, den 
Land, Bund und EU vorgeben, abhängig. 
-       Welchen Einfluss hatte dieses regulative Korsett? Gab es in diesem Zusammen-
gang Unterschiede zwischen den jeweiligen, übergeordneten Politikebenen? 
-       Welche Wirkung hatten klimapolitische Initiativen auf diesen Politikebenen auf 
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die lokale Klimapolitik? 
-         Hätte Offenbach eine Klimastrategie entworfen, wenn auf Bundes- bzw. EU E-
bene die entsprechenden Fördergelder nicht vorhanden gewesen wären? 
  
 
Welche Ziele wurden mit der Einführung des Klimaschutzprogramms verbunden? 
 
 
-       In Bezug auf die Reduzierung von CO2 Emissionen. 
-       In Zusammenhang mit anderen, nicht direkt mit der Abmilderung des Klimawan-
dels verbundenen Bereichen. 
-       Welche Kriterien spielten bei der Instrumentenwahl eine Rolle? 
-       In welchen Bereichen (Energie, Verkehr, Stadtplanung) wurden hauptsächlich 
Maßnahmen ergriffen? Wie ist diese Auswahl zu begründen? 
-        Welche Vorteile für die Stadt wurden mit einem intensiven Engagement im Be-
reich Klimaschutz verbunden? 
 
 
